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Abstract 
There is a lack of knowledge regarding how public safety organizations communicate 
threat-related information at the local level. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory 
case study was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related infor-
mation between public safety agencies (law enforcement, fire services, emergency medi-
cal services, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The conceptual framework for the 
study was general systems theory. The sample for this study was a subset of 13 individu-
als from the larger population of approximately 50 subject matter experts who worked 
within four public safety agencies and had extensive experience analyzing and sharing 
threat-related information. Purposeful sampling was utilized for the study. Data were col-
lected through in-depth interviews. The findings of this study clearly identified several 
important themes related to sharing threat-related information between local public safety 
organizations: information flow, collaboration, participation with the state fusion center, 
and the complexity of sharing confidential information. I found that Honolulu public 
safety agencies are currently communicating through information flow within and be-
tween organizations; however, this flow of information is intermittent. I also found that 
threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law enforcement sensitive 
information, and is difficult to share between agencies. Inadequate threat-related infor-
mation sharing and poor collaboration among local public safety agencies may put the 
public at increased risk from violent attacks. The results of this study contribute to posi-
tive social change by identifying the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related in-
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Terrorism and violent extremism continue to dominate the 24-hour news cycle. 
One needs only to review the 2015 Paris attacks that had 130 fatalities (“BBC News,” 
2015), the 2017 assault at the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival that had 58 fatalities 
(Bui, Zapotosky, Barrett, & Berman, 2017), or numerous mall and school shootings 
across the United States (“Worst Mass Shootings,” 2019) to recognize that terrorism and 
violent extremism are on the rise globally (Husain, 2015). Concurrently, the information 
revolution is evolving at an exponential rate with more and more activity of daily life 
conducted online (Huda et al., 2018). With violent extremist organizations now able to 
communicate and recruit followers via the Internet, it is critical that public safety 
organizations analyze information from all available sources and share threat-related 
information between agencies (“Public Safety,” 2011). 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission, developed 
suggestions to protect the nation from another assault (“National Commission,” 2004). 
Several of the recommendations focused on sharing information between public safety 
agencies (“State and Major Urban,” 2014). Federal, state, and local governments have 
invested billions of dollars to protect the American public from terrorist and violent 
extremist attacks (Hesterman, 2019). A primary role of public safety departments is 
“prevention and protection of the public from dangers affecting safety” (“Public Safety 
Law,” 2014, para. 1).  
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The benefits of monitoring and analyzing threat-related information are 
numerous. A 2012 White House publication entitled, National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and Safeguarding, acknowledged that information sharing between public safety 
organizations increases their ability to prevent threats to the public. Public safety 
organizations across the United States have developed methods to monitor threat-related 
information from the Internet and other openly available sources. The challenge is how to 
effectively share this information between public safety agencies (Carter & Rip, 2013). 
Before 2001, the nation’s public safety organizations worked together when necessary, 
but rarely shared information. It took several years for public safety agencies to develop 
relationships, policies, and interoperable communications equipment to facilitate 
effective information sharing (Carter et al., 2017). Organizational cultures within 
agencies had to adapt to a new philosophy of interagency cooperation (“Better 
information sharing,” 2015).  
Currently, there is not a clear understanding of the benefits and challenges of 
information sharing between local public safety agencies. Although there is much data 
about how federal agencies exchange threat-related information (Carter et al., 2017; 
Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Vacca, 2019), there is a lack of information on how local 
public safety agencies share this same type of data. Over the last decade, challenges to 
information sharing between local public safety organizations have emerged, but only a 
small number of these challenges have been documented in the literature. Information 
sharing between local agencies is proving to be much more difficult than it once 
appeared. It is well known that the organizational and political culture of agencies can 
3 
 
impede the process of information sharing (Mah, 2014). Communication equipment 
technology differences may also limit information exchange but are easier to resolve than 
cultural issues (Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2014). What is not known are the 
challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information 
between one another for the purpose of promoting public safety. Researchers do not fully 
understand the benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies, due to 
limited research on this issue (Carter et al., 2017). This lack of knowledge is problematic 
because local agencies hold the primary responsibility of responding to public safety 
threats.  
In reviewing the literature, I found no studies that focused on the specific benefits 
and challenges of sharing information between local public safety organizations in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. Hawaii presents a unique case because unlike the contiguous 48 states 
and Alaska, should something happen, mobilizing help from the mainland is logistically 
more complicated. Understanding how threat information is shared in Hawaii is thus 
critical because of its isolation. The findings of this study may help to fill this gap in 
knowledge. 
All modes of communication between agencies must be utilized to provide for a 
collaborative approach to preparing for and responding to events that affect public safety. 
A unique and evolving information resource used by public safety organizations (law 
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services [EMS], and public health) is 
known as open source information. It is essentially any information that is openly 
available to the public (“Intelligence,” 2013). Public safety organizations in most U.S. 
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metropolitan areas are now equipped to monitor open source information on the Internet 
and analyze it for potential threats to the public. If impending threats are discovered, it is 
important that the information is effectively shared with other public safety organizations 
in the region. The benefits and challenges that these organizations face when sharing 
threat-related information between agencies was the topic of this study.  
Chapter 1 will include a discussion of the background and the need for 
information sharing and collaboration between agencies and the rationale to public safety. 
I will discuss the problem for the study and the purpose and provide a brief overview of 
the benefits and challenges that public safety agencies face. The chapter also includes an 
overview of general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014), which served as 
the conceptual framework for the study, and how it relates to sharing of information and 
collaboration. The nature of the study is also discussed. Limitations, delimitations, and 
assumptions are presented. Chapter 1 concludes with a rationale for performing the study 
and an introduction to the literature review in Chapter 2. 
Background of the Study 
Valuable threat-related information can be obtained from analyzing publicly 
available information on the Internet. There is often information uncovered in an initial 
attack that may have the potential of stopping more attacks when effective collaboration 
occurs with the appropriate public safety agencies (Chermak et al., 2013). The rapid 
communication of threat-related information is vital immediately following an attack, but 
it comes with challenges.  
5 
 
After the San Bernardino (Schmidt & Masood, 2015) and Orlando attacks (Ellis et 
al., 2016), the connections between these two terrorist plots, occurring in vastly different 
areas of the United States, became evident to law enforcement agencies. This knowledge 
reinforced why it is so important to analyze threat-related information before and after an 
attack. The benefits of monitoring and analyzing open source information are immense 
but are still not completely known (Carter et al., 2017). Much work still needs to be done 
to meet the challenges involved in collaboration among public safety agencies (Carter et 
al., 2017). Public safety agencies across the nation must adapt to a new asymmetrical 
threat environment and elevate threat-related information sharing to a high priority within 
their organizations. 
Before 2001, U.S. public safety organizations worked together when necessary, 
but rarely shared information. Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the 9/11 
Commission pointed to a series of suggestions, that if implemented, would better protect 
the nation. Many of the recommendations pertained to increased “sharing of threat-
related information between federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners” (“State and 
Major Urban,” 2014, para. 1). The 9/11 Commission acknowledged that it was vitally 
important that this information sharing occur between all agencies that are responsible for 
the public’s safety, not only law enforcement organizations (“National Commission,” 
2004). A 2012 White House Publication entitled, National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and Safeguarding, affirms that the nation’s security “depends on our ability to 
share the right information, with the right people, at the right time” (p. 1). Chermak, 
Carter, Carter, McGarrell, and Drew (2013) argue that the use of intelligence methods has 
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enhanced law enforcement agencies ability to prevent threats to the public throughout the 
U.S. 
Hu, Knox, and Kapucu (2014) explained that it took nearly a decade for public 
safety organizations to see the benefits of exchanging threat-related information and 
“shift from a centralized command and control system to a more collaborative approach” 
(p. 699). New policies had to be developed and implemented, communications equipment 
had to be purchased or retrofitted with interoperable capabilities, and organizational 
cultures had to adapt to a philosophy of information sharing (Hu et al., 2014). Although 
there are a multitude of social media communication platforms that are consistently used 
by the public, there continues to be increased scrutiny of public safety organizations’ 
sharing of threat-related open source information due to privacy concerns (Carter et al., 
2017). Public safety organizations monitoring of social media has raised privacy concerns 
throughout the nation. Therefore, it is important that agencies develop privacy policies 
and make them available on their websites notifying the public of how they plan to 
monitor social media data. 
Benefits of Collaboration 
What is known and documented from a thorough review of the current literature 
are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies, but 
little is known of the challenges that are faced (Carter et al., 2016). The sharing of 
information between public safety organizations can increase the agency leaders’ ability 
to identify and prevent threats to the public (“National Strategy for Information Sharing,” 
2012). The November 2015 Paris attacks involved trained attackers targeting numerous 
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locations throughout the city. The attackers used high-powered automatic weapons and 
suicide vests making the attack a complex and well executed operation that took weeks if 
not months of planning (Witte & Morris, 2015). Following the attack, European security 
experts pointed out that “poor information-sharing among intelligence agencies, a 
threadbare system for tracking suspects across open borders and an unmanageably long 
list of homegrown extremists to monitor” (para. 2) were factors contributing to the deadly 
attack (Witte & Morris, 2015). French officials maintain that information sharing 
between public safety agencies may prevent, or at least reduce, the impact of future 
attacks.  
Huyck (2015) pointed out that the specifics of information sharing between public 
safety agencies have not yet been adequately defined. Information sharing occurs in 
various forms and at different levels depending on the specific organizations involved 
(Huyck, 2015). Whenever an attack on the public takes place, the need for the 
coordination of information sharing across all first responder agencies rapidly increases 
(“Orlando Terror Attack,” 2015). To facilitate the stream of information that is monitored 
and shared between public safety agencies, coordination has to be facilitated from the top 
down.  
Information exchange at the operational level requires a well-designed 
communication system that has been developed specifically for the sharing of real-time 
actionable information between public safety agencies (Huyck, 2015). Also, in order for 
first responders to share information effectively, they must have rehearsed the procedures 
multiple times during realistic training scenarios.  
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Challenges to Collaboration 
The challenges of utilizing and sharing threat-related information have also come 
into play over the last decade, but little is known of these challenges in the literature. 
Information sharing between local, state, and federal partners is much more difficult than 
it appears. Agencies organizational culture and political posture often come into play, 
which can slow down the flow of information between entities (Mah, 2014). Technology 
differences between organizations can also limit information flow.  
A common thread between many of the recent terror attacks is that government 
agencies had threat-related information linked to the suspects before the attack, but the 
information was not initially recognized as critical and was not effectively shared to local 
public safety officials (Ellis et al., 2016). Law enforcement officials are now aggressively 
identifying potential threats through monitoring open source and social media sources. 
However, if the information is not shared with other public safety organizations, critical 
threat information that may be necessary to avert a future attack may remain undeveloped 
and therefor unusable.  
There is significant literature on information sharing between federal and local 
agencies throughout the U.S., but I found no studies that focus on the specific benefits 
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations 
in Honolulu, Hawaii. Hawaii presents a unique case because unlike the contiguous 48 
states and Alaska, should something happen, mobilizing help from the mainland is 
logistically more complicated. Understanding how threat information is shared in Hawaii 
is critical because of the state’s isolation from the rest of the nation. The findings of this 
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study will help to fill this gap in literature by determining the benefits and challenges of 
sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
The participants for this study will be current, or former, subject matter experts (SMEs) 
experts who have extensive experience working in an information-sharing role in 
Honolulu public safety organizations. A presentation of the findings of this study will 
extend the existing literature on the benefits and challenges of information sharing 
between public safety organizations. It will be interesting to see the challenges and 
benefits that each report, and how these SMEs believe that the process of sharing 
information between public safety organizations can be improved.  
Problem Statement 
The overarching problem addressed in this study is the importance of 
communication between public safety agencies as they manage serious emerging threat-
related issues such as terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the federal 
government established guidelines to improve the communication and coordination 
between public safety organizations in order to prevent future terrorist attacks 
(“Homeland Security,” 2016). Public safety organizations throughout the nation have 
used these guidelines to establish policies in an effort to improve information sharing 
between agencies. 
There is reliable information in the literature about the sharing of information 
between federal and local agencies (e.g., Carter et al., 2017; Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 
2010) but there is a lack of knowledge on information sharing between local agencies. 
This is problematic because local agencies are on the front lines of the struggle against 
10 
 
terrorism and are the nation’s first layer of defense. Researchers and policy makers do not 
understand the benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies (Carter et 
al., 2017), which, given their unique threat setting, should be working closely together. It 
is not just communication between law enforcement agencies that is important but 
communication across all public safety agencies, including EMS, fire services, and public 
health. In an ideal world, local public agencies would have excellent interagency 
communication, and everyone would respond effectively when a public safety event 
happens. In reality, policy makers do not know if this is the case because research has not 
been done in this area.  
Research involving terrorist and violent extremist activity has demonstrated a lack 
of communication and coordination of efforts to thwart attacks (“National Commission,” 
2004). Examples of this lack of communication are the Boston Marathon (Hu et al., 
2014), the San Bernardino (Schmidt & Masood, 2015), and the Orlando terror attacks 
(Ellis et al., 2016), all of which shared similarities among the attackers. Threat-related 
information sharing between local, state, and federal partners is often difficult, but could 
have prevented some of these events from occurring at the outset, according to experts 
(Chermak et al., 2013).  
The benefits are more obvious when terror attacks are thwarted, such as the 
unsuccessful 2015 Joshua Ryne Goldberg attack on a 9/11 Memorial event in Kansas 
City, Missouri (Ellis & Botelho, 2015). But more terror attacks can be prevented if all 
agencies cooperate and coordinate their efforts. Loss of life may be prevented if 
challenges to threat-related information sharing between local public safety organizations 
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are identified and eliminated (Chermak et al., 2013). The steady increase in violent 
attacks and other threat-related public safety issues is the reason this research is so 
important.  
The gap in the literature is that researchers do not know how public safety 
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Therefore, it is 
unknown whether there are challenges or benefits to sharing threat-related information 
between local public safety agencies in the United States. The findings of this study may 
help to fill this gap in the literature by providing insight on the perceived benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits 
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law 
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on 
Honolulu for several reasons. Honolulu is a moderate sized city and faces many of the 
same challenges as other cities in the continental United States, including the need to 
share information across agencies in order to manage emerging threat-related issues. 
However, Honolulu is unique because unlike other cities it is remote and isolated, being 
approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. Assistance from other states may not be 
available for several days due to shipping transit time (“Pasha Hawaii,” 2019). As a 
result, there is an increased need to ensure interagency information sharing is occurring to 
facilitate the region’s ability to manage an attack. 
12 
 
The gap in the current literature is that researchers do not know how public safety 
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. It is essential that 
agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, according to Chermak et al., 
2013. Due to their unique situation, Honolulu public safety agencies provide an excellent 
opportunity for this research. The participants for this study were individuals who had at 
least 15 years’ experience sharing threat-related information between public safety 
organizations in Honolulu. The findings should provide a unique understanding of how 
public safety organizations currently share threat-related information encounter 
challenges, and how these challenges differ between organizations.  
Research Questions 
I sought to answer three research questions (RQs) for this qualitative exploratory 
case study. The questions were aimed at exploring the benefits and challenges that exist 
in sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu, 
Hawaii.  
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information 
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information 




This research was a phenomenological study. I used general systems theory as the 
conceptual framework because it effectively describes how information is exchanged 
between public safety organizations to protect the population from attacks. The theory 
also provided a conceptual platform to explore the specific research questions of this 
study. The goal of the research was to explore how agencies within the Honolulu public 
safety system are communicating with one another. I explored how public safety systems 
are interacting to create a cohesive response when needed. 
Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another 
within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts” 
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). In 1936 Ludwig von Bertalanffy first 
proposed general systems theory and the theory was expanded upon in the 1960s by Ross 
Ashby (“General Systems Theory,” 2014). Von Bertalanffy (1968) stated that systems 
were comprised of a series of components that are in constant interaction with their 
environment.  
General system theory can be defined as “the transdisciplinary study of the 
abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or 
temporal scale of existence” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). A system is often 
described as consisting of four things. The first are objects, the second attributes, the third 
is a relationship between those attributes, and the fourth is that the systems exist within a 
setting, or environment (“Communication Theories,” 2019). Systems are essentially a set 
of objects, or variables “that affect one another within an environment and form a larger 
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pattern that is different from any of the parts” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). 
Because elements in systems are constantly interacting with one another, when one part 
of a system changes it results in a change somewhere else within the system 
(“Communication Theories,” 2019). 
General systems theory will best guide the research to answer this study’s 
research questions. The theory has been used for several decades to study federal, state, 
and local government organizations. General systems theory is useful when studying the 
organizational changes and development of a community’s public safety system because 
it allows the researcher to explore the interconnection between individual agencies, or 
subsystems. When public safety organizations within the same region share relevant 
threat information with one another, it prompts other agencies within that region to 
prepare for, or possibly counter the threat. Government public safety agencies work 
together as a system to protect the public. Therefore, if miscommunication of threat-
related information occurs in one agency within a system, it can lead to poor operational 
decisions being made in another agency within the system, and potentially lead to a 
failure of the system to protect the public.  
 Because public safety systems are constantly interacting with one another, when 
one part of a system changes, it will result in a change somewhere else within the 
structure (“Communication Theories,” 2019). As public safety analysts monitor the 
Internet and social media for terms, phrases, and threat-related indicators, they identify 
risks and then notify other public safety organizations within their regional network to 
effectively address the threat (“Public Safety,” 2011). 
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The sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations is 
vital to improving law enforcement’s ability to uncover and stop violent attacks before 
they occur. Analysts at public safety organizations throughout the U.S. have the 
capability to research and analyze multiple forms of information from all regions of the 
nation, fusing local, regional, and national threat information together to uncover possible 
threats (“Public Safety,” 2011). 
State and local fusion centers are helping to integrate public safety organizations 
into an information-sharing environment. As public safety analysts collect and analyze 
information from multiple sources, they pass threat-related information to state fusion 
centers and then up to the federal government. Federal agencies share the information 
with their intelligence apparatus, add additional analysis, pass it back to state fusion 
centers and then finally back to the local public safety agencies. This circular information 
sharing, and collaboration process helps to protect the public from potential attacks.  
As geopolitical situations evolve and develop, organizations with the 
responsibility for guarding the public’s safety must adapt to a new asymmetrical threat 
environment through improved domestic intelligence (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). Fusion 
centers, which are strategically located throughout all 50 states, are currently in a position 
to take on an expanding role in our nation’s domestic security by helping to protect the 




Nature of the Study 
A qualitative design was determined the best method to analyze this study’s 
research information. Data was collected through interviews with SMEs, either current or 
recently retired, from four fields of public safety in Honolulu, Hawaii. The primary 
source of data was derived from in-depth interviews through conversational style 
discussions with the participants utilizing open-ended questions. 
To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions 
for this study, I performed a field test of the questions prior to the actual interviews. I 
went into the field and interviewed three individuals who had “expert knowledge about 
the population and research topic to provide feedback on the appropriateness of the 
questions being asked and how the questions are being asked in relation to the study 
focus” (“Field Testing,” 2016). These experts helped me refine the interview questions 
and develop appropriate follow up questions, inviting more conversation along a similar 
line of thought (“Field Testing,” 2016). The interview questions are closely linked to this 
study’s research questions. 
 Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. Individuals that had the depth of 
knowledge necessary to clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and 
shared between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii, were selected. All of the 
participants had at least 15 years of experience sharing information between public safety 
organizations. Individuals who had recently retired were also included in the study, if 
they met the selection criteria. There were three primary reasons to include this group in 
the sampling criterion. First, all of the participants had extensive experience in their 
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respective fields of public safety. Second, because they were no longer associated with 
the organizations there was no political pressure on them to answer the questions in a 
politically sensitive manor. Third, this research was an opportunity to capture extensive 
institutional knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost 
forever.  
 The primary purpose was to explore communication across agencies and examine 
the benefits and challenges of sharing threat related information between public safety 
agencies in Hawaii. The individuals selected were a part of the culture of these 
organizations and knew the social dynamics of each agency. Patton (2002) points out, 
“qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples, even single 
cases (N=1), selected purposely” (p.230). It was important to select participants that had a 
rich knowledge of their environment in order to build a quality research data set. Patton 
explained, “The logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich 
cases for study in depth” (p.230). This process allows a thorough understanding of the 
information in context.  
 The sample for this study was a subset of SMEs from the larger population within 
four fields of public safety that had extensive experience analyzing and sharing threat-
related information between agencies. One gap that we see in sharing of threat-related 
information is who is included and how do we involve public health (Hospitals, CDC, 
etc.) in the process. I included agencies that had representatives assigned to the Hawaii 
State Fusion Center, because these are the organizations that are active during an event. 
The larger population currently consists of less than 50 SME’s, who work within the 
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local public safety organizations and actively share threat-related information between 
agencies. For purposes of anonymity, three SMEs were selected from each of four fields. 
All individuals had at least 15 years’ experience. It would not have been feasible to 
interview every member of the entire population for this study. 
 Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. I identified SMEs in each of the 
four fields of public safety in Honolulu. Participants for the study were determined based 
on whether or not they met the inclusion criteria. Approximately three individuals from 
each field of public safety were interviewed, resulting in 13 cases, which was adequate 
for the study. This number of case interviews provided a clear understanding of the 
benefits and challenges associated with sharing threat-related information.  
 Each SME was contacted one month prior to the interview and the purpose of the 
study was explained. An email inviting them to participate in the study was mailed along 
with a consent form which was completed and returned to the researcher via email. The 
participants were contacted again by email prior to the interview to confirm a mutually 
agreed upon interview date and time. Each participant was given the choice to be 
interviewed via teleconference, the participants private residence, or a private meeting 
room at the Hawaii Public Library. The interviews were conducted outside of regular 
work hours. The researcher was the only person who knew the identity of the participants 
and did not disclose their names. Demographic details and site descriptions that might 
permit a reader to deduce the identity of a participant were withheld. Participants names 
and/or contact info was not recorded in the research records. During the interview phase 
of data collection, a review of the consent form was offered to ensure that the participants 
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were aware of the entire interview procedure. Consent forms did not require signatures if 
the participant indicated consent by returning a completed form via email with an 
identifying number.  
 In order to capture accurate information for a qualitative data set, I utilized voice 
recordings along with field notes. The answers were transcribed into written text and 
NVivo qualitative analysis software was used for data coding. The purpose of coding was 
to allow themes to emerge from the data that made sense to the researcher. I used a 
coding strategy that consisted of reading through all of the transcripts to gain a deep 
understanding of what took place during the interviews, while simultaneously reviewing 
my written notes. I then classified the data by “aggregating text into small categories of 
information” and then assigning an appropriate label (Creswell, 2013, p.184). Lastly, I 
separated all of the codes into four or five overarching themes that I referenced while 
writing my discussion of the data. A more thorough explanation of the methodology is 
presented in Chapter 3.  
Operational Definitions 
Centers of Excellence: “A team, a shared facility or an entity that provides 
leadership, evangelization, best practices, research, support and/or training for a focus 
area” (“Inquvent,” 2013, para. 1).  
Counterintelligence: An “organized activity of an intelligence service designed to 
block an enemy’s sources of information, to deceive the enemy, to prevent sabotage, and 
to gather political and military information” (“Counterintelligence,” n.d., para. 1).  
20 
 
Fusion center: Units that are located in every state in the nation and that “serve as 
focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, 
and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, 
tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners” (“Homeland Security,” 2014, para. 
1). 
General systems theory: “Systems theory was proposed in the 1936 by the 
biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and further developed by Ross Ashby. Von 
Bertalanffy emphasized that real systems are open to, and interact with, their 
environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, 
resulting in continual evolution” (“General Systems Theory,” 2014, para. 5). 
Intelligence analyst: An analyst whose primary role is “intelligence collecting, 
evaluating and processing personnel” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 2015, para. 1). 
These positions “may involve gathering information from a variety of channels, including 
human intelligence, other intelligence agencies, electronic and Internet surveillance, 
interrogations, and criminal investigations” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 2015, 
para. 1).  
Intelligence Community: “A group of government agencies and organizations that 
carry out intelligence activities for the United States government; headed by the Director 
of Central Intelligence” (“United States Intelligence,” 2015, para. 1).  
Open source intelligence (OSINT): Information utilized by the military, public 
safety, or the nation’s intelligence community that is publicly available to anyone. This 
important data source “plays an essential role in giving the national security community 
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as a whole insight and context at a relatively low cost” (“Intelligence: Open Source,” 
2013, para.1).  
Open Source Center: A government unit, operated by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), that is the “focal point for the intelligence community’s 
exploitation of open source material. It also aims to promote the acquisition, 
procurement, analysis, and dissemination of open source information, products and 
services throughout the U.S. Government” (“Aftergood,” 2014, para. 1). 
Public safety: The primary responsibility is to protect the public from harm. It is 
often used in the context of a government organization that has a mission to provide 
protection to the general public from dangerous natural and/or manmade events. 
Organizations such as law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health agencies 
fall into this category (“Public Safety,” 2016, para. 1).  
Situational awareness: As defined by the United States Coast Guard, “the ability 
to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is 
happening to the team with regards to the mission. More simply, it is the practice of 
knowing what is going on around you” (“United States Coast Guard,” 1998, para. 1). 
Threat-related information: Information that indicates a potential risk related to 
“an approaching or imminent menace; [a] negative event that can cause a risk to become 
a loss; … [or] a  natural phenomenon such as an earthquake, flood, storm, or a man-made 




For this academic research study, the following assumptions were made. It was 
assumed that the individuals from four fields of public safety in Honolulu had been 
appropriately trained in analyzing and sharing threat-related information. It was also 
assumed that each respondent would answer the questions to the best of their ability. It is 
important that the participants relay their personal experience working with threat-related 
information within the standard operating procedures established by their organization. It 
was assumed that the interviews followed the guidelines of Walden University and that 
the recordings made during the interview accurately represented the interview session. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The sample selection for this study focused on four fields of public safety in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. This study purposely did not collect information from across the entire 
nation, as the enormous dataset would be unmanageable. Fugard & Potts, (2015), point 
out that qualitative research sample size should be “small enough to manage the material 
and large enough” to allow a thorough understanding of the participants experience 
(p.670; Sandelowski, 1995). 
The intent and design were to capture the experiences of SMEs in public safety 
within a particular region. Individuals who had at least 15 years’ experience sharing 
threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu were the 
participants. Individuals recently retired were selected if they met the research study 
selection criteria. Because these individuals were no longer associated with their 
organizations there was no political pressure on them to answer the questions in a 
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politically sensitive manor. This research was also an opportunity to capture extensive 
institutional knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost. 
This study will help fill a gap in the literature by determining the perceived benefits and 
challenges of sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations in 
Honolulu, Hawaii.  
Limitations 
Limitations were present during the data collection process. Because the SMEs 
often worked with sensitive information, they were asked to keep the content of their 
conversations at the non-sensitive level. They were asked to speak openly and candidly, 
while at the same time not disclosing confidential material. During the interviews, the 
participants were very cautious when discussing internal agency issues and did not to 
disclose sensitive or otherwise confidential information.      
Significance 
The significance of this study was to determine the benefits and challenges of 
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in order to better 
protect the population. The research will advance the knowledge of prior published 
literature on information sharing between public safety organizations.  
Some of the most successful defense organizations utilize information sharing as 
a key tactical component. Modern security practices “are built around the concept of 
fusion,” or sharing of information (Kalu, 2009, p.34). A continuous learning strategy 
combined with effective information flow between security agencies can significantly 
reduce the odds of an attack (Kalu, 2009).  
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It is inevitable that public safety officials will increasingly become more involved 
in open source and social media data analysis processes. This study will shed light on 
how effective information exchange can assist public safety agencies with future 
terrorism challenges.  
Implications for Social Change 
Sharing the results of this study will create positive social change by identifying 
the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public 
safety agencies. As public safety organizations throughout the nation develop their ability 
to share threat-related information, they should review lessons learned from organizations 
examined in this study that have faced this important and complex undertaking. 
Horrific events such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al., 2014), the Paris attacks 
(“BBC News,” 2105), and the assault on an Orlando, Florida nightclub (Ellis, Fantz, 
Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016), are a stark reminder that individuals with aspirations of 
domestic terrorism can be readily recruited and trained to carryout violent acts. Organiza-
tions with the responsibility for public safety must adapt to a new asymmetrical threat en-
vironment through improved domestic intelligence. With violent extremist organizations 
now able to communicate and recruit followers via the Internet, it is even more critical to 
monitor all available communication sources and share threat-related information be-
tween public safety organizations.  
Summary 
Public safety organizations are forming relationships and working in a 
collaborative manor to address the social phenomenon of terrorism and violent 
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extremism. However, more work needs to be done to ensure that threat-related 
information is shared seamlessly between all organizations that have a responsibility to 
keep the public safe.  
The findings of this study will help to fill a gap in literature by determining the 
benefits and challenges of information sharing between public safety organizations. The 
purpose of this research was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-
related information between public safety organizations (law enforcement, fire services, 
EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The proliferation of the Internet and global 
communication along with the rise of violent extremism has brought together a new and 
dangerous phenomenon. This research will help to identify benefits and challenges of 
sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in a mid-sized 
metropolitan city and what can be done to improve this information exchange.  
Qualitative design was determined appropriate to explore the responses to the 
unique set of research questions for this study. General systems theory was utilized as the 
conceptual framework for the study. The findings of this research may assist other 
agencies across the nation share threat-related information in a more effective manner. 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Public safety organizations across the United States are engaged in the process of 
enhancing their open source information collection capabilities. At the same time the 
information revolution is growing at a rapid pace. It is crucial that public safety 
organizations keep up with the current pace of technology. Local public safety agencies 
often face challenges in using technology to share threat-related information that are 
specific to their individual organizations. Information sharing in today’s environment is 
complex and dynamic and public safety organizations must employ individuals who 
understand the latest communication technology (Kozuch & Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 
2015). The primary purpose of this research was to examine the benefits and challenges 
of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu, 
Hawaii. 
Individuals throughout the world now have the ability to communicate on multi-
ple platforms in real-time. Complex media such as high-resolution video and images can 
be sent instantly around the globe. Communication techniques that were once expensive 
and complex are now available to anyone with a smart phone. According to Boczkowski, 
Matassi, and Mitchelstein (2018), a recent survey indicated that “98% of those between 
18- and 29-years-old used social media and accessed 3.5 platforms on average” (p. 250) 
Terrorist organizations exploit these technology innovations to expand their global foot-
print (Cohn, 2013).  
Pivotal information relating to situational awareness and threat identification re-
sides in open source information and social media. Recent geopolitical events across the 
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world have been shaped in part through social media. In the recent political unrest exhib-
ited during the 2010-2011 Arab spring, for instance, major protests in the streets were of-
ten proceeded by heated conversations of political unrest online (Howard et al., 2011, p. 
3). In Egypt and Tunisia, protest organizers used social media extensively to connect with 
activists. Frequently, these online political conversations were picked up by news media  
outlets which spread the information regionally (Howard et al., 2011, p.3).  
In the 21st century, not only are digital technologies evolving at an accelerated 
rate, but historical evidence also illustrates “a larger trend of ever-more-rapid adoption of 
new technologies” (Desilver, 2014, p. 2). These global events illustrate why it is im-
portant that domestic public safety organizations monitor and share open source infor-
mation. A thorough review of the literature on the topic helps to better define the problem 
and the purpose of this research. By carefully reviewing the available information, I was 
able to determine the current relevance of the research problem. Reviewing the literature 
also helped to bring into context the importance of monitoring and sharing threat-related 
information between public safety organizations. The first major theme in the literature 
was benefits of sharing threat-related information, the second was fusion center facilita-
tion of information sharing between public safety agencies, the third was challenges of 
sharing threat-related information, and the fourth was social media use between public 
safety agencies. I also discuss the Literature Search Strategy and Conceptual Framework 
in this chapter. 
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Literature Search Strategy 
Library databases and search engines used in this research study included 
Homeland Security Digital Library, Sage Journals, EBSCOhost, Taylor Francis Online, 
PubMed, ProQuest Central. Database searches were conducted in the Walden University 
online library. Key information sharing websites were also used in this study including 
the Justice Information Sharing, and International Relations and Security Networks. Key 
search terms used in the research process included policy, open source, open source 
center, social media, fusion centers, national security, network fusion, counterterrorism, 
interoperability, intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence community, national 
intelligence, homeland security, information sharing, law enforcement, public safety, and 
public health. I placed date restrictions on the database searches to ensure that the 
majority of the information had been published within the past 5 years. I also restricted 
the language to documents published in English.  
The reference lists of the articles I selected were reviewed in order to locate other 
sources of data pertaining to my topic. I reviewed over 200 documents during the litera-
ture review process including books, peer reviewed journal articles, official government 
publications and websites, trade publications, and media sources that I deemed credible. I 
found over 80 documents that were relevant for this research. The major themes in the lit-
erature were benefits of sharing threat-related information, fusion centers facilitation of 
information sharing between public safety agencies, challenges of sharing threat-related 
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information, and social media use between public safety agencies. The results of the liter-
ature review are discussed in more detail in the “Literature Review” section later in this 
chapter. 
Conceptual Framework 
I used general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) as the 
conceptual framework for this research. I selected this theory because it offered the best 
description of how public safety organizations share threat-related information to protect 
the population from terrorist attacks. General systems theory also provided the best 
framework for responding to the research questions for this study. Researchers have used 
general systems theory for several decades to study both domestic and international 
politics (Tierney, 1972). General systems theory is useful when studying the 
organizational changes and development of a community’s public safety system by 
analyzing the interconnection between individual agencies or subsystems.  Elements in 
systems are consistently interacting with one another. A change in one area of a system 
results in changes in another area of the system (“Communication Theories,” 2019). 
In the article entitled, “Surveillance and Resilience in Theory and Practice,” Raab, 
Jones, and SzJones (2015), pointed out that “a system may not only react to 
environmental effects by changing its internal properties or organization, but also act on 
and change its environment, bringing about a new relationship or a new equilibrium” (p. 
26). General systems framework is effective in illuminating complex collaborative 
relationships between public safety organizations in dynamic, rapidly changing 
environments. Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one 
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another within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the 
parts” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). William et al., (2006) pointed out that 
within the U.S. public health industry there is growing awareness and acceptance of 
systems thinking. 
 In conducting this research, I sought to build upon the knowledge base of research 
regarding how general systems theory is currently utilized within modern government 
organizations. Von Bertalanffy first proposed general systems theory in the 1930s and the 
theory was furthered by Ross Ashby in the mid 1960s (“General Systems Theory,” 2014). 
Von Bertalanffy stated that systems are “a set of things that affect one another within an 
environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts” 
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Because elements in systems are constantly 
interacting with one another, when one area of a system undergoes change it 
subsequently results in change somewhere else in the system (“Communication 
Theories,” 2019). Thus, as public safety organizations within the same region share 
relevant threat-related information with one another, other agencies within that region are 
prompted to prepare for or counter the possible threat. When public safety analysts are 
able to monitor the Internet and social media for terms, phrases, and threat-related 
situations, they are able better identify and prevent threats to the community (Chermak et 
al., 2013).  
The sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations is 
vital to improving law enforcement’s ability to uncover and stop violent attacks before 
they occur. Analysts at public safety organizations throughout the U.S. have the 
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capability to research and analyze multiple forms of information from all regions of the 
nation, fusing local and national threat information together to uncover possible threats. 
As public safety analysts collect and analyze information from multiple sources, they 
pass threat-related information to local fusion centers. The information is then passed up 
to the federal government which in turn shares it at the top level of the nation’s 
intelligence structure, adds additional threat data from federal sources, and then passes 
the information to local fusion centers and then finally back to local public safety 
organizations. This circular information sharing, and collaboration process helps to make 
the nation safer overall.  
Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another 
within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts” 
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). When public safety organizations within the 
same region share relevant threat information with one another, it prompts other agencies 
within that region to prepare for, or possibly counter the threat. As geopolitical situations 
evolve and develop, organizations with the responsibility for public safety must adapt to a 
new asymmetrical threat environment through improved domestic intelligence. State and 
local fusion centers are currently in a position to take on an expanding role in the nation’s 
domestic security by helping to protect the public from violent attacks.  
Literature Review 
Threat-related open source information is a key resource for public safety 
organizations. Therefore, it is important that SMEs from multiple fields, including law 
enforcement, public health, EMS, and fire services work together toward the common 
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goal of sharing threat-related information between agencies. Lenart, Albanese, Halstead, 
Schlegelmilch, and Paturas (2012) explain, “fusion centers must employ people with the 
necessary competencies to understand the nature of the threat facing a community, 
discriminate between important information and irrelevant or merely interesting facts and 
apply domain knowledge to interpret the results to obviate or reduce the existing danger” 
(p. 174). The overarching goal of fusion centers is to share information between local 
public safety organizations, as well as ensure that vital threat-related information 
uncovered at the local level is passed up to federal government officials (Stone, 2015).  
The studies and articles chosen for this literature review are within the scope of 
the research study. They represent the knowledge currently available on how public 
safety organizations across the nation analyze and share threat-related information. The 
literature was reviewed and then synthesized to bring to light observable trends in threat-
related information sharing across multiple public safety organizations. The phenomena 
were described from the unique viewpoints of the individual organizations. This approach 
to the literature review process related back to the research questions posed for this study. 
The major themes in the literature were benefits of sharing threat-related information, 
fusion centers facilitation of information sharing between public safety agencies, 
challenges of sharing threat-related information, and social media use between public 
safety agencies. 
Benefits of Sharing Threat-Related Information 
 Public safety systems are large and complex, involving large numbers of highly 
trained professionals interacting with members of multiple organizations and the general 
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public on a continual basis. Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) pointed out, “The 
process of information sharing in complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical 
and dynamic” (p.727). It involves numerous organizations within local public safety 
systems communicating effectively on multiple levels to deliver accurate information to 
first responders when needed. Currently, law enforcement, fire services, and emergency 
medical organizations communicate with one another effectively via 911 emergency 
dispatch centers to route needed resources where they are needed during emergencies.  
 Many public safety organizations across the nation also share information through 
fusion centers, emergency management agencies, and other associations developed 
specifically to improve coordination and information exchange. This information 
exchange occurs in various forms depending on the organizations involved and the 
interagency communication structure of the local municipalities. Coordination must be 
facilitated from the leadership level of the organization down through the chain of 
command to generate an ongoing exchange of useful information.  
Health and medical integration into an information sharing environment. 
Health and medical issues are extremely important to the safety of the public, and many 
public safety organizations integrate medical analysts into their analytical staff (Carter & 
Rip, 2013). A primary responsibility of health analysts is to build relationships among 
medical partners to quickly identify dangerous substances such as chemical or biological 
agents. This capability relies not only on highly trained technicians in the field with the 
proper equipment, but also the reach-back capability to certified health laboratories 
within the region. These unique health laboratories can make an affirmative identification 
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of dangerous biological or chemical substances. Whether the threats are natural or man-
made this important aspect of surveillance must not be overlooked. 
Highly trained medical professionals can quickly determine which important 
health information should be disseminated to the public in an emergency (Carter & Rip, 
2013). Utilizing medical analysts is an effective way of validating and correctly 
determining true medical threats in an emergency. Lenart et al., (2012) pointed out the 
“ability to respond effectively to threats or events that place the country at risk is greatly 
enhanced when collection, analysis, synthesis and dissemination of public health and 
medical information and intelligence are included in the national network of anti-
terrorism fusion centers” (p. 175). 
 Information sharing between the health community and law enforcement 
organizations is a complex undertaking. As public safety information sharing evolves 
through the utilization of state fusion centers, public health and medical support is 
becoming a necessity. Lenart et al., (2012) explained, the process of “conferring 
appropriate security clearances to public health and medical personnel, as well as policies 
for ensuring patient confidentiality” are extremely important issues that must be 
addressed as information sharing between public safety organizations increases (p. 175).  
Carter and Rip (2012) pointed out that the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work 
collaboratively facilitating important public health information into fusion center 
operations. Multiple grants have been awarded through the National Institute of Justice to 
ensure that public health analysts work side-by-side first responders to protect the 
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nation's population. As fusion centers find their footing as an important addition to the 
nation’s intelligence community, public health may be the next logical edition to this 
public safety effort.  
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the DHS are 
currently developing policy to work more closely together. Sharing of information 
throughout law-enforcement, public safety, and public health are a primary reason for the 
facilitation of fusion centers nationwide. Carter and Rip (2012) explained, “Since 
September 11, 2011, a significant amount of progress has been made to improve 
information collection and sharing in both the public health and homeland security 
sectors in their own rights” (p.574). 
Carter and Rip (2012) argued that although significant efforts have been initiated, 
federal, state, and local environments still do not effectively share information nationally. 
One problem, which has been highlighted nationally is that public health has not typically 
been a part of law enforcement activities. Carter and Rip contend, with the development 
of threat-related information sharing on a national scale, public health should be 
integrated into the collaborative. Fusion centers were developed to share information 
between all levels of public safety sectors, so integrating public health into the public 
safety matrix is an important national agenda item.  
National security and public health integration have had a long history. Since the 
creation of chemical weapons in World War I, there has been a need for medical 
personnel trained and capable of effectively detecting these dangerous weapons, both in 
military and civilian operating environments. After the attacks of 9/11, there was 
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considerable concern that terrorist organizations around the globe could launch a 
chemical or biological attack on an American city. Therefore, public health SMEs were 
recruited into the security apparatus of the nation, as equal partners in the fight against 
terrorism. As more research has been completed on exotic weapons that could affect our 
nation’s bio surveillance of both human and animal disease, threat identification has 
become extremely valuable. A terrorist attack on the nation’s agriculture or livestock 
could be devastating to the U.S. economy.  
In order to keep a robust situational awareness, intelligence personnel have 
consistently welcomed the participation of highly trained medical staff. After the attacks 
of 9/11, a significant national security priority was placed upon identifying chemical and 
biological attacks. Within Homeland Security, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) holds 
the principal responsibility for health issues, while the National Biosurveillance 
Integration Center (NBIC) has the primary responsibility to monitor heath related threats 
to the population (Carter & Rip, 2012). 
Carter and Rip (2012) pointed out that the DHS is responsible for responding to 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events. However, 
HHS coordinates all health emergency response activities. Carter and Rip explained, “the 
CDC within USDHHS created a surveillance mechanism known as BioSense 2.0, which 
is currently the only nation-wide all-hazards emergency public health surveillance 
system” (p. 577). With these efforts, first responders must responsible for isolating and 
identifying not only man-made bioterrorism, but also natural disease epidemics that occur 
throughout the world which have the capability to threaten the U.S. population. 
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Involvement of private organizations in an information sharing environment.  
Taylor and Russell (2011) argued since the attacks of 911 there are now hundreds of gov-
ernment and private organizations involved in homeland security and intelligence collec-
tion activities. They pointed out, before the attacks sharing of intelligence between police 
departments and public safety agencies was severely lacking (Taylor & Russell, 2011, p. 
184). Currently however, public safety agencies throughout the nation are beginning to 
participate in the nationwide network of fusion centers in an effort to better protect the 
public.  
The DHS has invested millions of dollars toward improving the coordination of 
police departments to share criminal and threat related information (Jackson & Brown, 
2007). A mix of crime analysis, intelligence, and open source information may finally be 
a formula for fusion centers success. Taylor and Russell (2011) explained, “The strategic 
integration of intelligence, with an emphasis on predictive analysis derived from the 
discovery of hard facts, information, patterns, and good crime analysis defines 
intelligence led policing (ILP)” (p. 185). Relying solidly on information technology, 
intelligence led policing may help combat crime by significantly increasing intelligence 
decision making (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010). 
Taylor and Russell (2011) explained that sophisticated computer programs and 
competent analysis align hand-in-hand with grassroots relationships with the public. As 
this wealth of information is derived from on-going police operations it is compiled into 
fusion databases, which “serve as hubs for information on crime and terrorist operations 
in a specific region focusing on the recognition of patterns, indications and warnings, 
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source development, interdiction, and coordination of critical criminal justice resources” 
(Taylor & Russell, 2011, p. 185). All of this collective analysis and processing of 
important data focuses on the ability of analysts to help uncover terrorist plots in the early 
stages of development before they become deadly terrorist attacks.  
Vital information that is collected and processed on the streets of the nation’s 
cities is now passed up to the “National Counter Terrorism Center in Washington, DC for 
a coordinated response to potential threats” (Taylor & Russell, 2011, p.85). However, 
problems inherent in local police departments and other public safety agencies may 
plague the effectiveness of this fusion process. Taylor and Russell (2011) argued, “The 
structure and mission of law enforcement agencies undermines the very essence of fusion 
centers as well as what they are intended to do and who they are intended to protect” 
(p.185).  
Shepherd (2011) explained that although our world is inundated with 
communication platforms that the public uses every day, there continues to be a 
disconnect between public and private sharing of information when it pertains to 
terrorism surveillance. Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, the 9/11 Commission 
pointed to a series of suggestions that if implemented would better protect the nation. 
Shepherd indicated that incentives should be cultivated to bring about a fundamental 
public and private cooperation toward national security issues. He explained that fusion 
centers can be the conduit that effectively moves information simultaneously between 
public and private organizations. 
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The federal government has long maintained that the private sector owns or 
operates most of the key resources within the nation; therefore, it is crucial that 
government security organizations actively engage the private sector in security 
operations. Shepherd (2011) pointed out “The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) maintains the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council (CFSCC),” 
which represents “more than 100 different associations across an open access market” (p. 
36). Because all of these organizations come from different backgrounds and have 
different business models, the information provided by the CFSCC can be used 
differently by each organization.  
Shepherd (2011) explained that the benefits of fusion centers extend far beyond 
law-enforcement and security concerns into public safety, public health, and emergency 
management. A few of the benefits of this information sharing include terrorism and 
public safety training in a modern technologically advanced fusion center facility. An 
increased situational awareness during any type of hazard, whether it be man-made or 
natural, as well as an increased partnership with private organizations better protects the 
population from a wide spectrum of threats.  
 One area of the nation that has succeeded in expanding the fusion center’s role 
within the public sector is the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center (SNCTC) 
located within the greater Las Vegas area. Sheppard (2011) explained, “blending data 
from different sources, including law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector, 
with analysis, can result in meaningful and actionable intelligence and information that 
goes a long way in protecting a community against acts of terrorism” (p. 36). The 
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SNCTC management understands that the “private sector is a valuable asset to the fusion 
center and is a legitimate recipient of law enforcement intelligence due to their national 
and international operations, and the preponderance of private sector ownership of critical 
infrastructure and key resources of the United States” (Sheppard, 2011, p.37). 
 Centers such as the SNCTC can possibly fill a gap in the nation’s security and 
emergency preparedness. They have the ability to augment law enforcement, private 
security, and public safety all from a within one consolidated facility. Innovative fusion 
center directors can also expand their information exchange value by creating public 
safety training facilities. Additionally, integrating public/private cooperation into fusion 
center operations will create one facility that can provide multiple layers of protection for 
large urban areas. 
Integration of public safety organizations into an information sharing envi-
ronment. The DHS works with local public safety organizations to establish fusion liai-
son officer (FLO) programs, which allow fusion centers to recruit and train individuals 
from various public safety organizations to act as extensions of the fusion program. FLOs 
work with police departments, fire departments, and EMS organizations to report im-
portant threat information back to fusion center analysts as needed. They are not assigned 
full-time to fusion centers but work as a supportive counterpart of the fusion center pro-
cess.  
According to the DHS, fusion center initiatives include three interrelated critical 
focus areas, “better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, and assess the 
threat it poses to the nation as a whole and within specific communities; Bolster efforts to 
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address the dynamics of violent extremism, and strengthen relationships with communi-
ties as they play a vital role in countering violent extremism; Expand support for infor-
mation-driven, community-oriented policing efforts that have proved effective in prevent-
ing violent crime across the nation” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para. 10). Pub-
lic safety officials rely on various types of public engagement. Primarily, analysts encour-
age an open discussion of violent extremism in communities and promptly address any 
questions concerning extremist actions (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012). Analysts 
also work closely with first responders to identify “behaviors that are potentially indica-
tive of terrorist or other criminal activity, raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism 
and violent crime, and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the 
proper law enforcement authorities” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para. 10). This 
particular initiative builds a cooperative trust between the public safety responders and 
fusion center analysts. An important and unique component of the public safety commu-
nity also includes various health and medical organizations.  
Fusion Center Facilitation of Information Sharing 
State and local fusion centers are staffed primarily with representatives from 
federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners (“State and Major Urban,” 2014). 
According to the DHS, the government has invested significant federal funding to ensure 
that fusion centers are engaged in national security (“State and Major Urban,” 2014). 
With international terrorism threatening our nation’s security, public safety professionals 
will increasingly engage in the fight against terrorism. By integrating fusion centers into 
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the government's intelligence community, DHS hopes to identify terrorist threats at the 
earliest opportunity rather than waiting until terrorist cells become operational.  
The focus of this process relies on collaboration with local public safety organiza-
tions. It is a slow process of building relationships so that terrorist activity information 
can begin flowing from the field operations level up. DHS officials believe that this direct 
contribution of information from local communities throughout the country will lead to a 
series of successes in the future. The current U.S. National Security Strategy states, “the 
federal government must continue to integrate and leverage fusion centers to enlist all of 
our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities to prevent acts of 
terrorism on American soil” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 5). 
The federal government published guidance in 2003 that was designed to help 
fusion centers develop their capabilities to a baseline functional level across the nation. 
These baseline proficiencies are designed to ensure that all fusion centers nationwide can 
operate in an effective information sharing environment. The capabilities are built upon 
tested methodologies, such as the intelligence cycle used in the nation’s IC. The FBI 
points out, “the intelligence cycle is the process of developing unrefined data into 
polished intelligence for the use of policymakers” (“Intelligence Cycle,” 2010, para. 1). 
Using these standard methodologies allows state and local public safety analysts to 
communicate effectively with analysts within all levels of the federal government. This 
nationwide “strategic vision can be realized only when fusion centers demonstrate 
institutionalized levels of capability that enable efficient and effective information 
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sharing and analysis across the national network” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 
6).  
Baseline of common information analysis competencies. The DHS believes 
that a baseline of information analysis competencies will improve the nation's ability to 
take on the threat of asymmetrical terrorist activity. In an effort to expedite this process, 
DHS has initiated an expansive set of technical training courses for local public safety an-
alysts. DHS states, “through its long-standing partnership with the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), the Department has conducted more than 300 training and technical assistance de-
liveries, workshops, and exchanges on topics including risk analysis, security, and pri-
vacy, civil rights, and civil liberties since 2007” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 
7). 
The DHS has also established a nationwide yearly assessment of fusion centers 
throughout the nation in an effort to ensure that public safety personnel are performing at 
excepted levels. Four critical operational capabilities (COCs) are tracked including the 
fusion centers ability to “receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather” information (“State 
and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 11). Several capabilities including “privacy/civil rights 
and civil liberties protections, sustainment strategy, communications and outreach, and 
security” are tracked in the assessment (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 11). 
Through this ongoing evaluation process, gaps are identified and corrected in a timely 
manner. The overarching goal of the program is to develop analytical centers of 
excellence throughout the nation that are effective at sharing threat-related information.  
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Increasing analytical standards. State fusion centers that achieve a high level of 
analysis competence are proudly acknowledged as centers of analytic excellence. These 
organizations have made great strides towards analytical excellence. Abold, Guidetti, and 
Keyer (2012) pointed out, “This is a significant departure from the sense in which this 
term has been used previously and provides a next state for individual fusion centers that 
aspire to share their analytic competencies across a national network” (p.1). 
Public safety analysts working in fusion centers across the nation are finally 
reaching their goal of becoming true analytical centers. Just as in the nation's intelligence 
community different agencies perform different functions, which helps to significantly 
strengthen the collective. Abold et al. (2012), explained that this push toward specialized 
expertise that will help to build a larger more reliable network. Over the last decade 
public safety analysts assigned to state fusion centers have worked diligently to increase 
collaboration, as well as a sense of comradely between centers.  
In 2008, DHS in collaboration with the FBI developed a document entitled, 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. A portion of the 
document highlighted “capabilities determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated 
network of fusion centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion center to be 
considered capable of performing basic functions by the fusion center community” 
(“Information Sharing,” 2014, p.8). Since that time, many fusion centers across the nation 
have worked vehemently to not only meet those standards, but to surpass them. As noted 
earlier, “With the best practices of the IC (Intelligence Community) as a model for 
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success, one could argue that the same attribute of specialization should be extended to 
the network of fusion centers” (Abold et al., 2012, p.2). 
This focused development of fusion centers of analytical excellence would help to 
increase the nation's ability to counter domestic threats. These locally owned and 
operated multi-agency organizations’ primary responsibility is to receive, analyze, and 
disseminate information from multiple sources. Regardless of where the information 
originates, the primary function should be to assist in the coordinated situational 
awareness of public safety response agencies.  
The idea of this information-sharing network originated from the horrific events 
of 9/11. Soon after the infamous disaster, it was determined that information sharing 
between state and local public safety organizations was severely lacking (“National 
Commission,” 2004). Consequently, fusion centers were tasked to develop vital 
communication links between public safety organizations throughout the nation. The 9/11 
tragedies rallied a “diverse group of centers not only around a common cause of securing 
the homeland but also around a common framework for communicating and doing 
business” (Abold et al., 2012, p.2). The development of fusion centers of excellence is an 
effort by the government to better protect the nation from both domestic and international 
threats. Abold et al., stress that it is imperative that individual fusion centers continue to 
develop their unique set of analytical expertise as this rigor and precision will “greatly 
benefit the overall capability of the national network” (p.15). 
46 
 
Protecting the public from terrorism. An atmosphere of effective information 
exchange is essential in the current asymmetrical threat environment. The DHS empha-
sizes that “fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement, 
public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure pro-
tection, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of national 
intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their communities” (“State and 
Major,” 2014, para. 2). Effective information sharing can provide situational awareness 
to decision makers at the state level through collaboration with their federal partners. Alt-
hough federal agencies support the centers, they are operated solely by the states in which 
they reside. Federal entities primary focus is to support operations and assist when 
needed. Federal funding is also available to support infrastructure and personnel costs 
(“Federal Emergency Management Agency,” 2015). Security clearances and a full range 
of security issues have been initiated to train local public safety analysts to operate in an 
information sharing environment. The DHS clearly states that threats to our nation have 
changed dramatically since enemies abroad transitioned to asymmetrical tactics. There-
fore, the nation’s defensive capabilities must change to meet the threat.  
It is highly anticipated that threat-related information sharing will assist both local 
and federal law enforcement by uncovering terrorist plots across the nation (“State and 
Major,” 2014). The DHS projects, through federal, state, local and private partner 
collaboration that public safety analysts will have the capability to “gather and share the 
information necessary to pursue and disrupt activities that may be indicators of, or 
potential precursors to, terrorist activity” (“State and Major,” 2014, para. 4). The attacks 
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of 9/11 marked a turning point in national security and many policy makers began 
stressing the importance of sharing threat-related information between all government 
agencies to protect the nation abroad and at home. As terrorism grows globally it also 
initiates incidents of homegrown violent extremism. 
Countering domestic violent extremism. In a government publication entitled 
The Role of Fusion Centers in Countering Violent Extremism DHS states, “as analytic 
hubs, fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower frontline personnel to understand 
the local implications of national intelligence by tailoring national threat information into 
a local context and helping frontline personnel understand terrorist and criminal threats 
they could encounter in the field, while also protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties of individuals in their communities” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, 
para.1). 
Public safety analysts across the nation work with federal agencies in a collabora-
tive information-sharing environment to ensure that local public officials are aware of 
any terrorist activities, violent extremism, or organized crime in the area. The DHS has 
invested a significant amount of funding to ensure that public safety analysts are trained 
to meet predetermined analytic guidelines. This assists in “building grassroots intelli-
gence and analytic capabilities within the state and local environment so state and local 
partners can understand the local implications of national intelligence by tailoring na-
tional threat information into a local context” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para. 
2). In order to achieve effective situational awareness, all components of the public safety 
community must be involved in the information sharing process. The sharing of threat-
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related information between public safety organizations also involves many challenges. 
The following chapters will highlight many of these challenges, as well as touch upon 
lessons learned from sharing information throughout the intelligence community.  
Challenges of Sharing Threat-Related Information 
 Throughout history great military leaders, including Civil War commander 
Ulysses S. Grant, realized that publicly available open source information was extremely 
valuable and should be collected and analyzed order to better understand the enemy 
(Steele, 2008). During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
was America’s primary adversary. As a result, the U.S. military relied on classified 
intelligence collection methods to monitor the soviets. It is now evident that classified 
collection capabilities may not be the most effective means to gather information on the 
nation’s enemies. Many government reviews of our nation's intelligence community (IC) 
have experienced “America’s deficiencies in foreign languages and, to one extent or 
another, the open sources they represent; and every single President, Secretary, and 
Director of Central Intelligence has seen fit to ignore these concerns, persisting with the 
understandable but necessarily erroneous view that the U.S. Intelligence Community is in 
the business of finding and delivering secrets for the President” (Steele, 2008, p. 610).  
Open source information. Steele (2008) explained that CIA officials believe that 
open source intelligence (OSINT) provides approximately 80 percent of the useful infor-
mation utilized by the IC. The U.S. spends a significant amount of resources on classified 
information and only a small percentage of that on OSINT. Steele argued, “the return on 
investment (RoI) implications—of spending next to nothing on that 80 percent, while 
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spending tens of billions of dollars on secret collection, most of it technological, yet not 
having any single place where both secrets and non-secrets could be processed coherently 
and with all available automated tools” (Steele, 2008, p. 610). During the 1990s, there 
were several instances where proponents for OSINT lobbied Congress to approve fund-
ing for a robust OSINT program. However, in all instances funding for open source infor-
mation never became a priority. Steele declared the consequences for the lack of funding 
for OSINT “including our lack of awareness of the open spread of virulent Islam, in radi-
calized schoolhouses funded by Saudi Arabia from 1988 to 2001, continue to cost the 
United States blood, treasure, and spirit” (p.612). 
Steele (2008) went on to explain that open source information is not something 
that can be controlled by the intelligence community. It is something that flows freely 
from the Internet and social communication. He indicated that no one source can control 
its dissemination; therefore, because of its distributive nature, it must be shared between 
government and private organizations. In 2005 the federal government developed a 
national center devoted predominantly to processing open source information.  
United States national intelligence. This U.S. government’s primary source of 
open source information is the Open Source Center (OSC) located just outside of Wash-
ington, DC. This modern facility, established in 2005 by the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence (ODNI), helped to transform the nation’s IC toward accepting open 
source information as a legitimate intelligence resource. The acceptance of OSINT was 
accelerated by the rapid rise of radical Islamist attacks throughout the world. These 
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emerging new paramilitary organizations had become adept at using the Internet and so-
cial media to rally followers and plan attacks. With a single act of Congress entitled the 
“Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which President 
Bush signed into law on December 17,” the 16 agencies that made up the nation’s IC be-
came 17 (“Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” 2004).  
For decades, the IC struggled with how to effectively utilize open source 
information. This distinctive information did not quite fit within the well-structured 
boundaries of classified information. Even though OSINT made up a large portion of the 
nation’s intelligence, it had long been neglected as an integral source of intelligence data. 
Bean (2007) pointed out, “The professional literature typically points to the benefits and 
limitations of OSINT in meeting intelligence requirements, but larger investigations of 
how the concept of OSINT functions as an organizational symbol and site of contestation 
in the intelligence reform debate are absent” (p. 241).  
Some analysts in the nation’s IC do not consider OSINT a true form of 
intelligence. For decades it was considered unreliable, as most intelligence analyst’s 
preferred classified information gathered through covert or technological methods. It was 
not until the events of 9/11 that OSINT was elevated to a prominent status. Asymmetrical 
terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East and the world have added to the popularity of 
OSINT as a valuable source of intelligence. Bean (2007) explained, “Discrepancies about 
OSINT’s status as an intelligence discipline signify differences among stakeholders that 
lead to problems for OSINT’s status as a special type of knowledge” (p. 241). 
Nevertheless, the reliance on OSINT by the IC over the last decade has been surprising; it 
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is now considered vital in the ongoing struggle against global terrorism. The Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2012-2017 Strategic Plan states, “given the expansive, open-
source environment—combined with social media, rapidly developing new technologies, 
and growing mission partnerships in an era of diminishing resources—DIA will become 
increasingly dependent on outside sources of knowledge to succeed in its mission” 
(“Defense Intelligence Agency,” p. 10). 
One important fact about open source information is that the government and 
private industry access its value from different perspectives (Bean, 2007). Open source 
information is a huge revenue generator for the private sector. Large corporations 
throughout the world pull in substantial amounts of open source information, process and 
analyze it, and then sell it to multiple customers around the world. This generates large 
sums of revenue for their customers. The government collects large amounts of open 
source information and distills it down into actionable intelligence in order to better 
secure the nation. Therefore, some officials within the government believe that the 
private sector is actually much better at collecting, collating, and analyzing huge amounts 
of open source data than the government (Bean, 2007).  
The government and private industry interpret open source information in 
significantly different ways. The government states that it should pay for open source 
information once and only once, yet the open source community proposes that they 
should collect information once and then sell it multiple times (Bean, 2007). The 
utilization of OSINT by the United States government is currently on the rise. Many 
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OSINT reports are making their way to the president’s daily briefing, which is one of the 
most important intelligence products in the nation (Bean, 2007). 
The OSC is consistently producing a large volume of open source material for 
government use. Bean (2007) explained, “The OSC houses and builds upon the work of 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which was established in 1941 to 
monitor and translate foreign media” (p.250). The FBIS has been around for decades 
providing “translation, monitoring, and analysis of foreign Internet, print, radio, 
television, and other sources” (Bean, 2007, p.250). This consolidation of the FBIS into 
the OSC is a signal that the government is taking open source information very seriously. 
Bean explained “Transforming FBIS into the DNI Open Source Center implies a 
significant change; in order to prevent bureaucratic disruption, however, no consolidation 
of resources or operational authority under the DNI seems to have occurred” (p.250).  
Hulnick (2002) explained, OSINT makes up a large portion of the ICs actionable 
data. It is the mix of classified information and OSINT, which work in concert to build a 
better intelligence product. In the competitive private business environment “the use of 
anything other than OSINT, such as industrial espionage or electronic intercepts, has 
become a federal crime” (Hulnick, 2002, p. 566). Hulnick explained that some 
organizations, “have actually settled potential lawsuits at great cost because their 
intelligence professionals strayed beyond the use of OSINT into such classic illegal 




 Most analysts, public and private agree that open source information contains a 
vast amount of valuable information on a myriad of topics. The biggest problem with this 
key source of information is that there is so much of it that it is difficult to distill down 
into useable data. The sheer volume of open source information available has literally 
become overwhelming. The accuracy of the information collected is also a significant 
issue. The raw information “needs to be constantly checked and validated which is very 
difficult given the amount of data” available (Yates & Paquette, 2011, p. 12). The 
National Security Agency (NSA) “resorted to sampling and keyword techniques to sort 
the information, but some raw material allegedly remains untapped because there aren’t 
enough people to deal with all of it” (Hulnick, 2002, p.567). One dynamic solution to this 
problem involves initiatives that “are designed for ‘data mining’ and ‘knowledge 
management’ to detect patterns or anomalies in vast streams of raw data” (Hulnick, 2002, 
p. 567).  
Hulnick (2002) explained, the CIA has developed solutions to deal with the 
overwhelming amount of open source data. Recently, they have “turned to the private 
sector to develop techniques to sort, order, and deliver raw intelligence so that analysts 
are not overwhelmed” (p.567). Hulnick also pointed to the fact that open source 
information is riddled with reliability issues. There is so much information on the web 
that it is challenging to sort out which information is reliable, and which is not. Hulnick 
argued, “The world wide web has led to the proliferation of individual sites that produce 
propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation. But professional intelligence analysts 
should have no trouble sorting wheat from chaff in web databases” (p.568). 
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Language is an extremely important component of OSINT, and it is critical that 
analysts to be fluent in the language of the countries in which they study. Because we 
now live in a true global society, OSINT is intertwined into every language on the planet. 
Significant U.S. interests now focus on countries such as China and Iran where it is vital 
that analysts understand the culture intimately and speak the language fluently. Hulnick 
(2002) explained, “In the aftermath of the September 2001 events, the language problem 
has again led the CIA to turn to the private sector for technological help” (p. 572).  
Another form of OSINT that is often overlooked is referred to as grey 
intelligence. Hulnick (2002) explained, “Grey intelligence, a category coined by Jon 
Sigurdson, who teaches business intelligence, refers to materials that are not classified 
but have to be obtained by digging” (p.573). Financial transactions generate a huge 
amount of data that can be exploited by intelligence analysts. Hulnick stated, “Real estate 
transactions, environmental impact statements, uniform commercial code, for example, 
fit this category and are particularly useful for the private sector intelligence operative” 
(p.573).  
Several important successes have come from the OSC over the last decade. Much 
of the information that is gathered through the OSC is now filtered into intelligence 
reports giving analysts a better idea of how terrorist organizations operate and 
communicate throughout the world. Bean (2013) pointed out that the U. S. President’s 
daily intelligence briefing regularly includes information provided by the OSC. Most 
analysts understand that although open source information contains a wealth of valuable 
knowledge; it is often buried in volumes of data. Finding those golden nuggets of 
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valuable intelligence is truly a challenge. After the attacks of 9/11 the nation’s IC was 
forced to undergo an extensive organizational change. The looming threat to the nation is 
now from organizations that communicate, organize, and plan their attacks through social 
media and the Internet. However, Congressional funding for open source information 
collection is still deficient. The lack of significant financial support is truly a roadblock to 
the OSCs ability to fully engage the problem (Bean, 2013).  
 Bean (2013) explained “the nature of bureaucratic organizations, the ability of 
bureaucrats to protect their turf, and the fragmented structure of the U.S. federal 
government tend to stymie significant IC reform” (p. 43). Because officials within the IC 
are reluctant to fully embrace OSINT’s elevation to a primary intelligence source, the 
discipline continues to suffer from that neglect (Bean, 2013). However, things are 
beginning to change, the sheer existence of the OSC “represents the institutionalization of 
open source in the IC” (Bean, 2013, p. 43). There are several major tensions that inhibit 
the OSCs ability to dominate the nation’s IC. Bean explained, “tensions between and 
among materiality/symbolism, structure/agency, message processing/human context, 
exceptionalism/integration, and internal/external production characterize the post-9/11 
open source debate” (p. 43). As the IC continues to adapt to global terrorism, analysts 
reflect on lessons learned.  
Lessons learned from the intelligence community. Stephen Marrin (2004) ex-
plained that the primary focus of intelligence is its ability to prevent future terrorist at-
tacks (p.656). He acknowledged that there are many imperfections in the nation’s IC. 
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Some of those imperfections led to the IC’s inability to identify Osama bin Laden’s ter-
rorist organization planning of the September 11th attacks. However, even with these im-
perfections the IC can learn from their mistakes and refocus their energy towards two 
basic principles. These include “the use of rigor and tradecraft in the production of intelli-
gence analysis, and the integration of analysis into the policymaking process” (Marrin, 
2004, p.656). One of the primary reasons for having an intelligence apparatus is to pre-
vent surprise attacks like the one that occurred on 9/11. Years of intelligence production 
can ultimately lead to failure if the “information is not collected or integrated effectively, 
and policy failure can lead to surprise if actions were not taken despite intelligence warn-
ings” (Marrin, 2004, p.656).  
One of the biggest takeaways from intelligence failure is to learn from mistakes 
and reshape the IC to combat new and unique threats. Marin (2004) explained that 
evolving international relations and the rise of a global society create conditions where 
surprise is ever present. It is important to remember that “intelligence agencies may be 
responsible for the prevention of surprise, but not all surprises can be prevented by 
uncovering secrets” (Marrin, 2004, p.656). Even though some failures are inevitable, it is 
important to continually refine and improve our analytical standards. Marrin goes on to 
explain that many failures in intelligence throughout the last century, including the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, the 1950 North Korean invasion and other catastrophic failures of both 
intelligence and foreign policy, had a significant impact on geopolitics (p.659). As 
demonstrated in these examples, it is important to review the strategic failures of foreign 
policy, so that they will not be repeated in the future. Marrin explained, “Failure, though 
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perhaps inevitable, can be made less frequent through the implementation of a number of 
reforms that improve the quality of intelligence analysis” (p.662). The focus in the future 
will be learning from past mistakes and attempting to limit the amount of intelligence 
failures moving forward. Marrin pointed out, “this will require a two-pronged approach: 
more rigorous tradecraft to minimize faulty or incomplete analysis, combined with better 
customer service” (p.662).  
Many experts in the IC believe that the free flow of information has been signifi-
cantly restricted by a series of classification barriers (“New Information and Intelli-
gence,” 2008). This lack of organization prevents the analyst from viewing all of the in-
formation necessary to take effective action. Marrin (2004) argued, the “removal of or-
ganizational controls on certain types of information, and the relaxation of the need-to-
know principle and other security devices responsible for informational ‘stovepipes,’ 
would allow for more horizontal distribution of information throughout the intelligence 
and policy communities” (p.662). It is actions such as these that reduce the chances of 
surprise to the intelligence community. Intelligence failures, which often lead to devastat-
ing circumstances, can be “related to flaws in the delivery of the more conceptual rather 
than merely the informational product” (Marrin, 2004, p.663). 
 Inevitably, there is a significant amount of political pressure on the IC to develop 
intelligence analysis products that support policy maker agendas. It is this conforming 
posture that significantly threatens clear and unbiased intelligence analysis. Therefore, 
there a strong focus in the IC to develop methods that increase the accuracy of the overall 
intelligence product. Marrin (2004) explained, “an additional method for increasing the 
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accuracy of a conceptual model is to ensure that the analyst possesses in-depth 
knowledge of the account to include, as necessary, context, history, or language” (p. 
665). As the IC continues its adaptation to current threats, situational awareness of real-
time events in remote locations around the world is a high priority. Social media 
monitoring is proving to be a useful activity to establish situational awareness of 
emergent events around the globe. Public safety organizations are beginning to embrace 
the use of social media during large public events to enhance situational awareness.  
Social Media Use Between Public Safety Agencies 
Currently, the ardent use of social media enables information to be rapidly shared 
between individuals throughout the world. Whether emails, photos, videos, or text mes-
sages, these digital information sources are commonly utilized in both personal and pri-
vate endeavors. Government organizations are also utilizing social media sites to dissemi-
nate important information on everything from public events to public safety. However, 
law enforcement officials have been warning for some time that these digital tools are be-
ing utilized for unlawful purposes. Tech savvy criminal use the internet to “coordinate a 
criminal-related flash mob, or plan a robbery, or terrorist groups may use social media 
sites to recruit new members and espouse their criminal intentions” (“Developing a Pol-
icy,” 2013, p.1). 
To combat these illegal activities law enforcement agencies have been developing 
their ability to monitor open source information on the Internet. One of the most effective 
ways to monitor social media within legal boundaries is to develop an effective social 
media policy (“Developing a Policy,” 2013). These policies allow intelligence and law 
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enforcement analysts’ gradient levels of authority when monitoring social media outlets. 
Activities may range from “viewing information that is publicly available on social media 
sites to the creation of an undercover profile to directly interacting with an identified 
criminal subject online” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2) 
As analysts move along the continuum from least invasive to most invasive 
monitoring activities, they must secure multiple layers of authorization from supervisory 
personnel. Just as other covert actions are authorized in police investigations, social 
media monitoring should be well within legal authority. Fusion center “personnel must 
have a defined objective and a valid law enforcement purpose for gathering, maintaining, 
or sharing personally identifiable information” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2). As in 
most law enforcement activities, fusion center analysts should not maintain “political, 
religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or group, 
association, corporation, business, partnership, or organization unless there is a legitimate 
public safety purpose” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2). 
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), working with law-enforcement agencies 
nationwide has developed policies regarding social media. These policies not only protect 
the public's civil rights, but also help to protect law enforcement agencies from civil liti-
gation. All policies should be developed in close cooperation with local legal counsel to 
ensure that local, state, and federal laws are followed in the development of these im-
portant guidelines (“Developing a Policy,” 2013). It is also important than law enforce-
ment agencies update their privacy policies to include public notice of how they plan to 
monitor social media related data. Just as a police officer is compelled to search a home 
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or vehicle, criminal investigative regulations must be followed, and the public’s civil 
rights must always be held in the highest regard. As public safety agencies develop inter-
nal policies for social media, they must also incorporate social media connectivity be-
tween organizations.  
Social media as an information sharing platform. Pfeifer (2012) explained that 
information fusion between public safety agencies is not only a process of communi-
cating between different disciplines, but also leveraging technology to connect databases 
between different agencies. In order to give first responders, the ability to anticipate 
threats, they must have an effective situational awareness of an event as it unfolds (Carter 
& Rip, 2013). Pfeifer explained, it is the process of actual network fusion, tying together 
not only intelligence community officials with local law-enforcement officials, but also 
reaching out to fire departments, emergency medical service organizations, and public 
health officials to collaborate before an emergency occurs. In fact, “finding new ap-
proaches for collaboration may be less a matter of innovation and more a matter of dis-
covering what is already done by organizations” (Pfeifer, 2012, p.2). In the current digital 
environment, public safety organizations throughout the nation are increasingly becoming 
integrated into larger and larger digital networks. Therefore, it is likely that computer 
connectivity between these organizations is more achievable than ever before. Pfeifer 
pointed out, “Network fusion is an information sharing system that fuses information and 
intelligence from multiple sources to allow decision makers to better adapt to a changing 
threat environment” (p.2). 
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 Linking public safety data systems can enhance the actual preparedness 
capabilities of public safety organizations to share information. Pfeifer (2012) explained 
that to truly have an integrated system, public safety organizations must do more than 
simply place individuals in a fusion center facility where they can share information face-
to-face. Pfeifer argued that the “future of fusion centers will depend on their ability to 
collaborate with other organizations for prevention and response as well as their capacity 
for information to be pushed and pulled in real time through networking” (p.2). The 
process of network fusion has several advantages over building brick and mortar fusion 
centers. In a true virtual network, representatives of different organizations can 
communicate with colleagues faster online than they can in person. It is much cheaper to 
collaborate with public safety officials in a virtual meeting, than it is to co-locate them 
together over a period of time in a brick and mortar facility (Pfeifer, 2012). Pfeifer stated, 
“Network fusion exploits technology to quickly connect various organizations that 
participate in homeland security to exchange critical information, insights into potential 
attacks, and real-time situational awareness reports” (p.3).  
Utilizing this process, decision-makers can also be drawn into the conversation 
when the need arises through security video conferencing. Virtual conferences can be or-
ganized within moments, much faster than physical meetings can be called together. 
Pfeifer (2012) argued that the nation’s refusal to include collaboration technology in 
counterterrorism activities will severely reduce the ability to disrupt or respond to terror-
ist attacks. It is this data linking innovation that will provide public safety agencies the 
image of a terrorist suspect that may be progressing toward an imminent attack. Terrorist 
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organizations are already quickly adapting to new technology at a much faster rate than 
law enforcement organizations.  
 As fusion centers increase in size and scope throughout the nation in-person 
communication and collaboration will be a significant prohibitive factor. Collocating 
individuals from every organization that should be present within these centers will 
become more and more difficult to achieve. Using data networking as a leveraging factor 
will help government organizations achieve needed results without incurring prohibitive 
costs. Pfeifer (2012) explained, “The development of network fusion for faster, smarter, 
and cheaper information sharing and collaboration will require a socio technical approach 
that makes use of hard and soft systems” (p.3). In various areas of the nation public safety 
organizations are beginning to utilize social media in tactical operations during public 
safety emergencies.  
Social media use during public safety emergencies. In the last several years, 
social media has been taking on a new role in threat related emergencies. Nearly every 
facet of modern society now utilizes social media. Government agencies are increasingly 
using this communications platform to relay vital information to the public during crisis 
situations. Emergency responders as well as public and private organizations can deliver 
and receive important information instantly during an event. When major hazardous 
events occur, public safety organizations are beginning to depend upon social media 
tools. During the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya, Africa, authorities assisting 
with emergency management activities used Twitter. This simple form of communication 
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allowed government agencies to deliver public information from multiple locations 
simultaneously, which proved to be a valuable source of situational awareness.  
 Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, and Adini (2014) explained that 
during the mall attack, “all emergency responders used and leveraged social media 
networks for communicating both with the public and among themselves” (p.1). 
However, although extremely useful during emergency events, social media public 
postings also risk misinformation as well as vast amounts of irrelevant information. 
Simon et al., pointed out, “emergency managers should utilize filtering and pattern 
recognition algorithms on the data streams, in order to access important and meaningful 
information in real-time” (p.1). Utilization of this software can be invaluable to public 
safety and law enforcement organizations. Social media communication during 
emergency events has steadily risen over the last several years. However, because social 
media is a relatively new form of communication “there is not enough evidence for best 
practice when incorporating social media in emergency response” (Simon et al., 2014, 
p.2).  
 In a case study of the Westgate Mall attack Simon et al., (2014) utilized 
specialized computer software to collect the posts from Twitter and analyze various 
attributes of the data. The findings demonstrated that social media “served as an integral 
tool for emergency management in Kenya” particularly during this event (p.7). The 
information ranged from the location and number of injured individuals to actual photos 
of the attackers as they entered the mall. Much of the information was instrumental in 
public safety and law enforcement activities. During these types of rapidly unfolding 
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events, public safety organizations across the globe are slowly beginning to utilize social 
media (Simon et al., 2014). 
Use of social media by terrorist organizations. Advancing technology in mobile 
communications has unfortunately proven to be an asset to terrorist organizations 
throughout the world. Cohn (2013) pointed out that complex web-based communication 
applications allow extremist groups to communicate with their followers in real-time. He 
explained, “the ability to immediately notify all of one's collaborators, simultaneously, of 
sudden and spontaneous tactical changes is a tremendous leap in the terrorists' ability to 
evade law enforcement personnel” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). This incredible change in the 
communication capabilities inside terrorist organizations over the last decade has coun-
terterrorism officials throughout the world scrambling to keep up. Cohen (2004) stated 
that the ability to carry out a successful terrorist attack is a very complex and dynamic 
task. It is extremely difficult to carry out military tactical operations in a rapidly changing 
asymmetrical environment. Cohen explained, the “insertion, actualization, evasion, and 
finally extraction of the terrorists are far more difficult to achieve than a fantastical Hol-
lywood story would have us believe” (p.64).  
The ability to effectively communicate in real-time through all of the phases of a 
combat operation is a strategic advantage. The attacks of 9/11 forced the FBI and CIA to 
expand security measures domestically and globally (“Federal Bureau of Investigations,” 
2015). It also set into motion collaborative agreements between organizations that had 
never existed before. Public safety organizations throughout the nation were forced to op-
erate in a much more collaborative environment.  
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In 2008 a “commando styled terrorist raid in Mumbai, India,” again shook the 
world’s consciousness (Cohn, 2013, p.64). In this instance, a terrorist organization 
modified their attack strategy to the increased security environment. This indicated that 
terrorist organizations learned and adapted in order to succeed in a unique type of brutal 
attack on a major city. In the attack they utilized “elusive communication techniques to 
outwit dated counterterrorism defensive techniques” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). Cohn went on to 
explain how a 10-man squad was able to make their way into the city of Mumbai and 
carry out the catastrophic attack. Real-time communications were a significant factor in 
the attack. He explained, “the deep and comprehensive mobile communicative 
coordination amongst both the terrorists on site and their controllers proved to be the 
cornerstone of the operation's triumph” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). The coordinator of the 
terrorist operation was able to use common mobile cellular devices to orchestrate several 
teams of highly trained commandos from a secure location outside of the country. The 
coordinator watched live news feeds of the attack and then readjusted his commandos as 
needed. Cohen (2013) explained, “while these terrorists relied primarily on walkie-talkies 
and not social media per se, we may consider this communicative tool a predecessor to 
the ubiquitous mobile social media applications, which mark 2012, and beyond” (p.64). 
What is important to glean from this article is that there are terrorist organizations 
around the globe that study these attacks and others like them and concentrate on what 
worked, and what did not. It is plausible that social media communication, location, and 
mapping tools can be readily used to orchestrate future terrorist’s attacks. Law 
enforcement organizations around the world are now spending considerable time and 
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effort studying a number of social media applications, so that they may avoid being 
blindsided by the next innovative terrorist attack. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The major themes in the literature were benefits of sharing threat-related 
information, fusion centers facilitation of information sharing between public safety 
agencies, challenges of sharing threat-related information, and social media use between 
public safety agencies. The findings of this study will help to fill the gap in literature by 
determining the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii, and what can be done to improve 
information exchange between these agencies. The findings will extend knowledge in the 
discipline surrounding the ability of public safety organizations to effectively share 
threat-related information.  
The first major theme in the literature review focused on the benefits of sharing 
threat-related information. Soon after the 9/11 terror attacks, it became clear to the 
nation’s leaders that information sharing between federal, state, and local public safety 
organizations must be improved. Fusion centers were tasked with developing a vital 
information-sharing link between public safety organizations throughout the nation. 
Although the goal is slowly being achieved, fully integrated information sharing between 
public safety organizations has not yet become a reality. The federal government has 
been aggressively assisting the development analytic capabilities by assigning highly 
trained analysts to public safety organizations throughout the nation. This is done with 
the hope of increasing collaboration and intelligence sharing capabilities. 
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The second major theme in the literature was fusion centers facilitation of infor-
mation sharing between public safety agencies. State and local fusion centers are staffed 
primarily with representatives from federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners 
(“State and Major Urban,” 2014). By integrating public safety analysts into the govern-
ment's intelligence community, the DHS hopes to identify terrorist threats early and inter-
vene before violent extremists become operational. The focus of this process relies on 
collaboration with local public safety organizations. It also depends on building inter-
agency relationships, so that terrorist activity information can begin flowing from the 
field operations level up to the federal government.  
The third major theme in the literature review was challenges of sharing threat-
related information. Until the rise of global terrorism in the 21st century, freely available 
open source information had long been one of the least valued forms of information 
collected by the IC. It had been considered unreliable and very difficult to validate. 
During the Cold War, classified information gathered through covert or technical 
methods was the preferred intelligence asset. The attacks of 9/11 and the rise of 
asymmetrical terrorist warfare across the globe have proven otherwise. Currently, the 
nation’s IC estimates that OSINT provides approximately 80% of the useful information 
utilized by the IC (Steele, 2008).  
As a result, the nation’s IC invested millions of dollars in the development of the 
OSC in McLean, Virginia. The establishment of this modern research facility will help to 
counter terrorist activity throughout the world. The fusion of information collected from 
the OSC and analytic reports from intelligence agencies from around the world allow 
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members of the IC an enhanced perspective on terrorist organizations that threaten the 
United States. Many components of the IC are becoming increasingly dependent on open 
source of information to fulfill their mission, both domestically and abroad. 
The fourth major theme in the literature review was social media and the 
information sharing process. Because terrorist groups develop and plan attacks via the 
Internet, social media has become a valuable tool for threat analysis. Public safety 
organizations also use social media communication capabilities to collaborate between 
law enforcement, EMS, and public health officials during large-scale emergency events. 
The use of social media by public safety agencies will continue to develop and evolve 
into the foreseeable future.  
Local public safety agencies throughout the nation are working to improve their 
threat-related information sharing capabilities. At the same time digital technologies are 
evolving at a rapidly escalating pace. Therefore, it is crucial that local public safety 
organizations keep up with the rapid pace of technology. After a thorough review of the 
literature, it was apparent that a gap exists in clearly identifying the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. Chapter 3 will describe the methodology utilized to conduct the 
research for this study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
This chapter consists of an overview of the research design, rationale, and 
methodology of the study. It also includes a discussion of the role of the researcher and 
issues of trustworthiness. The findings of this study may help to fill a gap in literature on 
the perceived benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between 
public safety agencies. The purpose of the research was to explore the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law 
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii, a midsized 
metropolitan city. I sought to identify how these organizations can improve interagency 
information exchange. I determined that qualitative design was appropriate to explore the 
responses to the research questions for this exploratory case study. General systems 
theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) was the conceptual framework.  
Research Design and Rationale 
I developed the following RQs for this qualitative exploratory case study: 
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information 
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information be-
tween public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
To ensure that an appropriate design was selected for this study, I considered 
various quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approaches. A qualitative 
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exploratory case study was selected to effectively answer the specific research questions. 
In a case study, “the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, of 
one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2009, p. 13). I collected data from several 
individuals. The data were then thoroughly reviewed and analyzed to identify the benefits 
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu.  
Researchers typically use quantitative methods to “examine the relationships 
between and among variables” utilizing surveys and experiments to test hypotheses 
(Creswell, 2009, p. 145). The quantitative process includes “a parsimonious set of 
variables, tightly controlled through design or statistical analysis” to test a theory or 
assumption (Creswell, 2009, p. 145). I opted against using a quantitative design because 
the rigid methodology would not allow adequate investigation of the information sharing 
process between public safety agencies. The deductive manner of quantitative analysis 
was not well suited, I concluded, for this particular research. 
I opted against using a mixed methods design, which involves use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methodology (Creswell & Clark, 2017), because the 
quantitative aspect was not adequately suited to answer the research questions. My 
research relied on inductive open-ended questions rather than deductive closed-ended 
questions. The primary focus was to interpret the meaning inductively, within a flexible 
environment. The inclusion of quantitative data at this phase of an exploratory case study 
would require a research process that was preplanned and structured (Creswell, 2009).  
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Qualitative research differs from quantitative in that researchers become fully 
involved in the process of collecting data. Patton (2002) argued qualitative researchers 
are “interested in investigating a phenomenon to get at the nature of reality with regard to 
that phenomenon” (p. 215). The researcher seeks to thoroughly understand a particular 
phenomenon or event and then explain it to others. Analysis of qualitative data “requires 
reflection on the part of researchers, both before and during the research process, as a 
way of providing context and understanding for readers” (Sutton, & Austin, 2015, p.226). 
Researchers go through painstaking measures to interview participants, examine 
documents related to the topic, and collect other important information that will be 
utilized in the analysis portion the project (Patton, 2002). Qualitative researchers rarely 
utilize prepared instruments to collect their data (Creswell, 2009) and in qualitative 
research “there is no attempt to generalize the findings to a wider population” (Sutton, & 
Austin, 2015, p. 226). Themes should be allowed to develop naturally from the data, 
without the restrictive control deductive inquiry often requires (Creswell, 2009). The 
process depends on the researcher’s skill in analyzing multiple sources of information. 
Creswell (2009) pointed out that “qualitative research builds patterns, categories, and 
themes from the bottom up, by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units 
of information” (p. 175).  
The data collection method for qualitative research evolves and develops as 
information rich cases allow the researcher to uncover unique data for the study (Palinkas 
et al., 2015). Qualitative researchers ensure that they capture the data in the context of 
which was observed by working closely with the participants (Creswell, 2009). Unlike 
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quantitative research, the process is not preplanned or tightly scripted, but emerges as the 
researcher becomes more familiar with the participants and how they interact in the 
context of their environment (Creswell, 2009). Palinkas et al., (2015) point out, 
“qualitative methods are, for the most part, intended to achieve depth of understanding” 
(p.534). Creswell (2009) explained, “the key idea behind qualitative research is to learn 
about the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that 
information” (p. 176).  
A sincere interpretation of what is observed is woven into the fabric of the 
qualitative process. The researcher attempts to determine why individuals behave in a 
particular manner and what are the thoughts and feelings associated with those behaviors 
(Sutton, & Austin, 2015). Regardless of the process of qualitative data collection, there 
will be some researcher clarification involved, as this is a key difference between 
qualitative and quantitative processes. Creswell (2009) explained that “qualitative 
research is a form of interpretive inquiry in which researchers make an interpretation of 
what they see, hear, and understand” (p. 176). Qualitative researchers often interpret a 
particular issue by utilizing multiple perspectives to present a complex image that has 
developed through consistent qualitative processes (Creswell, 2009).  Research for this 
study was intentionally designed to allow me to thoroughly understand the phenomenon, 




Mode of Qualitative Analysis 
I explored several forms of qualitative analysis to determine which type would 
best answer the research question. These included grounded theory, ethnography, 
narrative, phenomenological research, and case studies. After considering these designs, I 
selected a case-study approach for the study. In Ethnography, the researcher focuses on 
specific groups acting within their natural settings over a period of time and attempts to 
describe the culture of the group (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). In grounded theory, 
the researcher “derives a general, abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction 
grounded in the views of participants” (Creswell, 2009, p. 13). Developing patterns and 
relationships of significance within a limited number of participants is the objective of 
phenomenological research (Moustakas, 1994). Narrative research involves having 
individuals provide detailed narratives about life experiences. The researcher goes 
through a process combining detailed narratives from both the participant and the 
researcher into a rich collaborative blend (Clandinin & Connelly, 2009; Creswell, 2009).  
After reviewing multiple forms of qualitative analysis, I confirmed that an 
exploratory case study would best answer the research questions for this study. I 
thoroughly reviewed the influences that helped shape the current state of threat-related 
analysis and information exchange between local public safety organizations. After 
careful examination I determined qualitative analysis would best explore the benefits and 




Role of the Researcher 
As a researcher, my role in this study was to ensure that I provided an accurate 
account of information I collected throughout the research process. The topic of 
investigation was selected through my exposure to threat-related information exchange 
between public safety agencies in Hawaii. I was employed as a health and medical 
analyst at the Hawaii State Fusion Center for approximately five years. It was only 
natural that I decided to focus my PhD dissertation on an information sharing related 
topic, as I was immersed in this intriguing field of work for several years.  
Academic researchers often select topics that are related to their personal or 
professional interests. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) explained that research 
topics are often “related to the researcher’s job, personal relationships, family history, 
social class, or ethnic background” (p.260). It is also important to select a topic of 
research that the researcher finds interesting and engaging at a personal level. Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias pointed out that researchers “emotional involvement in their 
work provides a meaningful link between the personal and emotional lives of the 
researchers and the rigorous requirement of the social scientific endeavor” (p. 261).  
Some of the study participants were individuals that I worked alongside in public 
safety organizations. Others were analysts and administrators from various public safety 
organizations in Hawaii. An advantage to the selection of this topic was that I was 
familiar with the inner workings of public safety organizations in Hawaii. I understood 
the social dynamics of the work environment as well as the professional terminology 




Participant Selection Logic 
 Patton (2002) pointed out, “Sample size depends on what you want to know, the 
purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, 
and what can be done with available time and resources” (p. 244). A qualitative design 
was utilized for this research. This project included data collection from interviews with 
SMEs from four different fields of public safety in Honolulu, Hawaii (law enforcement, 
fire services, EMS, and public health). In-depth interviews were the primary source of 
data collected and was gathered from conversational style discussions with the 
participants utilizing open-ended questions.  
The organizational culture of each agency was an important topic during the con-
versation. The interviews lasted 60 to 90 minutes and were recorded for reference. I took 
notes during the conversations. All interviews took place via a teleconference or in-per-
son meetings. Approval to conduct the study was confirmed through Walden’s institu-
tional review board. Each SME was contacted one month prior to the interviews and the 
purpose of the study was described. An email inviting them to participate in the study 
was mailed along with an informed consent form. The participants were also contacted by 
email prior to the interview to confirm a mutually agreed upon interview date and time. 
The interviews took place via teleconference, in person at the participants private resi-
dence, or a private meeting room at the Hawaii Public Library. The interviews were con-
ducted outside of regular work hours and were kept confidential. I was the only person 
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who knew the identity of the participants and did not disclose their identities to anyone. 
Participants names and/or contact info was not recorded in the research records.  
 Approximately three individuals from four different public safety organizations 
were interviewed, resulting in 13 cases. This number of case interviews provided a clear 
understanding of the benefits and challenges within public safety organizations of sharing 
threat-related information. Individuals who had at least 15 years’ experience sharing 
threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu were 
participants. Individuals recently retired were selected if they met the research study 
selection criteria. Because these individuals were no longer associated with their 
organizations there was no pressure on them to answer the questions in a politically 
sensitive manor. This research was also an opportunity to capture extensive institutional 
knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever.   
 During the interview phase of data collection, a review of the consent form was 
offered to ensure that the participants were aware of the entire interview procedure. The 
participants received a detailed description of the purpose of the research and an 
invitation to participate. The participants were asked to read and sign an Informed 
Consent form with a nameless identifying number in order to keep their identity 
confidential. Consent Forms did not require signatures if the participant could indicate 
consent by returning a completed form with an identifying number. While conducting the 
interviews, I followed all of the steps outlined in the research Interview Protocol 
(Appendix B). I explained that their contribution would provide valuable information to 
the study. The interviews were structured in a manner allowing a smooth transition 
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through the various steps of the interview. Open-ended questions also permitted the 
participant to expand upon any of their answers, as time allowed.  
Instrumentation  
When a researcher collects qualitative data using open-ended questions, “the 
searcher cannot statistically test the validity and reliability of questions” (“Field Testing,” 
2016). To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions 
for this study, I performed a field test of the interview questions prior to the actual inter-
views. To accomplish this, I went into the field and interviewed three individuals which 
had “expert knowledge about the population and research topic to provide feedback on 
the appropriateness of the questions being asked and how the questions are being asked in 
relation to the study focus” (“Field Testing,” para. 4, 2016). These experts helped me to 
refine the interview questions and develop appropriate follow up prompts, inviting more 
conversation along a similar line of thought (“Field Testing,” 2016). The interview ques-
tions were closely linked to the research topic. A detailed chart showing the linkage be-
tween the research questions and the interview questions is available in Appendix C. 
An interview guide was utilized. Patton (2002) explained, “An interview guide is 
prepared to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person inter-
viewed” (p. 343). The interview guide also ensured that the interview followed a relaxed 
agenda in order to utilize the time allotted for each interview effectively (Patton, 2002). A 
loose framework of the interview was predetermined ensuring questions were presented 
to each participant in roughly the same sequence and style. The data was recorded by 
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hand in a field notebook and simultaneously electronically recorded using a portable 
voice recorder. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
 Purposeful sampling was utilized. Subject matter experts that had extensive 
knowledge of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, were be selected for this study. These individuals had the depth of 
knowledge necessary to clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and 
shared between organizations. The primary purpose was to explore communication 
across agencies and examine the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu.  Individuals selected were a 
part of the culture of these organizations and knew the social dynamics of each agency. 
Patton (2002) pointed out, “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively 
small samples, even single cases (N=1), selected purposely” (p.230). It is important to 
select participants that have a rich knowledge of their environment in order to build a 
quality research data set. Patton explained, “The logic and power of purposeful sampling 
lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth” (p.230). This process allows a 
thorough understanding of the information in context. 
 The sample for this study was a subset of SME’s from the larger population 
within four fields of public safety that had extensive experience analyzing and sharing 
threat-related information between agencies. One gap that we often see in sharing of 
threat-related information is who is included, and how do we include public health 
(Hospitals, CDC, etc.). The study participants mirrored the population of the state fusion 
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center. Agencies that currently have representatives at the state fusion center were 
included because these are the organizations that will be active during an event. The 
larger population currently consists of less than 50 SME’s, who work within four fields 
of public safety in Honolulu. For this research, approximately three SME’s were selected 
from each field, which resulted in 13 participants. All individuals had at least 15 years of 
experience in public safety. It would not have been feasible to interview every member of 
the entire population for this study. 
 Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. I identified subject matter experts 
from each of the four fields of public safety. Participants for the study were determined 
based on whether or not they met the inclusion criteria. Research study inclusion criteria 
included: Individuals who worked for a public safety organization in Honolulu, Hawaii; 
They had 15 or more years of experience in information sharing between public safety 
organizations in Honolulu; If retired, within the last 10 years. For this research, the data 
collected from 13 interviews provided a clear understanding of the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies.  
 Qualitative analysis is different than quantitative in the fact that there is no 
optimal number for sample size. It is important to recognize while performing qualitative 
analysis, it is the richness of the cases that are of primary importance. Many highly 
regarded qualitative studies have been accomplished using very small sample sizes. 
Patton (2002) explained, “the validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from 
qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information richness of the cases selected 
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and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with the sample size” 
(p.245). 
 Interviews were arranged with the participants and conducted once, via 
teleconference, the participant’s private residence, or a private meeting room at the 
Hawaii Public Library. The interviews took place outside of regular work hours. 
Questions were asked in a semi-structured, open-ended format. It was anticipated that 
each participant would provide a substantial quantity of information. Patton (2002) 
explained, “the conversational interview offers maximum flexibility to pursue 
information in whatever direction appears to be appropriate, depending on what ever 
emerges from observing a particular setting or from talking with one or more individuals 
in that setting” (p. 342). 
An interview of this type is often described as ethnographic in nature (Patton, 
2002). Because the conversation was allowed to flow in any direction the participant 
preferred, it was not appropriate to offer prepared follow-up questions before hand. 
Therefore, the answers from each individual were unique in nature (Patton, 2002). It was 
extremely important that the participants were allowed to answer in their own distinct 
manner, as this is where significant knowledge was derived from the data. The interviews 
were scheduled several weeks in advance and I personally performed the interviews and 
collected the data for the study. The interview sessions lasted 60 to 90 minutes.  
Data Analysis Plan 
In order to capture accurate information for a qualitative data set, the voice 
recordings along with the field notes were transferred to a laptop computer. The 
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participant responses were then transcribed into written text. Once a draft transcript was 
transposed it was e-mailed to each participant to review to ensure that their responses 
were captured accurately. After the draft transcripts were returned with revisions they 
were entered into NVivo qualitative analysis software for data coding. All of the data 
collected from the participants was considered highly confidential and maintained in an 
encrypted format on a password protected laptop computer that will be held for one year 
and then permanently deleted. The process consisted of identifying key themes in the 
data, while continually reviewing my field notes to ensure that I was capturing the 
participants responses accurately. Maxwell (2013) explained, the key to data analysis is 
ensuring that all transcripts from the participant interviews are reviewed thoroughly and 
accurately.  All of the information was organized, scanned, and prepared so that it could 
be analyzed and coded at a later date. 
 A process of coding was utilized to assist with the process of analyzing the data. 
The key to coding is to allow themes to emerge from the data that makes sense to the 
researcher. Creswell (2013) stated that researchers should develop a codebook for each 
research study. To ensure that I captured the essence of the of the interviews I used a 
coding strategy that consisted of reading through all of the transcripts several times to get 
a deep understanding of what took place during the interviews. I also reviewed my 
written notes, making memos of important facts and details. The next step involved 
classifying the data. Creswell (2013) pointed out “coding involves aggregating text into 
small categories of information” and then assigning an appropriate label (p.184). I then 
developed a short list of codes, or a codebook, which was expanded upon as I continued 
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processing the data (Creswell, 2013). Lastly, I separated all the codes into four or five 
overarching themes that assisted me while writing my discussion and narrative of the 
data. I utilized NVivo computer software throughout the coding process.  
Issues of Trustworthiness  
Credibility 
 Validity and reliability of quantitative data were established for this study through 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability. Creswell (2009) pointed 
out that the trustworthiness and validity of qualitative analysis is extremely important in 
academic research. In order to ensure the credibility of the study several strategies were 
utilized. Creswell explained, “They should answer the reader’s ability to assess the 
accuracy of findings as well as convince readers of that accuracy” (p.191). Multiple data 
sources were analyzed in this research to triangulate the information and better develop 
the themes (Silverman, 2014).  
Transferability 
 The process of data gathering was described in detail, utilizing a rich and thick 
descriptive technique, so that the reader will receive a full and detailed account of each 
participant’s experiences (Creswell, 2009). I attempted to bring insights to the topic and 
enrich the understanding of the phenomenon that was being investigated (Maxwell, 
2013). The process of member checking was utilized in the analysis of the data. This 
allowed the participants the opportunity to comment on, add to, and even change any 




 To ensure the validity of the study, I also included information uncovered that did 
not support the developed themes. This ensured that different perspectives were captured 
when they were presented in the research data. Most themes were built upon evidence 
found in the data collected for the study. Creswell (2009) pointed out that researchers 
“can also present information that contradicts the general perspective of the theme” 
(p.192). This process allows any counter perspectives encountered to also be considered 
by the reader (Creswell, 2009). Peer debriefing was utilized as another validity check for 
the study. Creswell (2009) explained, “This process involves locating a person (a peer 
debriefer) who reviews and asks questions about the qualitative study so that the account 
will resonate with people other than the researcher” (p.192).  
Confirmability 
 Confirmability was established by practicing reflexivity throughout the project. 
Hsiung (2010) defined reflexivity as the ability of the researcher to reflect on him or 
herself and examine the relationship between the researcher and the individual being 
interviewed. An integral part of reflexivity is devoted to “examining one’s ‘conceptual 
baggage,’ one’s assumptions and preconceptions, and how these affect research 
decisions, particularly, the selection and wording of questions” (Hsiung, 2010, para. 1). I 
also utilized my experiential knowledge, consisting of “technical knowledge, research 
background, and personal experiences” to help uncover rich information revealed through 




 In developing a research project there are many ethical issues that must be 
anticipated to protect the integrity of the project. Professional conduct was observed at all 
stages of the research. This included following rigorous guidelines that have been put into 
place by Walden University. Creswell (2009) stated that researchers must go beyond 
what is expected of them ethically. He explained, “Ethical practices involve much more 
than merely following a set of standard guidelines such as those provided by professional 
associations” (p.88). The researcher should be aware of the possibility of ethical issues 
occurring during the research process. Significant problems can occur if ethical 
procedures are not followed from the beginning. Creswell explained, “Deception occurs 
when participants understand one purpose, but the researcher has a different purpose in 
mind” (p.89). This is why researchers should thoroughly explain to the participants how 
the research will be accomplished and what the research will be used for. 
 An air of credibility and trust must be established early on to ensure that the 
information is gathered freely and openly in a safe environment. Walden Internal Review 
Board (IRB) monitors research conducted at the university to ensure that studies do not 
infringe upon the participants civil rights or civil liberties. Confidentiality must be 
discussed, if statements made by the participants are confidential in nature. Creswell 
(2009) explained that federal regulations have been established to ensure IRB committees 
oversee academic research studies and protect the research participants. I ensured that 
Walden IRB approval had been granted before any research was conducted for this study.   
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The study data will be kept in an encrypted password-protected data file on my 
computer for one year, and then it will be permanently deleted. During the study I was 
careful to anticipate any situation that could bring harm to the participant. Patton (2002) 
explained that this process should be well thought out from the beginning, because 
attempts to reduce the impact or damage after the study is completed often leads to 
disaster. During the study I ensured that no language was used that could be considered 
biased or discriminative against anyone.  
Summary 
 In summary, this chapter described a process in which I used in a qualitative 
exploratory case study involving SMEs from four fields of public safety in Honolulu, 
Hawaii. It outlined an effective research design, as well as explained why a qualitative 
approach would best serve this particular topic. It explained that the data was collected 
utilizing in depth interviews of several SMEs who had experience sharing threat-related 
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. It explained the role of the 
researcher and how the topic of investigation was selected for this project. It also 
reviewed the methodology of the process, ensuring that all guidelines established through 
Walden’s institutional review board were followed. The process for recruitment of 
participants, data collection, and data analysis was explained. Trustworthiness concerns 
were integrated into the process to ensure that the study was ethically sound. Chapter 4 





Chapter 4: Results 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits 
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law 
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on 
Honolulu for several reasons. Honolulu is a moderate-sized city and faces many of the 
same challenges as other cities in the continental United States, including the need to 
share information across agencies to manage emerging threat-related issues. However, 
Honolulu is unique because unlike other cities it is remotely isolated, being 
approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. As a result, there is an increased need to 
ensure interagency communication occurs to facilitate the region’s ability to manage an 
attack (Carter & Rip, 2013).  
The gap in the literature was that there is a lack of knowledge about how public 
safety organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Because it 
is essential that these agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, due to 
their unique situation, an exploratory case study of Honolulu public safety agencies 
served as an excellent opportunity for this research. Individuals who had at least 15 years 
of experience sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in 
Honolulu participated in this study. The findings provided a unique understanding of how 
public safety organizations that currently share threat-related information have 
encountered challenges and how these challenges differ between organizations. 
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I developed three RQs for this qualitative exploratory case study. The questions 
were aimed at exploring the benefits and challenges that exist in sharing threat-related 
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. 
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information 
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
Field Test 
To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions 
for this study, I performed a field test of the interview questions prior to the actual 
interviews. To accomplish this, I went into the field and interviewed three individuals 
who had “expert knowledge about the population and research topic to provide feedback 
on the appropriateness of the questions being asked and how the questions are being 
asked in relation to the study focus” (“Field Testing,” 2016, para. 4). These experts 
helped me to refine the interview questions and develop appropriate follow-up prompts. 
Conducting a field test also aided in establishing validity and reliability of the research 
questions. By using this process, I was able to develop interview questions that were 
closely linked to the research topic.  
I e-mailed the Field Test to three SMEs in early January 2018. I received 
responses from all three individuals within 30 days. All three SMEs agreed that the 
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interview questions were appropriate in relation to the study focus and aligned well with 
the research questions. Two of the SMEs submitted suggestions on how to expand on the 
interview questions and continue the conversation on the topic. Field Test Participant 1 
stated:  
Many individual systems comprise the larger system. Threat actors may cross 
through multiple systems in a given period of time. Each organization may 
function as its own system. Problems within one system could be manifesting 
within other systems as well. The sharing of threat information between systems 
is needed to make others aware a threat may exist. Threat identification and 
mitigation strategies identified by one system can be shared to assist neighboring 
systems.  
This observation helped me visualize the individual organizations as separate 
systems within a larger public safety system. It also helped me understand how a violent 
individual could interact with different agencies within the larger public safety system 
and how, if that information was not shared, it could put other first responders at risk. For 
example, an individual may have a hostile or violent interaction with local law 
enforcement agencies on one occasion and several days later have an interaction with 
paramedics. The paramedics may be drawn into a dangerous encounter with a known 
violent individual with no prior warning from police. Therefore, it is vitally important 
that the emergency medical services are aware of individuals who may pose a threat to 
their responders so that they can take the appreciate precautions.  
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Field Test Participant 3, who had many years of experience working in a federal 
law enforcement agency informed me that ongoing law enforcement investigations would 
be a significant factor in an organization’s ability to share information related to the case. 
Field Test Participant 3 noted the tension between how “public safety agencies manage 
public safety, while ensuring no compromises of ongoing open law enforcement cases.” 
This concern was an important factor in my research and was addressed often by study 
participants who were from the field of law enforcement. Although the responses from 
the SMEs did not necessitate a change in the interview questions, they provided valuable 
context on the complexities of sharing information between public safety agencies. Their 
responses helped me to prepare for the interviews with the actual research study 
participants a few months later. A detailed chart showing the linkage between the 
research questions and the interview questions is available in Appendix C. 
Demographics 
I used purposeful sampling to select the participants. Individuals who had 
extensive knowledge of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies 
in Honolulu were selected. These individuals had the depth of knowledge necessary to 
clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and shared between 
organizations. It was important to include participants who had a deep knowledge of the 
public safety environment in order to build “information-rich cases for study” (Patton, 
2002, p. 230). Patton (2002) explained, “Studying information-rich cases yields insights 





Participant Gender Ethnicity    Years in public safety 
350 Male Hawaiian/Filipino/Portuguese 20 years 
351 Male Caucasian    37 years 
352 Female Asian 22 years 
353 Male Asian 34 years 
354 Male Caucasian 28 years 
356 Male Caucasian 33 years 
357 Male Caucasian 39 years 
358 Female Asian 17 years 
362 Male Caucasian 17 years 
363 Male Caucasian 46 years 
364 Female Asian 25 years 
365 Male Part Hawaiian 35 years 
366 Female Caucasian 46 years 
 
The study participants mirrored the population of the Hawaii State Fusion Center. 
At the time of the study, officials at the Hawaii State Fusion Center stated the larger 
population consisted of fewer than 50 SMEs who work within the local public safety 
organizations, including law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health. It would 
not have been feasible to interview every member of the entire population for this study. 
For this research, I selected approximately three SMEs from each field of public safety, 
which resulted in a total of 13 participants (Table 1). Two of the participants were SMEs 
in more than one field of public safety, which enhanced their distinctive knowledge of 
public safety in Hawaii.  
Eleven participants chose to conduct the interview via teleconference, one 
participant preferred to submit the responses to the interview questions via a written 
document rather than take part in an interview, and one chose to conduct the interview at 
the individual’s private residence. The interview process took place over a 5-month 
91 
 
period. Each interview lasted approximately one hour or less, resulting in 92 pages of 
transcribed data (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Interview Descriptive Statistics 
Participant Interview date Interview time  Sessions  Pages transcribed 
350 8/9/2018 44 minutes 1 9 
351 8/30/2018 54 minutes 1 7 
352 10/3/2018 58 minutes 1 11 
353 9/18/2018 50 minutes 1 9 
354 10/25/2018 25 minutes 1 4 
356 9/14/2018 59 minutes 1 12 
357 9/18/2018 31 minutes 1 6 
358 10/3/2018 34 minutes 1 6 
362 9/17/2018 68 minutes 1 13 
363 10/4/2018 26 minutes 1 6 
364 12/3/2018 30 minutes 1 3 
365 1/21/2019 Submitted 
transcript 
1 2 
366 1/11/2019 27 minutes 1 4 
 
All interviews took place outside of the participants’ work schedule. All 
participants in the study had at least 15 years of experience sharing threat-related 
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. Several participants who 
met the research study selection criteria were recently retired. This research proved to be 
an excellent opportunity to capture extensive institutional knowledge from these retired 
public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever.   
Data Collection 
Approval to conduct this study was granted by Walden University’s Institutional 
Review Board assigning the study number 06-14-18-0334016. Purposeful sampling was 
used to identify SMEs within four fields of public safety in Honolulu, including 
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individuals from law enforcement, fire services, EMS and public health. Individuals 
which had a least 15 years of experience sharing information between organizations were 
selected. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the 
benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety 
agencies (law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii.  
Each participant had a rich knowledge of their field of public safety and provided insight 
into what how their organization perceived the benefits and challenges of sharing 
information with other organizations.  
Patton (2002) pointed out, “what would be ‘bias’ in statistical sampling, and 
therefore a weakness, becomes intended focus in qualitative sampling, and therefore a 
strength” (p.230). The strength of purposeful sampling in qualitative research focuses on 
cases that are rich with information about the topic (Patton, 2002). This process allows a 
thorough understanding of the information in the context of the participant’s 
environment. Participants for the study were determined based on whether or not they 
met the inclusion criteria. For this research, the data was collected from 13 in-depth 
interviews and provided a clear understanding of the benefits and challenges of sharing 
threat-related information. I reached saturation at the 11th participant, as no new data was 
being discovered. However, I continued the interviews to include two more participants 
to ensure that I did not find new and unique data in the coding process. Faulkner and 
Trotter (2017) explained, “Data saturation refers to the point in the research process when 
no new information is discovered in data analysis, and this redundancy signals to 
researchers that data collection may cease” (para. 1). 
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The sample was a subset of SMEs from the larger population within four fields of 
public safety in Honolulu, including law enforcement, EMS, fire services, and public 
health. In many large cities, fire services and EMS are housed within the same 
organization. In Honolulu they are separate organizations, thus they were acknowledged 
as separate fields of public safety. Agencies with representatives who coordinate with the 
state fusion center were included, because these are the organizations that are active 
during large public safety events. The larger population currently consists of less than 50 
SMEs who work within local public safety organizations. Approximately three SMEs 
were selected from each field, which resulted in a total of 13 participants. It would not 
have been practical to interview every member of the larger population for this study. 
I began recruiting participants and scheduling interviews in August 2018. Due to 
their busy schedules, it took approximately 5-months to schedule and complete the 
interviews for 13 participants. Each participant was asked if they would like to conduct 
the interview via teleconference, at their residence, or at a private meeting room at a 
Hawaii public library. Eleven participants chose to conduct the interview via 
teleconference, one participant preferred to submit the responses to the interview 
questions via a written document rather than take part in an interview, and one chose to 
conduct the interview at their private residence. All of the interviews took place outside 
of the participants’ work schedule. Four of the interviews took place during the 
participants’ lunch break. Questions were asked in a semi-structured, open-ended format 
and each participant provided a substantial quantity of rich information. All of the 
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interviews were recorded except the one participant who preferred to submit the 
responses to the question via a written text document. 
After each interview I transcribed the recorded information to text. I then e-
mailed the transcription of the interview to each participant so that they could review it to 
ensure that my understanding of their responses was in line with their thought process. 
This process of member checking gave the participant the opportunity to comment on, 
add to, and even change any portion of the data they provided during the interview. I felt 
it was extremely important that the participants were allowed to answer in their own 
distinct manner during the interview and then make changes, if needed, to ensure I was 
capturing their thoughts accurately. Four of the participants made changes and additions 
to their interview data during this process. These individuals reviewed the transcripts 
carefully and added information, such as additional descriptions of an event, or clarifying 
statements that helped to explain their point of view on a topic. This additional 
information richly enhanced the data set. The data collection process took longer than I 
originally anticipated and therefore pushed the timeline of the data collection and analysis 
well into December of 2018.  
Data Analysis 
Data analysis for this study began by selecting 13 participants and interviewing 
them individually. After each interview, I listened to the recorded conversations and 
transcribed them into text and then uploaded all 13 files into NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. All research data was securely stored on a password-protected laptop computer. 
I carefully read through each transcript multiple times looking for common words that I 
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thought had meaning. I began aggregating the words into separate categories and 
assigned descriptive labels in the form of codes (Creswell, 2013). I also reviewed my 
written notes to ensure that I was documenting exactly what the participant expressed to 
me during the interview. I closely followed the coding process outlined by Creswell 
(2014), which includes assembling “raw data (transcripts, fieldnotes), organizing and 
preparing data for analysis, reading through all data, coding the data, interrelating 
themes/description,” and finally “interpreting the meaning of themes/descriptions” (p. 
197). I worked through all of the interview data and then coded each interview question 
separately to ensure that the codes I found during the first process surfaced again during a 
second pass. I sorted the data in NVivo by key words, looking for new and unique codes 
that I had not discovered during my initial attempt. My intent was to develop a thorough 
understanding of what the participants expressed during the interviews. The coding 
protocol is described in Appendix D. 
The coding process resulted in 92 first level codes and 31 second level codes 
(Appendix E). Using a process of inductive analysis, I continued aggregating the 
emerging phrases into categories. Creswell (2014) explained, “in the analysis of the data, 
researchers need to ‘winnow’ the data (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012), a process of 
focusing in on some of the data and disregarding other parts of it” (p. 195). I identified 12 
primary categories: (a) information flow, (b) collaboration, (c) fusion center, (d) 
confidential information, (e) agency culture, (f) different abilities, (g) policy, (h) 




Once I felt confident that the patterns were consistent throughout, I began 
identifying the links in the data by gathering similar codes into categories and similar 
categories into themes. Patton (2002) explained that “inductive analysis involves 
discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one’s data. Findings emerge out of the 
data, through the analyst’s interactions with the data” (p.453). By inductively analyzing 
the codes, categories, and themes, I developed four overarching themes: (a) Information 
flow within and between public safety organizations, (b) A lack of on-going collaboration 
between public safety organizations, (c) Agency participation with the state fusion center, 
and (d) The complexity of sharing confidential information between public safety 
organizations (Table 3). Creswell (2014), pointed out that the intent of qualitative 
analysis is to interpret the meaning of the patterns in the data, “It involves segmenting 
and taking apart the data (like peeling back the layers of an onion) as well as putting it 
back together” (p.195).  
Table 3 
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Information flow within and between public safety organizations was the most 
prominent overarching theme in the data. Many of the participants felt that information 
did not flow smoothly within their departments and consequently out to other 
organizations. Several of the problems stemmed from information being shared only 
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during intermittent urgent situations, rather than establishing an ongoing information 
sharing environment. Participant 364 explained:  
I think that it is sometimes difficult to determine how much information to share, 
or what is pertinent. Also, transparency is important. You may have the top 
people in the organization that know what is going on, but it doesn’t filter down to 
the workforce. The leadership may not feel that it is important to pass information 
down the chain, or even across to other agencies. Even if they do pass information 
down, they may not pass all of the information, or leave out important details. 
They may filter what they want to pass down, which could be dangerous. 
(Participant 364, personal communication, December 3, 2018).  
Participant 352 pointed out:  
I think if it's not done on a regular basis, it may not be properly received, or there 
may not be a mechanism to receive and act on the information. So, we've got to 
have something in place so that when the information is pushed, or shared, or 
whatever, now I can receive it and I can deal with it, as opposed to what is this 
about, why are you calling me, what am I supposed to do with this. (Participant 
352, personal communication, October 3, 2018)? 
Several of the participants stated that information sharing between public safety 
organizations is a relatively new concept. Participant 353 explained:  
Sharing of information between public safety organizations, or for that matter 
within units within an organization is a newer phenomenon. I will tell you 30 
years ago, people didn’t tell anyone about their investigation, they would not to 
99 
 
tell other people within the police department, for example, or they wouldn’t tell 
federal law-enforcement, or other state agencies. They just didn’t tell anyone 
because it was a need to know situation. (Participant 353, personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
A lack of ongoing collaboration between public safety organizations was the 
second overarching theme. An ongoing collaborative environment allows multiple 
agencies with different perspectives to view the threat information and analyze it from 
different points of view. Participant 358 explained, “The benefits are awareness. I just 
had a meeting with an FBI colleague discussing some of these things. I believe that we 
have different perspectives on the same information, so there could be some helpful sort 
of awareness, so that we can address the issues that we tend to address. For them it is law 
enforcement issues, for us it may be disease issues, disease threats. It’s how that 
information is shared, and what particular information is shared” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). Many of the participants stated it is vital that public 
safety organizations collaborate with one another on a daily basis rather than just when an 
emergency event brings them together. Participant 352 pointed out, “It's a really bad day 
if you're meeting your fellow responder for the first time, as you enter a life-and-death 
situation” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Agency participation with the state fusion center was the third overarching theme. 
Many of the participants stated that it is important that their agency participate with the 
fusion center so that threat-related information was disseminated across all public safety 
agencies simultaneously. Participant 366 explained, “If we are sharing information, then 
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everyone has the same information and it provides better protection for the public. If we 
don’t share, then we just open ourselves up and any type of situation could happen. Only 
a few agencies may have that information and if we want to be responsive, it is going to 
take all of us to be responsive, not just one agency. Security is not one agency’s 
responsibility, it is all of our responsibility” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).  
The complexity of sharing confidential information between public safety 
organizations was the fourth overarching theme in the data. Many participants stated that 
it is often difficult to share information due to its sensitive nature, or its relation to an 
ongoing law enforcement investigation. Participant 366 explained, “I think the challenges 
are, number one, the interpretation of the information. Number two, how timely that 
information is. If you are sharing information via Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN), or the computer, or email, is everyone looking at the same information? 
Also, the sensitivity of that information. While you may have a disclaimer on that 
material and have a need to know, others may be sharing with people who do not have a 
need to know” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
  By inductively analyzing the participants responses to the interview questions, I 
linked the overarching themes to the study’s research questions (Table 4). RQ1 asks, how 
are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information between one another 
in Honolulu, Hawaii? The most prominent overarching theme in the data, information 
flow within and between public safety organizations, linked to RQ1. Agencies in 
Honolulu are communicating via information flow within and between organizations; 
however, in some cases this flow of information was intermittent. Several problems 
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stemmed from information being shared only during urgent situations. Establishing an 
ongoing information sharing environment between organizations is necessary to ensure 
that information is effectively shared in an all situations.  
RQ2 asks, what are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The second 
overarching theme in the data linked to RQ2, indicating that there was a lack of an 
ongoing collaborative environment between public safety agencies that allows multiple 
agencies with different perspectives to view threat-related information and analyze it 
from different points of view. Because agencies have different skills and expertise, it is 
important that they collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information. The fourth 
overarching theme in the data, the complexity of sharing confidential information 
between public safety organizations, also linked to RQ2. Some threat-related information 
contains highly protected, or law enforcement sensitive information and is difficult to 
share between agencies. It is important that agencies develop a process, through ongoing 
collaboration to share this sensitive information.  
RQ3 asks, what can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? RQ3 linked to the third overarching 
theme in the data, agency participation with the state fusion center. Ongoing agency 
participation with the state fusion center is vitally important to allow threat-related 
information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with different skills and expertise, and 
then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously. 
Table 4  
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Table Linking Research Questions to Overarching Themes 
Research questions  Overarching themes 
RQ1. How are public safety 
agencies communicating threat-
related information between one 
another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
Information flow within and between public 
safety organizations. 
RQ2. What are the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety 
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
A lack of ongoing collaboration between public 
safety organizations. 
 
The complexity of sharing confidential 
information between public safety organizations. 
RQ3. What can be done to 
improve the sharing of threat-
related information between public 
safety agencies in Honolulu, 
Hawaii? 
Agency participation with the State Fusion 
Center. 
 
Discrepant cases were also included in the analysis. In the Study Results section, I 
included contradictory perspectives on several topics. Different perspectives are 
important to understand the complexities of sharing threat-related information in a real 
world environment. Creswell (2009) explained, “researchers can also present information 
that contradicts the general perspective of the theme. By presenting this contradictory 
evidence, the account becomes more realistic and hence valid” (p.192). 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
Creswell (2009) pointed out that researchers using qualitative analysis should 
carefully document their procedures, describing the multiple steps of the research to 
demonstrate the reliability of the study. Throughout the data collection and analysis 
process I carefully described every step involved in order to assure the reader that the 
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information was accurately collected and examined. I triangulated multiple sources of 
data including participant interviews, field notes and supporting publicly available 
documents to develop the themes in the data.  
In order to enhance the validity of the research, the participants were selected 
from various professions within four fields of public safety to allow for multiple 
perspectives. Creswell (2009) explained, “if themes are established based on converging 
several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed 
as adding to the validity of the study” (p.191).  
Transferability 
 I attempted to describe the collection and analysis of the data for the study in a 
rich descriptive manner to enhance the explanation of the process to the reader (Creswell, 
2009). I first collected the research data through in-depth interviews, which were 
recorded, and then transcribed the data to written text exactly as it was communicated to 
me. I then e-mailed the transcription of the interview to each participant so that they 
could review it to ensure that my understanding of their responses was in line with their 
thought process, intentions, and understanding. This process of member checking gave 
the participant the opportunity to comment on, add to, and even change any portion of the 
data they provided during the interview. Several of the participants made changes and 
valuable additions to their interview data during this process which richly enhanced the 




In an effort to strengthen the validity of the study, I coded all of the data that I 
received from the interview transcripts. I worked diligently to include all the viewpoints 
of the participants throughout the study, including information that contradicted the 
majority perspective (Creswell, 2009). This process allows counter perspectives to be 
uncovered and considered as the reader moves through my description of the data 
(Creswell, 2009). I utilized peer debriefing as another validity check in the study by 
asking a public safety SME at the PhD level to review my analysis of the data and ask 
questions about any aspect of the process (Creswell, 2009). This helped me to uncover 
errors and/or weaknesses in the process that might catch the attention of the reader.    
Confirmability 
I established confirmability by applying reflexivity throughout the data collection 
and analysis process. Reflexivity is described as the ability of the researcher to reflect on 
themselves to examine the relationship between the researcher and the individual being 
interviewed (Hsiung, 2010). Hsiung (2010) pointed out, “reflexivity is the process of 
examining both oneself as researcher, and the research relationship” (para. 1).” The 
researcher must examine their own preconceptions, and how this may affect the wording 
of the interview questions (Hsiung, 2010). Before I finalized the research questions for 
this study, I performed a field test to ensure the interview questions were as free from 
bias as possible and suitable to explore the research questions (Appendix F). The field 
test consisted of interviewing three individuals who had “expert knowledge about the 
population and research topic to provide feedback on the appropriateness of the questions 
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being asked and how the questions are being asked in relation to the study focus” (“Field 
Testing,” 2016). I also utilized my first-hand knowledge, consisting of “technical 
knowledge, research background, and personal experiences” in the field of public safety 
to help uncover rich information revealed through the in-depth interview process 
(Strauss, 1987; Maxwell, 2013, p. 45).  
Study Results 
In the following section I present each research study question along with 
responses from the participants. In the Interpretation of Findings, I discuss the three most 
prominent themes that emerged from the data for each specific question.  
Interview Question 1 
The question was, what are the benefits of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following responses were 
provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “being able to communicate and then kind of validating if 
something is really a threat” (personal communication, August 9, 2018).  
Participant 351 stated, “why would we need to know what kind of chemical? 
Well, a lot of reasons, one for the medical people to treat it, if it happens” (personal 
communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “I think a third thing that it will do is that it will broaden 
the perspective of the group. Because in a way you're enhancing the collective wisdom 




Participant 353 stated, “the benefits are obviously keeping our community safe 
and preventing terrorist attacks, whether domestic or foreign, or self-radicalized” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “I think with the sharing you get a bigger picture. Some 
agencies may have a piece of the puzzle another agency doesn’t have, and then put it 
altogether” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “one agency doesn't have expertise in every single 
potential threat to our community, there's no way we could understand or learn about this 
information without threat sharing between the agencies and having an organized manner 
to disseminate that information” (personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “for the sharing of information in real time during 
responses, and to maximize coordination and minimize the impact on the community 
during those responses” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “the benefits are awareness. I just had a meeting with an 
FBI colleague discussing some of these things. I believe that we have different 
perspectives on the same information, so there could be some helpful sort of awareness” 
(personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “the benefits are it keeps everyone on the same page. I 
mean if one agency knows something criminal related, or law enforcement, or public 
safety related and it's important that the other agencies ought to know also” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2018). 
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Participant 363 stated, “that's pretty easy, the benefits are everybody knows the 
same information at the same time. The trouble is getting the trust and rapport good 
enough that people at the higher-ups will actually share the threat information” (personal 
communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “I think that some of the benefits are it makes for a better 
coordinated effort between agencies. I think that it also keeps everybody informed and on 
the same page” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “agencies will commit to more focused assessments and 
risk analysis in their daily operations and at emergency incidents” (personal 
communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “first of all, we are too small for every agency to have their 
own information network. It has got to be shared, so that we collectively are collaborating 
on what needs to be done” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview 1. Participant responses were analyzed 
according to their perception of the benefits of sharing threat-related information between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu. All 13 participants stated that collaboration was a 
benefit of sharing information. The different abilities of each public safety agency and 
information flow within and between agencies also ranked high in the responses to the 
question. The chart in Figure 1 highlights the number of participants who mentioned 




Figure 1. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
1. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 1 focused on 
collaboration. The participants stated that having all of the public safety agencies on the 
same page was very important. It is also essential that these agencies establish an ongoing 
collaborative relationship with one another before they arrived at the scene of a major 
incident and must work together. Participant 366 touched on the theme collaboration by 
explaining, “First of all, we are too small for every agency to have their own information 
network. It has got to be shared so that we collectively are collaborating on what needs to 
be done” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
The second theme in the responses to this question was different abilities of each 
public safety organization. Many participants offered the opinion that one agency cannot 
know all of the threat-related information, and each agency views threat-related 
information from a different perspective. Law enforcement perceives threat-related data 
much differently than public health; however, each organization can provide valuable 

















public safety agencies have access to the same information, it leads to a much more 
coordinated response.  
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow. Several 
participants stated that information flow is essential within organizations and also 
between organizations. Often information may flow effectively within an organization 
but is then blocked internally before it is shared with other organizations. Participant 350 
explained, “some of the benefits right off the top is validating. Being able to actually 
validate what are really actual threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018). 
Interview Question 2 
The question was, how does sharing threat-related information between public 
safety organizations help identify and prevent threats to the public? The following 
responses were provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “the agencies can identify gaps and aid each other by 
bringing resources to bear in those gaps, in those areas that help deter, help detect, and 
help respond to specific threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated, “one thing is the awareness for the staff, and way back 
when, and the cleaning staff, you know that make up the rooms. There were products for 
law enforcement only, and it says what to look for, identifiers” (personal communication, 
August 30, 2018). Participant 351 continued, “who’s in hotel rooms. You’ve got to make 




Participant 352 stated, “it's a really bad day if you're meeting your fellow 
responder for the first time, as you enter a life-and-death situation” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “it is important to share information because they may 
have different pieces of the puzzle, the same puzzle” (personal communication, 
September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “the Customs and Border Patrol intelligence officer 
realized that in California they were getting ship containers that were coming from 
Vietnam or Thailand that were filled with the wrong refrigerant that could possibly 
explode” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). Participant 354 continued, “I 
notified my department to see if we had any other containers coming into Honolulu, and 
we were able to establish a big response and standby with police and fire at the docks 
while they carefully unloaded these things” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “I think it goes back to the old saying, you don't know 
what you don't know. In our agency for instance, the drugs of abuse, the narcotics with 
contamination of first responders and the need for mega doses of Naloxone” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “information being gathered by the law enforcement 
community is critical to the safety of the responders, not only to the responders to that 
particular incident, but also to developing the response protocol to protect the responders 
from secondary events” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
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Participant 358 stated, “obviously we deal with a lot of sensitive information so 
we want to be aware of potential cyber threat concerns, because we don’t want any 
compromise of our data which could impact public health” (personal communication, 
October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “say, whoever gets the information, the organic 
information does put it out to the news or something, do all of the law enforcement 
agencies see that at the same time, no, because they are busy” (personal communication, 
September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “so, it's important again, more eyes on the on the 
precursors, more eyes on anybody that is being crazy out there. Talking crazy, acting 
crazy, buying guns and other bad stuff” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 363 also stated, “the people who can actually do something are those folks 
who are out there like cops. Get the information back through HSIN through LEEP (FBI 
Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal), get it back to the JTTF (FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Force)” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “say that law enforcement is watching a certain person 
because they believe that they are a threat and they have information from an employer 
that this person is a loose cannon” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant continued, “then EMS responds to the house and sees weapons. If EMS had 
known that beforehand, they could have informed law enforcement earlier and possibly 
avoided a dangerous situation” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
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Participant 365 stated, “emergency medical personnel are the first indicators of 
the health of the community and can detect sharp increases in medical emergencies 
stemming from possible chemical/biological threats” (personal communication, January 
11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “if we are sharing information, then everyone has the same 
information and it provides better protection for the public. If we don’t share, then we 
just open ourselves up, and any type of situation could happen” (personal 
communication, January 11, 2019).  
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 2. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their perception of how sharing of threat-related information 
between public safety organizations helps to identify and prevent threats to the public. 
Seven of the participants stated that collaboration and responder safety was an important 
factor. Safety of the public also ranked high in the number of the responses to this 
question. The chart in Figure 2 highlights the number of participants who mentioned 
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Figure 2. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
2. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 2 focused on 
collaboration between public safety agencies. By sharing information, the agencies can 
identify gaps and provide collaborative resources to protect the safety of the public. 
Participant 351 indicated that the information must be pushed, not only to public safety 
professionals, but also to individuals in the private sector such as hotel security and 
cleaning staff who might have access to important threat-related information within the 
hotels. Participant 352 stated that responders should work together collaboratively before 
they are forced to meet during an actual incident.  
The second theme in the responses to this question centered around responder 
safety. One agency may have information that can add a piece of the puzzle held 
primarily by another organization. Threat-related information not shared by one agency 
may put other responders’ safety at risk, such as EMS when they enter a domestic 
violence scene to render medical care. Participant 357 touched on this theme by pointing 
out, “information being gathered by the law enforcement community is critical to the 
safety of the responders, not only to the responders to that particular incident but also to 
developing the response protocol to protect the responders from secondary events” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).  
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on safety of the public. 
Participants were acutely aware that their actions, or inactions, affect the safety of the 
public. As an example, cyber-attack information that results in breached data should be 
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shared between agencies so that they can better protect their networks from unauthorized 
intrusion. Participant 358 explained, “we deal with a lot of sensitive information, so we 
want to be aware of potential cyber threat concerns, because we don’t want any 
compromise of our data which could impact public health” (Personal communication, 
October 3, 2018). 
Interview Question 3 
The question was, how does communication software play a role in the sharing of 
threat-related information? The following responses were provided by the interview 
participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “in this day and age, the technological advances in 
communication software, really what it does is it allows us to communicate in real-time, 
overtly, covertly, across multiple agencies” (personal communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated, “the office of homeland security finances HHVISA 
(Hawaii Hotel Visitor Industry Security Association), HIORCA (Hawaii Organized 
Crime Alliance) and Safe Keiki websites, so important, the buy-in” (personal 
communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “I think it helps to build a network and a mechanism, for 
sharing that will remove that that margin for individual error” (personal communication, 
October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “besides the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN), and FBI’s Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP), I could also to a certain 
respect include the Hawaii High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and the 
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Western States Information Network (WSIN)” (personal communication, September 18, 
2018). Participant 353 added. “I think they all play a major role in collecting information, 
categorizing information, sharing information and then add to that notifying an agency if 
there is a conflict. That’s typically the way deconfliction works” (personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354: “I think one it allows all first responders in Honolulu to access 
the HSIN stuff. Not only to see what is going on here in Hawaii, but in the bigger picture, 
to get information from across the entire nation” (personal communication, October 25, 
2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “personal health care information, response capabilities, 
response patterns. Not to the level of classified or top-secret or anything like that, but it 
definitely is for official use only type of information where you just don't want that 
widely disseminated” (personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “right now, we are looking at implementing software 
applications for an immediate notification of key city department heads. That was a 
missing piece in our response protocols” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “in terms of disease management, we have our own disease 
management software for monitoring trends from our surveillance data, but in terms of 
broadly, no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “there are several ways that communication software plays 
a role. We currently use our intranet system exclusively for passing information up and 
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down within the organization, but you are not always logged on” (personal 
communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “I think it is getting better because of community access to 
HSIN. That's a really big deal, that's huge. Non-law enforcement people get in there and 
we know who they are, and they become a trusted partner” (personal communication, 
October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “if you put it in writing it can be a good reference. We can 
avoid misinterpretation or a situation where we send out the wrong message. So, I think 
that it is very important” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “most public safety agencies using social media, websites, 
and wireless emergency alerts are effective in providing information rapidly to the 
public” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “everyone has the same platform of information to work 
from. Versus, if we picked up the telephone and we called someone, how did you hear it, 
and how I hear it and how the next person hears it may be different” (personal 
communication, January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 3. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their perception of the role communication software plays in the 
sharing of threat-related information. Eight of the participants stated that secure websites 
played a significant role in the sharing of threat-related information. Information flow 
and electronic communication also ranked high in the number of the responses to this 
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question. The chart in Figure 3 highlights the number of participants who mentioned 
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 3. 
               
Figure 3. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
3. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 3 pertained to 
storing data on secure websites. Various online portals are utilized by public safety 
organizations in Honolulu including, HSIN, LEEP, and WSIN, which allow law 
enforcement and other public safety officials to share sensitive threat-related information 
in a secure portal. Only vetted individuals who have completed background checks are 
allowed to access these portals. One of the challenges is encouraging people to utilize 
these assets and login to the portals to check for new and updated information. Participant 
354 explains, “it allows all first responders in Honolulu to access the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) stuff. Not only to see what is going on here in Hawaii, but 
in the bigger picture, to get information from across the entire nation” (personal 





















The second theme in the responses to this question pertained to utilizing 
communication software within their own organizations and then passing pertinent threat-
related information out to other organizations so that all of the public safety organizations 
have a common operating picture of the potential threats in their region. Participant 366 
explained, “everyone has the same platform of information to work from. Versus, if we 
picked up the telephone and we called someone, how did you hear it, and how I hear it 
and how the next person hears it may be different” (personal communication, January 11, 
2019). 
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on disseminating threat-
related information to other organizations in real-time, utilizing electronic 
communications software during critical events. Participant 364 commented on this 
concept stating, “if you put it in writing it can be a good reference. We can avoid 
misinterpretation or a situation where we send out the wrong message. Effective 
communication can reach a larger number of people” (personal communication, 
December 3, 2018).  
Interview Question 4 
The question was, what are the challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following responses were 
provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “I believe the classification of information is a challenge. 
How we classify what information we have really depends on who's going to see it, or 
how it's going to get shared” (personal communication, August 9, 2018)? 
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Participant 351 stated, “for instance when CIU (Criminal Intelligence Unit) comes 
to a partner's meeting, almost invariably, they never say a word, zero. I'm constantly told 
by administrators of the police they are there just to absorb” (personal communication, 
August 30, 2018). Participant 351 continued, “if they can't give us techniques and 
procedures, there's something to look out for, then we don't need them in the partners 
meeting because we are there to share information” (personal communication, August 30, 
2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “I think if it's not done on a regular basis, it may not be 
properly received, or there may not be a mechanism to receive and act on the info” 
(personal communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 continued, “I think it is a 
challenge right now, because I think if you were to call EMS today, or even Fire, with 
some sort of active threat info, would they know what to do with that information” 
(personal communication, October 3, 2018)? 
Participant 353 stated, “sometimes the providing agency of the information, the 
investigators work hard, they work extensively, and maybe months of arduous work on 
this investigation then when it is given to another agency” (personal communication, 
September 18, 2018). Participant 353 went on to say, “the agency that provided 
information would like to be acknowledged or receive some credit for it. Sometimes that 
does not happen” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “I think one of the challenges is if you share too much, or 
someone leaks it out to the public or to the media, it could possibly ruin an ongoing 
investigation” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
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Participant 356 stated, “the biggest challenge is trust and making sure the 
information is secure. Because in any agency, federal, state, or local governments, there's 
always a few people who want to share things with the media and share things with their 
friends” (personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “I don’t see any major barriers at this point of time in 
Honolulu. I think we have an excellent sharing of information amongst our public safety 
agencies” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “I think it’s knowing what it is they might, or might not, be 
interested in” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 358 added, “let me 
know if they [FBI] felt there was something that they needed to know, because I wouldn’t 
necessarily know if there was something nefarious about a particular bunch of cases we 
are investigating, or outbreak or whatever” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “do they have a system set up to be able to share between 
public safety agencies other than just a phone call between people that know each other” 
(personal communication, September 17, 2018). Participant 362 added, “is there a 
software system set up, is there a bridge built to be able to share threat information, other 
than the news” (personal communication, September 17, 2018)? 
Participant 363 stated, “the senior level guys, they get bonuses for having these 
meetings and showing that they're sharing. They get out of the meeting and then they bad 
mouth, oh I had to share, I had to, had to share” (personal communication, October 4, 
2018). Participant 363 added, “it's a reluctance that they're losing their power, they're 
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losing. They think, I don't have complete control over my information anymore. My 
information. I've heard it at many meetings” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “it may make it more of a competition between certain 
agencies. Say, for example law enforcement wants to be the one to track down the bad 
guy, or be a hero, so they may not share the information as necessary” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “Agencies need to evaluate and react appropriately to 
threat-related information” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “I think the challenges are, number one, the interpretation 
of the information. Number two, how timely that information is. If you are sharing 
information via HSIN, or the computer, or email, is everyone looking at the same 
information” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 added, “while 
you may have a disclaimer on that material and have a need to know, others may be 
sharing with people who do not have a need to know” (personal communication, January 
11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 4. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their perception of the challenges of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Nine of the participants stated 
that confidential information was a challenge of sharing of threat-related information. 
Information flow and agency culture were other themes which ranked high in the 
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 4 highlights the number of participants 
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 4. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
4. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 4 centered 
around the complexity of sharing confidential and protected information between public 
safety organizations. When information contains details that are confidential or sensitive 
it can only be shared with people that have a legitimate need to know that information 
(e.g. active police investigations). Also, classified national security information can only 
be shared if the receiver has a national security clearance and is authorized to receive the 
information. Therefore, sharing this type of information with all public safety 
organizations is not possible. Confidentiality of information inherently inhibits the ability 
to share information. Participant 356 stated, “the biggest challenge is trust and making 
sure the information is secure. Because in any agency, federal, state, or local 
governments, there's always a few people who want to share things with the media and 
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The second theme in the responses to this question pertained to information flow 
within and between organizations. It is important to build paths for information to flow 
within agencies so that when it is received, it can be disseminated to the right people 
within the organization. Participant 352 pointed out that information must be shared on a 
regular basis for agencies to develop the processes to utilize it, or eventually the flow of 
information will stop. Participant 352 explained, “I think if it's not done on a regular 
basis, it may not be properly received, or there may not be a mechanism to receive and 
act on the info” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).   
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on agency culture. When 
threat-related information is shared between agencies there is always a concern that the 
information may be inadvertently shared to the wrong people or to the media. Participant 
364 explained, “In some situations we may not know who the good guy is, and who the 
bad guy is. If information is shared carelessly, someone may tip off the bad guys” 
(personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Interview Question 5 
The question was, please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to 
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations. The following 
responses were provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated that national security clearances create a barrier. He 
explained, “we kind of touched on it, but I think you know again it is the clearance” 
(personal communication, August 9, 2018). Participant 350 added, “here in Honolulu we 
have multiple military installations from every branch of service you know from the basic 
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military unit level all the way up to the combatant command level and so, there's a lot of 
information flowing about threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018) 
Participant 351 stated, “HPD has a Crime Analysis Unit. We wanted to hook up 
with them and share information. The last administration said no. So, it’s that lack of data 
that we're getting, well that we're not getting” (personal communication, August 30, 
2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “law enforcement does a great job dealing with the 
information coming in and sifting through it and deciding what's relevant and what's not. 
There's no medical perspective or no healthcare perspective that is viewing that 
intelligence or that data” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “sharing of information between public safety 
organizations or for that matter within units within an organization is a newer 
phenomenon. I will tell you 30 years ago people didn’t tell anyone about their 
investigation” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “the only real barrier that I can think of was that the 
HIDTA wanted to do drug raids on suspected houses that were producing illegal drugs. 
They wanted a way to warn us [Firefighters/EMS] if we responded to that house” 
(personal communication, October 25, 2018). Participant 354 added, “they had to be very 
careful about not sharing the information so that it would not get back to the criminals” 
(personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “the second barrier is I think, that just not everyone 
understands the importance of information sharing” (personal communication, September 
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14, 2018). Participant 356 added, “people who've been in one lane for many years in their 
agency and they are kind of in this tunnel and don't realize what's going on in the world 
around them, actually affects your agency” (personal communication, September 14, 
2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “we [Honolulu county government] do have the public 
safety response functions, we are much more attuned to planning and preplanning for 
these events, but it does become very important to include functions of state government 
in this as well” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 357 added, 
“that is going to be a bigger challenge because they are not focused towards a public 
safety function. At least in the state of Hawaii” (personal communication, September 18, 
2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “if we are going to be sharing data with entities who don’t 
normally deal with protecting health information, personal information on a day-to-day 
basis, how do we get assurance that they have appropriate training” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “lack of education or knowledge of the benefits of sharing 
information. Another one would be lack of manpower or at least not allocating resources 
that should be. The third one would be the political will” (personal communication, 
September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “so that's all we're supposed to do is filter that stuff and 
you have to be judicious on how you filter it, because what you filter out might be what 
somebody else needs” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
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Participant 364 stated, “you may have the top people in the organization that 
know what is going on but it doesn’t filter down to the workforce” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). Participant 364 added, “even if they do pass 
information down, they may not pass all of the information or leave out important details. 
They may filter what they want to pass down, which could be dangerous” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “one perceived barrier could be that dedicated resources 
within a department specifically focused on the intelligence function. With personnel 
staffing functions so difficult to procure, the intelligence function would be assigned as 
an additional duty” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “the different levels in which the DPS (Department of 
Public Safety), the DLNR (Department of Land and Natural Resources), the AG 
(Attorney General) and the HPD all relate to one another. They are not all on the same 
level.” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 also added, “I think 
that hurts us because I don’t think that we communicate enough together. How do we 
bring everyone together? I don’t think we do that very well” (personal communication, 
January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 5. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their perception of the top three barriers at their respective 
organizations to sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations. 
Seven of the participants stated that information flow was a barrier when sharing threat-
related information. Different abilities and employee training were themes which also 
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ranked in the top three responses to this question. The chart in Figure 5 highlights the 
number of participants who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview 
Question 5.         
              
Figure 5. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
5. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 5 focused on 
information flow within and between organizations. Often, the leadership of an 
organization may be receiving information but does not chose to pass all of the 
information down to the rest of the organization. Participant 364 pointed out: 
It is often difficult for leadership to determine what information to share and how 
much information to share. Because leadership is not continually working at the 
operations level, they may not pass down information that is important to the 
responders on the street, or they may only pass down a portion of the information 





























is not passed down, they are filtering it in one form or another. (Participant 364, 
personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
The second theme in the responses to this question focused on the different 
abilities of each public safety organization. Each agency is proficient at what they do on a 
daily basis; however, each excels at different skills. Law enforcement may be very good 
at determining threats related to an active shooter situation, but not skilled at detecting 
threats from a health or medical related emergency. Participant 352 pointed out, “If the 
threat-related information is not viewed by subject matter experts in various fields of 
public safety, such as medical or public health, critical information may be missed which 
may pose an unintentional risk to the public” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).  
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on employee training. In 
order to share information effectively, organizations must invest in the appropriate 
training for staff members who are designated to receive and transmit confidential or 
sensitive data. Participant 358 explained, “If we are going to be sharing data with entities 
who don’t normally deal with protecting health information, personal information on a 
day-to-day basis, how do we get assurance that they have appropriate training” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). 
A discrepant response to this question focused on financial resources. A lack of 
financial recourses could restrict an organizations ability to assign staff to participate in 
information sharing environments. Participant (356) pointed out, “if we were unable to 
fund someone's participation in something like the fusion center and we were also unable 
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to fund someone to generate our own research, to disseminate our own information, that's 
a barrier” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).  
Interview Question 6 
The question was, how does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related 
information between public safety organizations? The following responses were provided 
by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “I guess it's really dependent upon if we are nearing an 
election season for politics; depending on who is running and gunning for positions. I 
would say that sometimes the politics are from even within their own unions” (personal 
communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated: “So HPD's culture you know well, not to share, not to 
release but to work things internally. That is the culture of HPD” (personal 
communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “one is that the director overseeing the department that 
contains EMS is appointed by the mayor. So, every time you change the mayor you 
probably are going to change that director and so you have a lack of continuity” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 also added, “that director may have 
little or no medical background and yet they're seen as being in a position that should be 
the medical lead for the city. So, I think that's usually problematic and that's entirely 
political” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “the importance of the fusion center. Whether they are 
firefighters or police officers, through the wish of the chief, if the chief wants those 
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personnel back and staffed somewhere else then there is no one at the fusion center” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 also added, “that’s a big 
impact and that is a big policy decision that could play a role” (personal communication, 
September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “one of the big ones would be funding” (personal 
communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “We were appointed and when you're appointed you have 
to follow the orders of your elected official or you get fired. So, what I noticed in the 
Health Department is they were very nervous about upsetting tourists” (personal 
communication, September 14, 2018). Participant added, “I appreciated that and 
understood that, but that was a political reality as a barrier. Not so much of the 
information we released internally as information sharing, but what we released to the 
public” (personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated, “within state government, many of the state government 
functions culturally do not see types of responses as being part of their mission or even 
part of their responsibility and that is going to take a cultural shift” (personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “starting with the real politics. There are state legislators 
and even congressional members who seem to think that they should be privy to 
everything, no matter what. They get very irate when we politely decline and tell them 
no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
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Participant 362 stated, “The people making decisions are not the people on the 
ground, they are not getting the information from people on the ground to help them 
guide their decisions at the top. That is the biggest problem. This is information sharing” 
(personal communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “that really affects the intelligence community the police, 
fire, EMS, their budgets. I get more votes because I help the homeless or I do something 
with the urban stuff. I don’t get more votes by having more cops on the street” (personal 
communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “people may have alternative motives such as, if we make 
our organization look better, we will get more funding next year, purchase more 
equipment and improve the organization” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “In my experience amongst numerous administrations, 
politics will enhance or diminish the importance of sharing threat-related information.  
Politics can impact the procurement of vital equipment in information sharing and the 
staffing of new positions” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “Because of the geography and the political climate here I 
think people feel they are protected. They do not feel that there is a great threat against 
the state of Hawaii” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 added, 
“it would be nice if everything could remain open as it did many years ago. But I think 
we still put many people at risk by not implementing security measures” (personal 
communication, January 11, 2019). 
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Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 6. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their perception of how politics plays a role in the sharing of 
threat-related information between public safety organizations. Nine of the participants 
stated that politics played a significant role in the sharing of threat-related information. 
Agency culture and information flow were themes which also ranked in the top three 
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 6 highlights the number of participants 
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 6. 
              
Figure 6. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
6. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 6 focused on 
politics. The participants indicated that the political environment at any given time could 
affect the sharing of threat-related information. State or county political leadership may 
request information that is sensitive, such as personally identifiable data or law 
enforcement sensitive information that cannot be shared outside of individuals with a 
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are state legislators and even congressional members who seem to think that they should 
be privy to everything, no matter what. They get very irate when we politely decline and 
tell them no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Within each agency politics at the leadership level also plays a role in the sharing 
of information. Participant 353 explained, “the importance of the fusion center. Whether 
they are firefighters or police officers, through the wish of the chief, if the chief wants 
those personnel back and staffed somewhere else then there is no one at the fusion 
center” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 added, “that’s a 
big impact and that is a big policy decision that could play a role” (personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
The second theme in the responses to this question was agency culture within an 
organization. According to the participants, some public safety organizations are very 
protective of their programs which leads to less sharing of information between agencies. 
A perceived competition between agencies or even between agency sponsored public 
safety campaigns can affect information sharing. Participant 354 stated:  
Like what we are doing here with the see something say something [campaign]. I 
remember going to the meetings and crime stoppers representatives were there, 
and they were totally against it because they had a similar program and they 
thought that it would interfere with their operation. They did not want us to push 
the agenda of the see something say something and take away from their program. 
So, I know that that was kind of a huge political. I guess the politics between the 
organizations. (Participant 354, personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
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Participants also described a reluctance to share due to entrenched agency culture. 
Participant 351 stated: 
So HPD's culture you know well, not to share, not to release but to work things 
internally. That is the culture of HPD. I'll tell you exactly, so when we asked the 
last administration for the highlights and for working with CIU (Criminal 
Intelligence Unit). The assistant chief who oversaw that area said yes, this makes 
sense of course. This person goes to the chief and it's blocked. I don't think it was 
politics but a culture of close hold. (Participant 351, personal communication, 
August 30, 2018). 
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow within and 
between organizations. Several participants stated that information flow within their 
agencies did not flow effectively from the administrative level down to operations level 
and from the operations level back to the administrators. It is important that the 
leadership of public safety organizations designate internal information flow as a priority 
and take the steps necessary to make it an effective part of daily operations. Participant 
362 explained, “The people making decisions are not the people on the ground, they are 
not getting the information from people on the ground to help them guide their decisions 
at the top. That is the biggest problem.” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).   
Interview Question 7 
The question was, what can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related 
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following 
responses were provided by the interview participants. 
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Participant 350 stated, “having technology to help us keep each other on the same 
page and communicate, you know, that's always key. Communication is key” (personal 
communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated, “I'll tell you what the problem with HPD is. The problem 
for getting somebody assigned to the fusion center like it used to be” (personal 
communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “involve non-law enforcement agencies in kind of lower-
level more day-to-day threats. Sort of begin information sharing on some level and I 
would start ramping it up from there and getting it a little more sophisticated. I think that 
would help” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “first it is what I mentioned earlier, maybe considered 
overlap here is that the chief of police has to buy in on the importance of participating in 
WSIN, HIDTA, participating in deconfliction requirements” (personal communication, 
September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated, “I think we need to get more of the organizations buy in. 
You saw what happened when we got our new fire chief. He pulled us out of the fusion 
center and did not want to have anything to do with it” (personal communication, 
October 25, 2018). Participant 354 also added, “to prove that it will be beneficial to 
everyone. That is one way to include organizations like the fire department and EMS. I 
think that it would be important to have a fire representative at the fusion center” 
(personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
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Participant 356 stated, “whether that be police, fire, EMS, or military, you have to 
have someone who reports to the highest levels assigned to disseminate and receive 
information” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).  
Participant 357 stated, “between the federal and state levels and in particularly 
between the joint chiefs of staff and the military and the military command and the 
sharing of information with the state. I think that is an area that can be improved” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).  
Participant 358 stated, “agencies that are again not used to dealing with health 
information or other private information it would be good if they had regular training in 
place for key personnel and had protocol in place on how to handle sensitive 
information” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “better communication not only between agencies, but the 
agencies should share the information that they are getting from within their 
organizations by better communications from the boots on the ground to the 
administrators” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).  
Participant 363 stated, “unfortunately, until we get another big 9/11 event people 
are not going to be freely sharing information” (personal communication, October 4, 
2018). Participant 363 also added, “like I say until we get another big bang everybody is 
withdrawing back into their stove pipes” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “create a website that everyone in the department can go to 
and access the same information. A shared drive or folder on the intranet for internal use, 
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so that everyone has the same information. It can serve as a reference” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “for county fire departments, the State Fire Council 
provides cooperation amongst the counties by state statutes. Funding each county with 
one intelligence officer responsible for coordination, research, and monitoring of current 
and emerging threats” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “understanding that the state agencies don’t have the same 
responsibilities as the Honolulu Police Department. But respecting what they do and the 
training that they have and the responsibilities that they have I think would go a long 
way” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 7. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to their opinion of what could be done to improve the sharing 
of threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Five of 
the participants stated that agency culture, information flow, and the state fusion 
center were factors that may improve threat-related information sharing. The chart 
in Figure 7 highlights the number of participants who mentioned certain topics in 
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their responses to Interview Question 7.              
 
Figure 7. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
7. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 7 was agency 
culture within organizations. A topic that was mentioned several times in the responses 
was buy-in by the leadership of the organizations. If the chief of a department (e.g., 
police, fire, or EMS) does not buy-in to an initiative or program it simply will not move 
forward. Participant 356 explains, “I think first of all there has to be buy in from the 
highest levels of the agency” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).   
The second theme in the responses to in this question focused on the state fusion 
center. Several participants stated the need to have representatives from all of the public 
safety organizations assigned to the fusion center. Staff shortage, lack of funding, and 
lack of buy-in were primary reasons why some organizations do not currently assign staff 
to the state fusion center. Participant 350 pointed out, “Communication is key. As you 























together and really helping things evolve in the sharing of information” (personal 
communication, August 9, 2018). 
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow within and 
between agencies. There was a concern by several participants that information was not 
effectively flowing internally between the administration of the organizations and the 
operational staff, or boots on the ground, as one participant put it. This was a common 
theme throughout the study. Participant 362 explained, “better communication not only 
between agencies, but the agencies should share the information that they are getting 
from within their organizations by better communications from the boots on the ground 
to the administrators” (personal communication, September 17, 2018). Participant 362 
added, “because right now the communication is pretty much straight down or sideways. 
Also, the communication that is coming down is not really needed you know, it is 
administrative” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).  
Participant 363 stated:  
Unfortunately, until we get another big 9/11 event people are not going to be 
freely sharing information. Right after 9/11 if you wanted something you got it. 
At APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) if we wanted to do something 
related to the event you got it. You want to share information, good, share that 
information. Like I say until we get another big bang everybody is withdrawing 




Interview Question 8 
The question was, what role could agency policies, within your organization, play 
in improving the sharing of threat-related information? The following responses were 
provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated, “now do I think there needs to be some level of guidance 
and direction, absolutely because how do you gain manpower and how do you gain 
funding” (personal communication, August 9, 2018)? 
Participant 351 stated, “A fusion center can help coordinate that along with the 
FBI, that's in policy” (personal communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “I don't think just making a policy is going to solve it. You 
really need to have the buy-in and the policy just is just a document for the steps that you 
take to do something” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “I worked for the Honolulu Police Department. I believe 
the policies are critical. The reason I say that it is because it keeps our personnel safe” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).  
Participant 354 stated, “I think that it would be important to have a policy so that 
if you saw certain things you would have to report it. Because we don’t have any policies 
like that currently” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated, “having it in writing I think kind of guarantees it. I guess 
guarantees is to strong of a word, but it more enables a department to do the right thing” 
(personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
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Participant 357 stated, “I think where we could really make some significant gains 
if we began to utilize some of the available resources in terms of alerting the public more. 
So that they could be more prepared” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated, “Within our organization based on our past experience, it 
would probably be good to have ongoing discussions within the agency or organization to 
determine how we might address these things in the future” (personal communication, 
October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “They [HPD] can make it a policy that they are going to be 
a part of the fusion center and share information” (personal communication, September 
17, 2018). Participant 362 added, “they have different policies for SSD (Specialized 
Services Division) and MED (Major Events Division) they all have policies so they could 
assign someone to the fusion center or a group and make a policy that they will 
participate” (personal communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “policy on the big government side is knock down those 
walls of information sharing between operations and intelligence. There is still that 
division” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).  
Participant 364 stated, “I think policies keep people accountable. Accountability 
is a big one. No one can say I didn’t know, or I didn’t have access, or no one can point 
the finger at anyone else” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “Fire departments with organized top-down hierarchy are 
reinforced to up-channel any threat-related information as soon as possible.  Those 
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subject matter experts work with leadership to provide a uniform/unified posture or 
response” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated, “to codify the SLEC (State Law Enforcement Council). I 
think that is one thing. I think the other thing would be to have representation of all of 
these agencies in the fusion center” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 8. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to what role agency policies played in improving the sharing of 
threat-related information between public safety organizations. Nine of the participants 
stated that specific agency policies may improve threat-related information sharing. The 
fusion center and information flow were themes which also ranked in the top three 
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 8 highlights the number of participants 
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 8.       
              
Figure 8. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
8. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 8 centered 



















needed to enhance the sharing of threat-related information. Policies help keep 
responders safe and ensure that individuals stay involved in the information sharing 
process and are not allowed to regress to a pre 9/11 culture of holding information within 
each organization. Participant 353 stated, “I worked for the Honolulu Police Department. 
I believe the policies are critical. The reason I say that it is because it keeps our personnel 
safe” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 also added, “there 
are many things that we have no control of but there are things that we do have control of 
and deconfliction and case activation procedures are critical to keeping our people safe” 
(personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 364 explained, “I think policies keep people accountable. 
Accountability is a big one. No one can say I didn’t know, or I didn’t have access, or no 
one can point the finger at anyone else” (personal communication, December 3, 2018). 
The second most prominent theme in the responses to this question was public 
safety participation in the state fusion center. Several of the participants stated that it is 
vitally important for public safety organizations to assign a liaison to the fusion center. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2018) defines state and major urban area 
fusion centers as organizations that “operate as state and major urban area focal points for 
the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between federal; 
state, local, tribal, territorial; and private sector partners” (para.1). Participant 366 
explained:  
I think the other thing would be to have representation of all of these agencies in 
the Fusion Center, so that we could actually gain their confidence and they would 
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feel like they are part of what’s going on when it comes to the security and the 
protection of our community. Because right now I do not feel that outside of the 
fusion center, even my own office, I do not feel that they understand all of the 
threats that are out there. All of the areas that we need to be watching. You have 
got to have that influence that brings it together, but right now I think everyone is 
operating in their own little world and when they have to, then they support each 
other. (Participant 366, personal communication, January 11, 2019).  
The third most prominent theme in the responses to this question was information 
flow within and between organizations. This was a theme highlighted multiple times in 
this study. There was a concern by several participants that information was not 
effectively flowing between segments within the organizations. Participant 363 stated, 
“policy on the big government side is knock down those walls of information sharing 
between operations and intelligence. There is still that division” (personal 
communication, October 4, 2018). Participant 363 also added, “the agents find out the 
information and say I don’t want to share that with the intelligence side because then it 
doesn’t become my case, my information” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).  
Interview Question 9 
The question was, please describe any past lessons learned at your organization 
that could improve the exchange of threat-related information between public safety 
organizations. The following responses were provided by the interview participants. 
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Participant 350 stated, “they're asking for help and their giving us information and 
how we can help and how we did help. That's what's got to be encouraged” (personal 
communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated, “set your objectives, set your goals, set your objectives and 
make your strategies” (personal communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated, “I am for some cross training of medical people and maybe 
even just simple cross training of some of the law-enforcement guys” (personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 added, “they call it tactical EMS, and 
they have tactical physicians or physicians that are on their EMS staff. Like through the 
partnerships with the university or whatever and so they have a high degree of medical 
expertise” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated, “I was a commander of a narcotics vice division at one 
time and I had a drug unit report to me that they conducted an undercover investigation 
and they followed the procedures required for a critical event deconfliction” (personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 added, “when they went to the 
scene that they identified, they ran across their brother officers from HPD at the same 
location also in plain clothes, which was a conflict” (personal communication, September 
18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated:  
I think the improvement on sharing information of stuff that you don’t really want 
to get out to the public. The confidential information that may have to do with law 
enforcement. Our agency just dropped all of that stuff. I think that it was a huge 
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help when we were actually using it. Everyone had an opportunity to log into 
HSIN and check out the information. The last two years before I retired and no 
one was using it, so I think a lot of the information sharing has stopped at least 
within my department. You know our department used to send out threat-related 
stuff as far as being exposed to something, like when we are responding to calls 
and stuff. But they stopped sending that kind of stuff out and put it into an area 
like a doc you share, so that you would have to go look it up. Guys stop going 
there because they had to actually look it up and it was more of a hassle. So, as far 
as the fire department is concerned, I think information sharing has gotten much 
worse since APEC in 2011. Information sharing has really gotten worse as far as 
dangers and things like that. (Participant 354, personal communication, October 
25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated:  
Again, I touched on some of these in the earlier discussions but number one, 
working with the health department. They did not have I thought an active role in 
the fusion center and so their information coming in was not good and their 
receiving information was not good. So, again this sensitivity to tourism and 
having to kind of clear everything with them before we put it into memos to the 
other city agencies was an issue. But again, I learned to kind of work with them 
and we learned a system to kind of keep them happy and to keep their executive 
branch happy. So, we could share biological threat information and again not 
necessarily biological terrorism, but just naturally occurring diseases such as flu 
147 
 
and other things to make our first responders aware. (Participant 356, personal 
communication, September 14, 2018). 
Participant 357 stated:  
The biggest lesson is the need for immediate sharing between the leadership of 
the organizations that are responding. I think a really good one was again that 
nuclear attack warning that we had. When that alert came out falsely within three 
minutes our police chief knew that it was a false alert. That was because HPD 
dispatch was extremely proactive in terms of reaching out to PACOM (U.S. 
Pacific Command) to try to validate whether we actually had an incoming missile. 
They found out that it was not true. So, that information flowed out to the police 
officers in the field who had begun to go through communities making PA 
announcements, but it did not flow to the leadership of the fire department or the 
emergency services department. So, as a consequence, because we were unaware 
that one of our key partners had validated that it was a false alert and because we 
had not heard anything from the governor, we shut down our EMS service for 16 
minutes which was protocol in that circumstance. So that could have been 
avoided. So that was a big lesson learned. Thus, the effort to bring these key 
decision-makers to a single text platform to share that kind of information. 
(Participant 357, personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated:  
If the legislation actually gave me the staff that I needed it would help. 
Unfortunately, this unrealistic expectation that we can monitor for the diseases, 
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investigate them, stamp them out and then also establish all the protocols and 
agreements and to deal with all the administrative stuff at the same time. That’s 
the challenge for us. That would be the most ideal if we had staff that could work 
on those things. That would be helpful. It still doesn’t obviate the need to reach 
out to partners and have ongoing discussions. (Participant 358, personal 
communication, October 3, 2018). 
Participant 362 stated, “when my organization supported the fusion center by 
putting someone in it, we were doing great things. Information was getting shared, 
information from databases inside the police department was getting shared with other 
agencies” (personal communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated:  
My first one was APEC. Everyone was sitting on that main floor. Everyone saw 
the same information on the LEO (FBI Law Enforcement Online) board at the 
same time. They were all sitting in a big room together. We had a little 
intelligence cell off to the side doing classified stuff. When we found information 
that we could share we popped it over onto the LEO board. Once we lost that 
facility, that cohesiveness then we lost the ability to share quickly with 
everybody. Everybody went back to their agency and said oh that was nice. We 
saved the world from unattended packages. But that was the best information 
sharing that I have ever seen. That was a good lesson learned. It was expensive 
but everyone was sleeping better at night because everyone on these islands knew 
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the same information at the same time. (Participant 363, personal communication, 
October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated, “in 2011, I know that we worked with the 93rd CST a lot. I 
think that we had a really good relationship with them. We also had a good relationship 
with the fusion center. At that time information flowed very smoothly” (personal 
communication, December 3, 2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “even with all of the lessons learned from 9/11 and the 
changes made, at many times there is no sense of urgency” (personal communication, 
January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated: 
I think that the last half of the year all the events that we have had in the state. I 
think has helped bring folks together, but we don’t have enough resources to have 
it on a continual basis and I think we saw that in December. I don’t know what we 
can do about that. Because we are not going to increase their resources, so how do 
we increase the support or how do we make sure that we have good support for 
everything versus just a few. (Participant 366, personal communication, January 
11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 9. Participant responses were 
analyzed according to past lessons learned at their organization that could improve the 
exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations. Eight of the 
participants stated that improved information flow within and between organizations 
could improve information sharing. Collaboration between organizations and the 
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challenges involved in sharing confidential information also ranked in the top three 
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 9 highlights the number of participants 
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 9. 
              
Figure 9. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question 
9. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 9 was 
information flow within and between organizations. Eight of the participants stated that 
information flow within organizations and between organizations is vital; however, many 
believe that information flow has declined since the attacks of 9/11. Participant 362 
stated:  
Here is the biggest thing, when my organization supported the fusion center by 
putting someone in it, we were doing great things. Information was getting 
shared, information from databases inside the police department was getting 
shared with other agencies. Other agencies information was getting shared with 



















people because we were sharing information. Now here’s the lesson, our police 
department does not support the fusion center by putting someone there and that 
communication has been cut off. (Participant 362, personal communication, 
September 17, 2018). 
Participant 354 explained:  
I think the improvement on sharing information of stuff that you don’t really want 
to get out to the public. The confidential information that may have to do with law 
enforcement. Our agency just dropped all of that stuff. I think that it was a huge 
help when we were actually using it. Everyone had an opportunity to log into 
HSIN and check out the information. The last two years before I retired and no 
one was using it, so I think a lot of the information sharing has stopped at least 
within my department. (Participant 354, personal communication, October 25, 
2018). 
The second theme in the responses to this question was collaboration. Six of the 
participants stated that collaboration was very important in the sharing of information. 
Not only collaboration when an event happens, but ongoing collaboration between 
organizations on a daily basis. The sharing of information between agencies builds a 
common operational picture of the current threat environment. Several participants 
believe some of the collaborative environment between agencies has declined since the 
attacks of 9/11. Participant 363 pointed out that while working at the APEC event in 
2011, “Everyone was sitting on that main floor. Everyone saw the same information on 
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the LEO (FBI Law Enforcement Online) board at the same time. They were all sitting in 
a big room together” (personal communication, October 4, 2018). 
The third theme in the responses to this question centered around the complexity 
of sharing confidential and protected information between public safety organizations. 
Several participants indicated that confidential information inherently slows information 
flow because only those individuals with a need to know can receive the information. 
Often, only the leadership of organizations received the highly confidential or sensitive 
information. It takes specially trained analysts additional time to filter out the confidential 
content before it can be shared between agencies, if it can be shared at all. Participant 357 
pointed out, “The biggest lesson is the need for immediate sharing between the leadership 
of the organizations that are responding” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
A discrepant case in the responses to this question focused on critical event 
deconfliction of law enforcement active operations to ensure the safety of responders. 
When undercover officers initiate field operations it is important that those operations are 
deconflicted to ensure that another law enforcement agency is not targeting the same 
suspect at the same time. Deconfliction is extremely important for police officer safety 
but would not typically be utilized by other public safety organizations. Participant 353 
described deconfliction:  
I was a commander of a narcotics vice division at one time and I had a drug unit 
report to me that they conducted an undercover investigation and they followed 
the procedures required for a critical event deconfliction. However, when they 
went to the scene that they identified they ran across their brother officers from 
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HPD at the same location also in plain clothes, which was a conflict. If I 
remember correctly, the plan to make a drug buy wasn’t successful because they 
saw other police officers there. They recognized other police officers there in 
plain clothes, so the operation was called to a halt and the supervisor there put a 
hold on the investigation and pulled out. (Participant 353, personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
Interview Question 10 
The question was, what is your perception of the current state of threat-related 
information exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The 
following responses were provided by the interview participants. 
Participant 350 stated: 
I think it's really good. I really do think here in Honolulu we're doing a great job 
and I say that because I witnessed it. Like I was kind of using an example of the 
new techniques and tactics that we happen to use by getting police, fire, and EMS 
together. To go to these just horrific events, should they ever happen, and I hope 
they never happen, but to see them working together and training together for 
what we hope never happens is a sign of healthy relationships. I think if you talk 
about specifically sharing threat-related information and they’ve got to probably 
be. I'd say probably at a 9 (on a rating scale from 1 to 10, with 1 representing low 
and 10 representing a high level of information sharing) and the only reason it’s a 
9 and not a 10 is that ‘threat’ is sometimes defined or perceived differently across 
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those cultures you know, it's just different cultures as to what are threats. 
(Participant 350, personal communication, August 9, 2018). 
Participant 351 stated: 
So externally when we get external products, we're able to disseminate them. 
Exchange of internal information within the state then there’s a gap. We’re not 
getting data. Is it improving? Well yes, it is improving. We are going to join with 
WSIN. That is good. I would rate the current state of information exchange at a 3, 
because if there is criminality involved it's going to get to whoever's got to 
investigate the case. That's going to happen, but as far as the overall protection of 
everybody it's not. (Participant 351, personal communication, August 30, 2018). 
Participant 352 stated: 
I think that the medical side, both EMS as well as hospitals are slowly starting to 
see the importance of preparing for active threat response. I think the agencies are 
a little less siloed than they used to be and I think the realization is there that this 
is important but the action is not there yet. At the same time that they see it as 
important and realize that we really should start doing something, that something 
hasn't necessarily been defined yet or codified, and I think we still need that 
mechanism for medical review of intelligence info. I think that's sort of a kind of 
lynchpin, if you will, that will tie a lot of things together. I think the realizations 
there just the action is slow in coming. So, I think there's good, really good 
information exchange among the law enforcement side of the house. I think 
there's poor information exchange between law enforcement and health. It's 
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gradually getting better though. (Participant 352, personal communication, 
October 3, 2018). 
Participant 353 stated: 
Since I am retired, I will say that before I retired I believe that it was good and on 
a scale of 1 to 10, and this is anecdotal there is no scientific formula to what I 
have to say, I think it would it would be high. I would say it is at least an 8, 
maybe a 9. The reason I say that is because of the relationships I had and the 
relationships I saw between agencies at the various levels. The meetings that we 
had, the attendance at the HIDTA meetings and the attendance at the other 
conferences, for example HSLEOA (Hawaii State Law Enforcement Officials 
Association) conferences. I attend the FBI National Academy re-trainer every 
year and the attendance is typically high. (Participant 353, personal 
communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 354 stated: 
I think it is a lot less than it was during APEC in 2011. Gradually after APEC 
things kind of died down and then once we pulled our personnel from the fusion 
center, information I think it really went down. I tried to stay involved for a little 
while and go to the FBI meetings and things like that. I also tried to push our 
HAZMAT (hazardous material SMEs) guys to go, and I think they did for a 
certain amount of time, but I’m not sure. So, I saw how much the information 
sharing decreased. It is sad to think that something has to happen before they 
realize that it is important and a help to everybody. There is no reason why we 
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couldn’t have somebody partially going into the fusion center a few days a week 
or something. I just can’t see what the real drawback is to that. (Participant 354, 
personal communication, October 25, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated:  
I would give it a 7.5. I'll say an 8.0. I think there's always room for improvement. 
So, here's what I base by my number on. Number one, if all agencies had an 
appointed designee to the fusion center. That to me would make it have a higher 
rating. If the fusion center did not have a permanent director and staff, that would 
make my rating go lower, and if all agencies embraced the fusion center with 
robust two-way information sharing that would make my rating go higher. If there 
was funding, city, state, and federal for the fusion center that would make my 
rating go higher. So, I leave it at a 7 to 8 range because I don't think we're quite 
there with what I just said. But we're better I think than we were ten years ago. 
So, I think to get to a 10, to be the best you can be, you have to have all the 
agencies participating and if somebody's not physically there, they at least have to 
be available electronically to receive and give information. All agencies have to 
contribute to share reports and to receive reports and there has to be adequate 
funding. At least at one or two levels, but preferably three levels of government to 
ensure an adequate and robust response capability and sharing capability. 
(Participant 356, personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
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Participant 357 stated, “about an 8 out of 10. I think I kind of covered where we 
are going to move it up to a 9, or a 10, and how we are going to do it in our earlier 
conversation” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
Participant 358 stated: 
I think if we are just talking purely public safety or law enforcement with public 
health, I honestly think that it is fairly good. If you threw in the emergency 
management agencies, I would say that it depends. If we are just talking law-
enforcement and us, I think that it is pretty good. We have a low threshold to 
reach out to our law enforcement partners whether we are talking about HPD, our 
state level public safety division, or FBI. I think we have a very low threshold to 
reach out to them and I think vice versa. I know there is certain information that 
they do not share with us and honestly, as I told the FBI guys if you don’t think it 
is pertinent to the public health and it is more of a national security issue then I 
don’t mind not knowing. So, but I think we have good relationships with our law 
enforcement partners. (Participant 358, personal communication, October 3, 
2018). 
Participant 362 stated: 
I would say it is a 5. When a real threat is known in an agency, secret service, or 
sheriffs, or police and they find out real credible information that is definitely a 
public safety issue they will put it out to the different agencies. This also goes for 
fire, EMS, and public health, if they deemed that those organizations should 
know. So, only if, and these cases are few and far between. That is why I say it is 
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a 5 at best. It could go up dramatically just by putting someone in the fusion 
center and more than one person. One is none, two is one. Three is better. They 
need an HPD lieutenant or a sergeant and some analysts to be able to really get 
involved and share information. With that they would have to write a policy or 
change existing policies. They have an information sharing policy right now, you 
don’t do it, and the only time you can send out a report is in the records division. 
They could just change that. The unit at the fusion center is authorized to share 
information within their training that kind of thing. And that way the policy 
wouldn’t have to be written, it could just be tweaked. (Participant 362, personal 
communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated: 
I would give it a 5. Because we went from the perfect example of APEC and we 
quickly digressed right back to 50% or less of information being shared that 
should be shared. So, I would give it a 5. If we can get back to that model where 
you don’t have a need to know, you have a need to share, or something is going to 
be missed and something is going to blow up. Once we have an event again the 
politicians will leave the homeless alone and not worry about saving the whales 
and say, oh, we’ve got to save the people. We will be in that mode for a about a 
year or two and then back to saving the whales. (Participant 363, personal 
communication, October 4, 2018). 
Participant 364 stated: 
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On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say the current amount of information sharing is a 1 
or a 2. Our department keeps all of the information at the top. Everything is held 
so secret and then one person finds out and it spreads almost like a rumor and then 
everyone wants to know. (Participant 364, personal communication, December 3, 
2018). 
Participant 365 stated, “Public safety agencies take a much lazier approach to 
threat-related information due to the remote location of Hawaii; the difficulty to get in 
and out of the islands undetected; and with hardened high value targets” (personal 
communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 366 stated: 
Well I think that it is good. I think that the fusion center does what it can. But I 
think that our real issue is, does everyone look at this, does everyone read it, does 
everyone take it to heart as to what is out there? Then again, I think there is 
apathy in our political leadership. To me everyone is reactive. Right now, we get 
a few requests, but most folks will be reactive if something happens, versus how 
do we look at this now. With the improvements that we can all do and hopefully 
have better day-to-day operations, versus waiting until something happens and 
then everything has to come together at once. You don’t have any say. And so, I 
think that’s our biggest problem. If I were to grade it 1 to 10, I would give the 
fusion center probably about an 8. But I would give the public safety folks 
probably about a 4 or 5. The same for our political leadership, a 4 or a 5. We can 
only do so much at the fusion center. Everyone else has to help us and that is 
160 
 
where I think that we are lacking. (Participant 366, personal communication, 
January 11, 2019). 
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 10. Participant responses 
were analyzed according to their perception of the current state of threat-related 
information exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Five of the 
participants stated that public safety agency participation the fusion center was a factor 
that may improve information sharing. Collaboration between organizations and different 
abilities of public safety organizations also ranked in the top three responses to this 
question. The chart in Figure 10 highlights the number of participants who mentioned 
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 10. 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview 
Question 10. 
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 10 focused on 
the Hawaii State Fusion Center. Five participants stated that consistent agency 





















indicated that information sharing on a daily basis in a designated facility such as fusion 
center is important. It is also important that information that is shared is actually 
reviewed and acted upon by the agencies. Participant 366 explained, “Well I think that it 
is good. I think that the fusion center does what it can. But I think that our real issue is, 
does everyone look at this, does everyone read it, does everyone take it to heart” 
(personal communication, January 11, 2019). 
Participant 362 stated, “it is a 5 at best. It could go up dramatically just by putting 
someone in the fusion center, and more than one person. One is none, two is one. Three is 
better” (personal communication, September 17, 2018). 
Participant 363 stated, “I would give it a 5. Because we went from the perfect 
example of APEC and we quickly digressed right back to 50% or less of information 
being shared that should be shared. So, I would give it a 5” (Personal communication, 
October 4, 2018). 
Participant 356 stated: 
I would give it a 7.5. I'll say an 8.0. I think there's always room for improvement. 
So, here's what I base by my number on. Number one, if all agencies had an 
appointed designee to the fusion center. That to me would make it have a higher 
rating. If the fusion center did not have a permanent director and staff, that would 
make my rating go lower, and if all agencies embraced the fusion center with 
robust two-way information sharing, that would make my rating go higher. 
(Participant 356, personal communication, September 14, 2018). 
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The second theme in the responses to this question was the collaboration between 
agencies. Many of the participants believed that there was collaboration between agencies 
due to relationships between individuals in different organizations, but it was not 
consistent and ongoing. Agencies seemed to collaborate when needed on a certain case or 
event and then regress back into a non-sharing environment when the event was over. 
Participant 353 stated: 
Since I am retired, I will say that before I retired, I believe that it was good and on 
a scale of 1 to 10, and this is anecdotal there is no scientific formula to what I 
have to say, I think it would it would be high. I would say it is at least an 8, 
maybe a 9. The reason I say that is because of the relationships I had and the 
relationships I saw between agencies at the various levels. (Participant 353, 
personal communication, September 18, 2018). 
The third theme in the answers to this question centered around the different 
abilities of public safety organizations. Several of the participants stated that different 
public safety organizations have expertise in different areas of public safety. As an 
example, the Honolulu Fire Department hazardous materials experts may be aware of a 
threat or hazard (e.g. toxic chemical release) that law enforcement and/or EMS personnel 
may be unaware of. Participant 358 explained:  
I was recently meeting with the new point of contact for us with the FBI who 
heads up their WMD (weapons of mass destruction) program. We were meeting 
to just touch base. Generally, when you have a good relationship with law 
enforcement and public safety, I think that it is important to have an ongoing 
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discussion. Because there may be things that they are aware of that they don’t 
realize to let us know about and visa-versa. I gave him a whole bunch of real-life 
examples of where I may not know if there is anything that they might be 
interested in. So, I said to him, look if you hear about something please don’t 
hesitate to reach out to me and ask me, have we considered this, or is there any 
potential for law enforcement issues or security issues that they need to be aware 
of. (Participant 358, personal communication, October 3, 2018). 
Nine participants ranked what they believed to be the current state of threat-
related information sharing between public safety organizations in Honolulu. This 
ranking was based on a rating scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing low and 10 
representing a high level of information sharing. This was very interesting because 
several of the participants were firm in their rankings in the lower ranges between 1 and 
3, and other participants believed information sharing between agencies was actually very 
good by ranking in the 8 to 9 range. The average of the nine participant’s rankings was 
5.9.  
Summary 
Chapter 4 highlighted multiple aspects of public safety organizations in Honolulu 
sharing threat-related information. All participants agreed that information sharing 
between public safety organizations has improved since the attacks of 9/11; however, 
many of the participants felt that there is more work that needs to be done. This research 
uncovered four overarching themes.  
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The first overarching theme in the data focused on the flow of information within 
and between agencies. Several participants stated that information did not flow smoothly 
within their departments and consequently out to other organizations. The problem 
seemed to be intensified by information being shared only during intermittent urgent 
situations rather than establishing an ongoing information sharing environment. A lack of 
ongoing collaboration between public safety organizations was the second overarching 
theme in the data. An ongoing collaborative environment allows multiple agencies with 
different perspectives to view the threat information and analyze it from different points 
of view in real-time. Agency participation with the state fusion center was the third 
overarching theme. Many of the participants stated that it is important that their agency 
participate in the state fusion center, so that threat-related information can be 
disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously. The complexity of sharing 
confidential and protected information between public safety organizations was the fourth 
overarching theme. Often, threat-related data contains confidential personal identifiable 
information (PII), and/or protected health information (PHI), or sensitive information 
pertaining to ongoing law-enforcement investigations and therefore can be difficult to 
share.  
Chapter 5 will discuss ramifications of the data collected and recommendations to 
improve the sharing of threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu. It includes sections on interpretations of the findings, limitations and 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits 
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law 
enforcement, fire, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on Honolulu 
for several reasons. It is a moderate-sized city and faces many of the same challenges as 
other cities in the continental United States, including the need to share information 
across agencies to manage emerging threat-related issues. However, Honolulu is unique 
because of its isolation, being approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. As a result, 
there is an increased need to ensure interagency communication is occurring to facilitate 
the region’s ability to manage a large-scale public safety event without immediate 
assistance from other states. 
The gap in the literature is that researchers do not know how public safety 
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Because it is 
essential that agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, due to their 
unique situation, an exploratory case study of Honolulu public safety agencies served as 
an excellent opportunity for this research. The findings provided a unique understanding 
of how public safety organizations that currently share threat-related information have 
encountered challenges and how these challenges may differ between organizations. I 
determined that a qualitative research design was the best method to answer this study’s 
research questions. I collected data through interviews with SMEs, either currently active 
or recently retired from four different fields of public safety in Honolulu. The primary 
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source of data was gathered from conversational style discussions with participants 
utilizing open-ended questions. 
Interpretation of Findings 
The findings of this study clearly identified several important themes related to 
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu, 
Hawaii. The findings also confirmed my rationale for using the conceptual framework of 
general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) in that the theory effectively 
described how information is exchanged between public safety organizations to protect 
the population from attacks. The theory also provided a conceptual platform to explore 
the specific research questions of this study.  
General system theory is often described as “the trans disciplinary study of the 
abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or 
temporal scale of existence” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Systems are 
essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another within an environment 
and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts” (“Communication 
Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Because elements in systems are constantly interacting with one 
another, when one part of a system changes it results in a change somewhere else within 
the system (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). 
In the literature review for this study, the article entitled “Surveillance and 
Resilience in Theory and Practice” by Raab et al. (2015) indicated that “a system may not 
only react to environmental effects by changing its internal properties or organization, but 
also act on and change its environment, bringing about a new relationship or a new 
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equilibrium” (p. 26). A general systems framework is effective at illuminating complex 
collaborative relationships between public safety organizations in rapidly changing 
environments.  
In the article entitled “Practical Challenges of Systems Thinking and Modeling in 
Public Health,” William et al., (2006) explained that utilizing a systems perspective along 
with incorporating systems modeling in public health could eventually lead to better and 
more effective public health organizations across the nation. William et al., stated 
“ambitious attempts are under way to focus practitioners on improving overall system 
performance” (p. 540). Systems theory is useful when studying the organizational 
changes and development of a community’s public safety system because it allows the 
researcher to explore the interconnection between individual agencies or subsystems. 
When public safety organizations within the same region share relevant threat 
information with one another, it prompts other agencies within that region to prepare for 
or possibly counter the threat (Carter et al., 2017). Government public safety agencies 
work together as a system to protect the public (“Public Safety,” 2011). Therefore, if 
miscommunication of threat-related information occurs in one agency within a system, it 
can lead to poor operational decisions being made in another agency within the system, 
and potentially lead to a failure of the system to protect the public.  
A careful review of the literature helped me determine the relevant challenges of 
sharing threat-related information. Public safety agencies across the United States extract 
threat-related information from the Internet and other openly available sources (Chermak 
et al., 2013). The challenge is how to effectively share this information between public 
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safety agencies (Carter & Rip, 2013). Currently, there is not a clear understanding of the 
benefits and challenges of information sharing between local public safety agencies, 
based on my review of the literature. There appears to be extensive data about how 
federal agencies exchange threat-related information (e.g., Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 
2010; Carter et al., 2017; Vacca, 2019), yet there is a lack of information about how local 
public safety agencies share this same type of data.  
Public safety systems are complex, involving large numbers of highly trained 
professionals interacting with multiple organizations and the general public on a 
continual basis. Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) point out that “the process of 
information sharing in complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical and 
dynamic” (p. 727). It involves numerous organizations within local public safety systems 
communicating effectively on multiple levels to deliver accurate information to the first 
responders when needed. Many public safety organizations across the United States share 
information through emergency management agencies and other associations, such as 
state fusion centers, which were specifically developed to improve coordination and 
information exchange (Stone, 2015). This information exchange occurs in various forms 
depending on the organizations involved and the interagency communication structure of 
the local municipalities.   
In theory, local public safety agencies have excellent interagency communication 
and respond effectively when a public safety event happens. Yet, it is not known if this is 
the case because minimal research has been done in this area (Chermak et al., 2013). 
Threat-related information sharing between local agencies is proving to be much more 
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difficult than it once appeared. What scholars do not know from the current literature are 
the challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information 
between one another for the purpose of providing public safety. This lack of knowledge 
is problematic because local agencies hold the primary responsibility of responding to 
violent public safety threats. Scholars do not fully understand the benefits and challenges 
of collaboration among these agencies due to “relatively minimal scholarly attention” to 
this issue (Carter et al., 2017, p. 1).  
There is reliable information in the literature about the sharing of information be-
tween federal and local agencies, but there is a lack of knowledge of information sharing 
between local agencies. Local public safety agencies are on the front lines of the struggle 
against terrorism and targeted violence and are literally the nation’s first layer of defense. 
It is not just threat-related information sharing between law enforcement agencies that is 
important; we need to see this communication across all public safety agencies including 
fire services, EMS, and public health. This study identified four important themes related 
to sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu, 
Hawaii: 1) information flow within and between public safety organizations, 2) 
collaboration between public safety organizations, 3) participation with the state fusion 
center, and 4) the complexity of sharing confidential and protected information between 
public safety organizations.  
The most prominent theme focused on information flow within and between 
public safety organizations. Data from this study’s literature review reveled that 
information flow within public safety organizations is a complex process. Kozuch and 
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Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) pointed out, “The process of information sharing in 
complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical and dynamic” (p.727). It involves 
numerous organizations within local public safety systems communicating effectively on 
multiple levels to deliver accurate information to the first responders when needed. 
Participants from several Honolulu public safety organizations were concerned that 
information did not flow smoothly within their departments and subsequently out to other 
organizations. Although most participants acknowledged that when urgent events 
occurred, information flow ramped up between public safety organizations to address the 
event. Once the event was concluded however, information flow subsided back to a less 
than ideal level.  
What appears to be missing is a constant and ongoing exchange of threat-related 
information, which was independent of urgent threat events. Several study participants 
were concerned that much of the information may not flow effectively from the 
administrative level to the operations level. Also, a concern was that the information was 
filtered as it moved down through the organization and across to other agencies. This 
filtering of information may potentially leave out important details other organizations 
could use to identify threats to the public.  
The study participants were concerned that if information is not shared on a 
continual basis, threat-related information may become siloed within an organization. 
After an urgent event happens, unfortunately it is too late to analyze threat-related 
information that might have been used to prevent the event at the outset. Data from this 
study’s literature review demonstrated that predictive analysis may assist in defusing 
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events before they occur. Taylor and Russell (2011) explained, “The strategic integration 
of intelligence, with an emphasis on predictive analysis derived from the discovery of 
hard facts, information, patterns, and good crime analysis defines intelligence-led 
policing” (p. 185). Relying solidly on information technology, intelligence lead policing 
may help combat crime by significantly increasing intelligence decision-making 
(Bharosa, Lee, and Janssen, 2010). Agencies in Honolulu are currently communicating 
via an information flow within and between organizations; however, this flow of 
information is intermittent. Establishing an ongoing information sharing environment 
between organizations is necessary to ensure that information is effectively shared in an 
all situations.  
The second important theme identified in the study focused on collaboration 
between public safety organizations. When organizations collaborate on a regular basis it 
allows information to be shared and viewed from different perspectives in real-time. This 
allows organizations a common operating picture of emerging threats. Participants stated 
that a significant benefit of sharing information is this continuous awareness of threats to 
the public. Some participants believed that there was collaboration between agencies due 
to relationships between individuals in different organizations, but it was not consistent 
and ongoing. Agencies seemed to collaborate when needed on a certain case or event, and 
then regress back into a non-sharing environment when the event was over. Several 
participants stated that ongoing collaboration was vitally important to public safety but 
was often overlooked due to personnel shortages and the daily race to keep up with 
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operational workloads. Because agencies have different skills and expertise it is 
important that they actively collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information. 
The third important theme was participation with the state fusion center. State 
fusion centers’ principal mission across the nation is to share information between law 
enforcement and public safety organizations at the federal, state, and local level. All 
participants were aware of the state fusion center, but not all organizations assigned 
personnel to the fusion center. Data from this study’s literature review confirmed that 
participation with state fusion centers nationwide is increasing. Taylor and Russell (2011) 
argued since the attacks of 911 there are now hundreds of government and private 
organizations involved in homeland security and intelligence collection activities. They 
pointed out that before the attacks, sharing of intelligence between public safety agencies 
was severely lacking (p. 184). Currently, public safety agencies throughout the nation are 
beginning to participate in the nationwide network of fusion centers in an effort to better 
protect the public.  
Some Honolulu public safety organizations have a long history of holding 
information within the agency. Long-held organizational cultural beliefs that law 
enforcement information should stay within law enforcement agencies is difficult to 
change. Participant 353 explained: 
Sharing of information between public safety organizations, or for that matter 
within units within an organization is a newer phenomenon. I will tell you 30 
years ago people didn’t tell anyone about their investigations, they would not to 
tell other people within the police department for example, or they wouldn’t tell 
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federal law enforcement or other state agencies. They just didn’t tell anyone 
because it was a need to know situation. (Participant 353, personal 
communication, September 18, 2018).  
Ongoing agency participation with the state fusion center is vitally important in 
order to allow threat-related information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with 
different skills and then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously.  
The final theme in this study was the complexity of sharing confidential and 
protected information between public safety organizations. Often, threat-related data 
contains very confidential PII and/or PHI, or information pertaining to ongoing law-
enforcement investigations. Data from this study’s literature review demonstrated that 
health and medical issues are extremely important to the safety of the public and many 
public safety organizations integrate medical analysts into their analytical staff to assist in 
the sharing of health-related information (Carter and Rip, 2012). However, this type of 
information can be difficult to share to other parties. Federal regulations such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FIRPA) come into play, which can impede 
information sharing. Ongoing law enforcement investigations containing sensitive 
criminal data may also impede the process of sharing threat-related information between 
organizations. Threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law 
enforcement sensitive information, and is difficult to share between agencies. It is 
important that agencies develop a policy-based process, through ongoing collaboration, to 
share this sensitive information. 
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There is a chance that poor information flow, poor collaboration, and inadequate 
participation in fusion centers could possibly allow another catastrophic man-made 
terrorist event to occur. This type of catastrophe would likely temporarily improve 
interagency threat-related information sharing due to an increase in national security 
concerns by all public safety professionals involved. Nonetheless, eventually, the country 
would lapse back into mediocrity and the cycle would continue. The eventual retirement 
of public safety officials with decision-making authority would be replaced by those that 
do not see prevention as important as those that were involved in the last catastrophic 
event. Other concerns and issues in organizations, such as organizational growth, fiscal 
budgets, hiring new employees, etc., will become the priorities pushing aside the priority 
of information gathering and sharing, collaboration, and fusion center participation.  
The results of this study will create positive social change by identifying the bene-
fits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public safety agen-
cies. As public safety organizations throughout the nation develop their ability to share 
threat-related information, they should review lessons learned from organizations exam-
ined in this study that have faced this important and complex undertaking. Horrific events 
such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al, 2014), the Paris attacks (“BBC News,” 
2105) and the assault on the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival (Bui et al., 2017) are a 
stark reminder that individuals with aspirations of violence can strike without warning. 
With targeted violent attacks on the rise globally, it is even more critical to effectively 
share threat-related information between public safety organizations. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Several limitations were identified in the study. All of the participants worked in 
public safety organizations and routinely dealt with sensitive information in one form or 
the other. This may consist of law enforcement sensitive information pertaining to 
ongoing criminal cases. It could also include PII and/or PHI, such as health status, 
prescription medications, or other health-related data. Therefore, it was important that the 
participants ensured the information they shared during the interviews did not include any 
form of sensitive data related to an individual or an agency. Another limitation to the 
study was the lack of review of internal agency documentation. I had access to publicly 
available documents but was not allowed access to internal agency policy documents.  
Delimitations of the Study 
A delimitation for this study focused on the sample selection. SMEs from four 
public safety organizations located in Honolulu, Hawaii, were selected. Patton (2002) 
pointed out that qualitative research sample size “depends on what you want to know, the 
purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, 
and what can be done with available time and resources” (p.244). This study purposely 
did not collect information from across the entire nation, as the enormous dataset would 
be unmanageable.  
The intent and design of this study was to capture the experiences of SMEs in 
public safety organizations within a particular region. Individuals who had at least 15 
years of experience sharing threat-related information between public safety 
organizations in Honolulu were selected as participants. Some individuals that had 
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recently retired were included as long as they met the research study selection criteria. 
This research was an opportunity to capture extensive institutional knowledge from these 
retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever. Further, research for 
this study was collected from a limited number of participants in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Different perspectives and factors could have been received from the interview if 
additional participants were included from other regions of the country. Consequently, 
different experiences may have been disclosed.  
Recommendations 
This focus of this study was on public safety organizations in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
Honolulu is a mid-sized modern metropolitan city. It faces many of the same challenges 
as other cities in the continental U.S., including the need to share information across 
agencies to deal with emerging threat-related issues. However, Honolulu is unique 
because unlike other cities it is remotely isolated, being approximately 2,500 miles from 
the mainland. As a result, there is an increased need to ensure interagency 
communication is occurring to facilitate the regions ability to deal with a large-scale 
public safety event without immediate assistance from other states. Understanding how 
threat information is shared in Honolulu is critical because of its isolation. The findings 
of this study will help to fill a gap in literature by determining the benefits and challenges 
of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu, 
Hawaii. 
Currently, there is plenty of data in the literature about how threat-related 
information sharing at the federal level has improved since the terror attacks of 9/11 
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(Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Carter et al., 2017; Vacca, 2019). What is not clear are 
the challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information 
between one another. This is problematic because local agencies hold the primary 
responsibility of responding to public safety threats. We do not fully understand the 
benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies due to “relatively minimal 
scholarly attention” to this issue (Carter et al., 2017, p. 1). This study helped to uncover 
the information sharing challenges public safety organizations face in Honolulu, Hawaii; 
however, there is much more work to be done throughout the rest of the nation.  
It is recommended that other mid-size cities throughout the nation conduct similar 
research to uncover the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety organizations within their regions. Research at the local level is 
also needed to uncover the benefits and challenges of sharing information between public 
and private organizations within their regions. Once there is a significant data set 
available for comprehensive analysis, researchers could offer recommendations on how 
to improve threat-related information sharing at the local level nationwide.   
Implications 
Publishing the results of this study via Walden University and ProQuest, as well 
as sharing the research with Honolulu public safety organizations, may stimulate critical 
discussion of the necessity for optimal information sharing environments. Positive social 
change may occur through the identification of the benefits and challenges of sharing 
threat-related information between local public safety organizations. As public safety 
organizations throughout the nation develop their ability to share threat-related 
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information, they should review lessons learned from organizations examined in this 
study that have faced this important and complex undertaking. 
Attacks such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al, 2014), and the assault on 
the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival (Bui et al., 2017) are a clear reminder that 
individuals with aspirations of violence can strike without warning. With targeted violent 
attacks on the rise globally (Hesterman, 2019) it is even more critical to effectively share 
threat-related information between public safety organizations. All public safety agencies 
must overcome the obstacles that keep them from sharing threat-related information 
effectively in order to better protect the public from attacks. 
I found that Honolulu Public Safety agencies are currently communicating 
through information flow within and between organizations; however, this flow of 
information is intermittent. Several problems stem from information being shared only 
during urgent situations. Establishing an ongoing information sharing environment 
between organizations is necessary to ensure that information is effectively shared in all 
situations. Because public safety agencies have different skills and expertise, it is 
important that they actively collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information.  
I also found that threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law 
enforcement sensitive information, and is difficult to share between agencies. It is 
important that agencies develop a policy-based process, through ongoing agency 
collaboration, to share this sensitive information. The implication is that ongoing agency 
participation with the state fusion center is vitally important to allow threat-related 
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information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with different skills and expertise, and 
then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously. 
The 9/11 Commission, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 
published recommendations to help protect the nation from another major terrorist attack. 
Many of these recommendations focused directly on information sharing between public 
safety agencies (“State & Major Urban,” 2014). Since the 9/11 attacks, federal, state, and 
local governments have invested billions of dollars and countless work hours in an 
attempt to protect the public from violent attacks. Threat-related information sharing at 
the federal level has improved since the tragic events of 9/11; however, there is a lack of 
information on how local public safety agencies share this same type of information. 
Therefore, it is vitally important that more research is focused on this topic, because 
rather than violent attacks on the public decreasing from year to year throughout the 
nation, they are increasing at an alarming rate.   
Conclusion 
Horrendous attacks such as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting 
(Chuck, Johnson, & Siemaszkoin, 2018) in Parkland, Florida, clearly demonstrate that 
individuals who strive to commit violence can strike anywhere without warning, whether 
they are recruited and trained by extremist organizations or self-motivated. Local public 
safety organizations must work together to adapt to this new asymmetrical threat 
environment. Local threat-related information gathering and sharing capabilities must be 
improved between the public safety organizations who are tasked with the responsibility 
of keeping the public safe.  
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The responsibility to keep the public free from violent attacks cannot be assigned 
solely to federal agencies or even to local law enforcement organizations. It must be a 
shared responsibility between multiple agencies. As one of the participants in this study 
so articulately pointed out, “It is going to take all of us to be responsive, not just one 
agency. Security is not one agency’s responsibility, it is all of our responsibility” 
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Thank you for your interest in my dissertation research, to identify and explore the 
benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety 
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii. The purpose of this letter is to go over some important 
issues and to obtain your signature on the attached Informed Consent form.  
 
I will be utilizing an exploratory qualitative process that will allow me to capture a 
comprehensive description of your experience. I hope to answer the following: 
 
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information 
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information be-
tween public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
Specifically, I am looking for your thoughts and feelings about the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu and what can be done to improve information exchange between these 
agencies.   
 
All of the information you share with me will be stored in a secure manner. Any 
demographic information that may connect you to the information will be removed. A 
copy of your transcript will be e-mailed to you for review and you can make any 
revisions you feel are necessary, prior to it being entered into the study.  
 
I value your participation and contribution to my study and thank you for your 
commitment of personal time. If you have any further questions or concerns feel free to 
contact me at [telephone number redacted], or [e-mail address redacted]. 
 
Sincerely, 







Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Part I: Overview 
 
Overview 
1. Interviews recorded (with permission) 
2. Interview conducted in a neutral setting 
3. Interview time period 60 to 90 minutes  
 
Interview Methodology  
The methodology involved in this research study will include conversational style in-
depth interviews. Follow-up questions used to stimulate conversation, if needed. A semi 
structured question design will be utilized. Interviews will include:  
1. 10 predetermined questions  
2. Identical questions for all participants  
 
Location of Interview: To be determined 
Date: To be determined  
Start Time: Prearranged time 
Finish Time: 60 to 90 minutes 
 
Part II: Interview Components 
 
1. Interview Components  
a. Introduction  
b. Consent and confidentiality agreement review 
c. Interview 
 
2. Purpose of the interview  
The purpose of the research was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-
related information between public safety agencies (law enforcement, fire services, EMS, 
and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii 
 
3. Permission to record interview  
I would like to tape-record our discussion, with your permission. Only I will have access 
to the recording. No responses will be ascribed to you by name. The research results will 
describe in summary what is said during the conversation. The recording will be erased 
after the dissertation is completed. 
 
The interview will consist of open-ended questions intended to obtain your personal 
experience and perceptions. The interview is scheduled to last 60 to 90 minutes. If you 





Part III: Interview Questions  
 
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety 
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
2. How does sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations 
help identify and prevent threats to the public? 
 
3. How does communication software play a role in the sharing of threat-related 
information? 
 
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related information between public 
safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to sharing threat-
related information between public safety organizations.  
 
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related information between 
public safety organizations? 
 
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
8. What role could agency policies, within your organization, play in improving the 
sharing of threat-related information? 
 
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your organization that could improve 
the exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations.  
 
10. What is your perception of the current state of threat-related information 




Appendix C: Chart Linking Research Questions to Interview Questions 
Interview questions RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii? 
RQ1   
2. How does sharing threat-related information 
between public safety organizations help identify 
and prevent threats to the public? 
RQ1(a)   
3. How does communication software play a role in 
the sharing of threat-related information? 
RQ1(b)   
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related 
information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 RQ2  
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your 
organization, to sharing threat-related information 
between public safety organizations.  
 RQ2(a)  
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of 
threat-related information between public safety 
organizations? 
 RQ2(b)  
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of 
threat-related information between public safety 
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
  RQ3 
8. What role could agency policies, within your 
organization, play in improving the sharing of 
threat-related information? 
  RQ3(a) 
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your 
organization that could improve the exchange of 
threat-related information between public safety 
organizations.  
  RQ3(b) 
10. What is your perception of the current state of 
threat-related information exchange between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?  





Appendix D: Coding Protocol 
A process of coding will be utilized to assist with the process of analyzing the 
data. The key to coding is to allow themes to emerge from the data that makes sense to 
the researcher. Creswell (2013) stated that researchers should develop a codebook for 
each research study. To ensure that I have captured the essence of the of the interviews I 
will use a coding strategy that consists of first reading through all of the transcripts to get 
a deep understanding of what took place in the interviews. I will also thoroughly review 
my written notes, making memos of important facts and details.  
The next step will include classifying the data. Creswell (2013) pointed out 
“coding involves aggregating text into small categories of information” and then 
assigning an appropriate label (p. 184). I will then develop a short list of codes, or a 
codebook, which will be expanded upon as I continue processing the data (Creswell, 
2013). Lastly, I will separate all the codes into four or five overarching themes that will 
assist me while writing my discussion and narrative of the data. I will utilize NVivo 
computer software throughout the coding process. 
Reference 
Creswell, J. W. (2013) Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five 
approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
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Appendix E: Code Book 
Code name Description Sources References 
Information flow The consistent and effective 
exchange of information  
13 97 
Between state and county Information sharing between 
state and county organizations 
4 8 
Co-locate dispatch Locating the 911 dispatch 
centers for all public safety 
organizations in the same 
location 
1 2 
Communication Effective communication 
between organizations 
4 7 
Include decision makers Include decision makers in the 
decision-making process 
2 9 
Information sharing in real time Information sharing in real-
time 
7 13 
Less information than before Agencies are sharing less 
information 
4 6 
Right information to right people Ensuring the right information 
gets to the right people within 
a public safety organization 
8 19 
Sharing information internally Sharing information internally 
within a public safety 
organization  
6 13 
Withholding information Threat-related information is 
withheld/not shared for some 
reason 
6 14 
Threat information not acted 
upon 
Threat related information is 
not acted upon by a public 
safety organization 
6 10 
Collaboration Working with another 
organization cooperatively to 
achieve a goal  
13 70 
After action report Agencies complete after action 
reports 
1 1 
Agencies are equally invested Agencies are equally invested 5 6 
Coordinated response Agencies coordinate response 
to incidents 
6 9 
Coordination of resources Agencies coordinate their 
resources during a response 
4 7 
Engagement with the visitor 
industry 
Agencies engage with the 
Hawaii visitor industry 
1 1 
Everyone on the same page All agencies on the same page 






Code name Description Sources References 
Common operating picture Common operating picture, all 
agencies have the same 
operating information in real-
time during an incident 
3 6 
Interoperability Agencies work together as one 8 12 
Obligated to share Agencies are obligated to 
share threat related 
information 
1 1 
Fusion center State agency - primary 
purpose is analysis and sharing 
of threat-related information 
11 56 




TTO Threat Team Oahu  1 1 
Validating threats Determining if a potential 
threat is valid  
3 5 
Confidential information Information that is sensitive or 
protected  
12 48 
Clearances Agencies have personnel that 
have the proper national 
security clearances to view 
classified information 
2 3 
    
Goes to the wrong people Confidential information leaks 
to people outside public safety 
7 15 
Gets out to the news media Confidential information leaks 
to the news media 
4 9 
    
Law enforcement confidential 
informants 
Law enforcement confidential 
informants 
1 2 
Need to know Individuals within public 
safety organizations that have 




People must be vetted Individuals within public 
safety organizations should be 




Understand when to share 
confidential information 
Individuals within public 
safety organizations know 






Code name Description Sources References 
Agency culture The culture within the 
organization 
11 45 
Allocation of funding Allocation of funding 1 1 
Buy in Agency willingness to actively 
participate 
7 17 
Control over information Attempting to control 
information 
7 12 
Wants the credit Agency seeks credit for 
accomplishments  
5 8 
Different abilities Public safety agencies have 
different skillsets and unique 
areas of expertise  
11 38 
Different jargon Public safety agencies use 
different and unique jargon 
within their organizations 
1 2 
Different knowledge base Public Safety agencies hold 
different and unique 
knowledge base within their 
organizations 
5 8 
Different perspectives Public Safety agencies have 
different perspectives 
depending on their field of 
public safety 
5 10 
Medical perspective Individuals with medical 
training can view situations 
with a health/medical 
perspective 
7 17 
Policy Policy issues within a public 
safety organization  
11 29 
Accountability Public safety organizations are 
accountable for their actions 
2 2 
Discipline for not following 
policy 
Public safety organizations 
personnel are disciplined for 
not following policy 
1 1 
FIRPA Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), Federal 
law that protects the privacy of 
student education records 
1 1 
Not enforcing policy Public safety organizations 
that do not enforce their 







Code name Description Sources References 
Responder safety The safety of a public safety 
organizations responders 
10 28 
Police Police officer safety 5 11 
Fire Fire fighter safety 4 7 
EMS Paramedic safety 4 13 
Secure websites Websites that have enhanced 
security features to ensure 
only vetted individuals can 
access 
10 24 
HSIN Homeland security 
information network 
3 3 
LEEP  Law enforcement enterprise 
portal 
1 1 
Politics Activities associated with 
local governance 
9 21 
Political will to share 
information 
An organization’s political 
will to share information 
3 3 
Unions A labor union or trade union 3 5 
Training Information sharing training 5 20 
Cross training of personnel Training personnel across 
agencies to perform duties 
1 2 
Lack of training A lack of training pertaining to 
information sharing 
3 6 
Training together Agencies training together 1 1 
Electronic communication Communication using 
electronic devices 
8 18 
Email Information sharing through 
email 
1 2 
Push notifications to the public Information is shared to a 
wide audience via text 
messages to the public 
3 4 
Virtual communication Webcasts/virtual meetings 2 2 
Safety of the public The safety of the public  7 15 
HIDTA High intensity drug trafficking 
area – A federal law 
enforcement program 
3 12 
WSIN Western states information 
network - A federal law 
enforcement program 
2 6 
Personnel shortage Lack of personnel 8 11 
Lack of finances Lack of budget 8 11 
(table continues)  
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Code name Description Sources References 
Deconfliction The attempt to reduce the 
possibility of undercover law 
enforcement personnel 
accidently encountering each 
other by sharing information 
on their operational 
movements 
3 10 
Software Digital programs used by a 
computer 
5 9 
Cyber attack Digital software attack 2 2 
Hacking gaining of unauthorized access 
to a computer 
1 1 
eGuardian Federal law enforcement web 
portal 
1 1 
Misallocation of resources Resources are not put to the 
best use 
5 9 
Misallocation of human capital Human capital is not put to its 
best use 
3 5 
Homeless Individuals who have no 
permanent residence  
2 7 
Meetings Formal meetings between 
public safety agencies 
2 6 
Discussions Informal discussions among 
agency representatives  
2 3 
Social media Websites that allow users to 
participate in sharing social 
information 
3 5 
Misinformation Inaccurate information 2 2 
APEC Asian pacific economic 
cooperation a regional 
economic meeting involving 
world leaders  
3 5 
Single point of failure An individual, or part of a 
system, which if fails may 
cause the entire system to fail 
2 4 
Education Training in information 
sharing  
2 3 
View threat info as LE An individual or organization 
that views threat information 
as a law enforcement 
responsibility 
3 3 
See something say something National see something say 
something campaign 
3 3 
(table continues)  
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Code name Description Sources References 
Non-law enforcement left out Agencies that are not 
responsible for law 
enforcement responsibilities 
are not given threat-related 
information  
1 2 
SLEC Hawaii state law enforcement 
coalition  
1 2 
Lack of time Not enough time to complete 
operational tasks 
1 1 
JTTF Joint terrorism task force - A 










I would first like to sincerely thank you for participating in this doctoral field test.  
 
I am currently in the process of completing dissertation research on the benefits and 
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in 
Honolulu, Hawaii.  
 
The general overarching problem addressed in this study is the importance of 
communication between public safety agencies as they deal with serious emerging threat-
related issues such as terrorism. It is unknown whether there are challenges or benefits to 
sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies in the United 
States. The findings of this study will help to fill this gap in the literature by determining 
the perceived benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii. 
 
Multiple factors affect the sharing of information between public safety organizations 
including technical and political issues, as well as the lack of communication and 
coordination between agencies. These problems will be addressed in this research by 
examining how public safety agencies share threat-related information between one 
another. The intention is to explore any possible issues that might reduce their ability to 
prevent terror attacks.  
 
The theoretical framework that I am using for this study is General Systems Theory.  
 
For this research I hope to answer the following Research Questions: 
 
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information 
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information 
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information be-
tween public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
I plan to ask the following Interview Questions to the participants: 
 
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety 




2. How does sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations 
help identify and prevent threats to the public? 
 
3. How does communication software play a role in the sharing of threat-related in-
formation? 
 
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related information between public 
safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to sharing threat-
related information between public safety organizations.  
 
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related information between 
public safety organizations? 
 
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between 
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? 
 
8. What role could agency policies, within your organization, play in improving the 
sharing of threat-related information? 
 
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your organization that could improve 
the exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations.  
 
10. What is your perception of the current state of threat-related information ex-
change between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?  
 
By conducting this research, I hope to explore the benefits and challenges that exist in 
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations.  Experienced 
public safety officials will be interviewed utilizing open-ended questions.  
 
Please record below any suggestions that you have regarding the purpose of this study, 
the proposed research questions, proposed interview questions, or the process for 
























Please return the form with your feedback in the enclosed postage paid envelope. If you 
have any questions, please contact me at [telephone number redacted]. Your time and 
input for this doctoral study are greatly appreciated! 
 
Sincerely,  
Cort M. Chambers 
 
